199. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1677. 1. There is given below the text of an “Estimate of Viet Cong Situation” drafted by the Mission Intelligence Committee and concurred in by Ambassador Porter and General Westmoreland which I have found of value and believe will be of interest to concerned Washington agencies:
2. “The basic trends and patterns in the situation noted in our last estimate (19 August 1965)2 have continued through October. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts reflect determination to continue the war, and Viet Cong forces are maintaining relatively strong military pressure. Following a brief decline in Viet Cong activity in September, which may have marked the transition from the largely frustrated summer campaign to the current autumn-winter campaign, the tempo of Viet Cong actions has risen to the highest levels in over a year. The scene of major operations appears to have shifted with the rainy season from the highlands to the coastal provinces, with large-scale attacks recorded in Quang Tri, Phu Yen, and Binh Dinh. Nevertheless, current activity in Pleiku Province indicated that the enemy retains significant capabilities in the highlands.
3. “No regimental-size operations have been mounted by the Viet Cong since June in the III Corps area. Viet Cong main force units in this region apparently have been kept off balance by US-GVN ground and air operations, which have inflicted substantial losses in terms of equipment and supplies. Viet Cong capabilities in this area evidently are being reinforced, however, by the movement of North Vietnamese Army elements from the highlands and the continuing flow of Viet Cong elements coming from the Delta.
4. “Activity in the Delta has increased markedly during the past two months, but consists largely of small-scale harassments and sabotage activities. The lack of aggressive large-scale attacks in this area suggests that the capabilities of main force units have been temporarily reduced by the transfer of cadres and troops to other areas. Nevertheless, the sizeable Viet Cong forces remaining in the Delta appear capable of maintaining their hold on wide areas of the countryside.
5. “The build-up of Viet Cong conventional military capabilities is continuing, despite the heavy losses suffered in large-scale engagements. [Page 564] Documents captured in the Delta in August directed the upgrading of half of the village guerrillas to permit the build-up of main force units. This extraordinary measure, which could produce enough manpower to form two or three new regiments, was rationalized in the documents as necessary to restore the balance of forces which had been upset by the introduction of U.S. and allied ground combat units.
6. “Paralleling this internal reinforcement, the enemy has infiltrated a number of additional North Vietnamese Army elements in recent months. Two additional regimental-sized North Vietnamese Army units have been identified, and there are indications that at least two others may also have arrived. While some of these may comprise cadre groups to permit the creation of new Viet Cong main force units, others apparently are integral North Vietnamese Army combat units. In either case, these elements, well equipped with modern small arms and heavy weapons, represent a significant reinforcement of Viet Cong capabilities.
7. “Paralleling the continuing build-up of Viet Cong forces is the construction of a motorable road from North Viet-Nam through the Laos panhandle to a point at least as far south as Kontum Province. This main route, which is nearing completion, together with lateral roads leading into South Viet-Nam at several points, will permit a substantial increase in the flow of supplies and equipment through Laos, and may replace the now insecure sea infiltration route as the principal axis for Viet Cong logistical support. With a dependable supply route capable of moving ammunition in quantities, the capabilities of Viet Cong forces in the highlands to sustain large-scale operations will be enhanced. Their forces in the Delta, however, will remain largely dependent on shipments by sea or via Cambodia.
8. “Politically and psychologically, the Viet Cong position is less favorable. Although many of the basic factors which contributed to political instability in Saigon last year remain unresolved, the rebuff of the Viet Cong summer campaign and the U.S. and allied military build-up have removed popular fears of an early Viet Cong victory and thereby enhanced the prospects for governmental stability. Nevertheless, the Ky government remains subject to political pressure from the Viet Cong and from opposing political circles. The government has not had time to demonstrate progress in implementing its programs and faces growing economic difficulties. An effective, integrated pacification program is only in the early stages. Repeated success by security forces in uncovering terrorist and propaganda rings in urban areas have disrupted Viet Cong capabilities in this field and shaken the confidence of their clandestine agents. The Liberation Front suffered a significant psychological setback when the populace generally ignored the Front’s unprecedented propaganda appeal for a general strike and hour of silence on 15 October to commemorate the anniversary of the execution of a Viet Cong terrorist. [Page 565] The failure of this appeal, and the absence thus far of any spectacular terrorist acts during the much-heralded, month-long ‘Hate America’ campaign represent a blow to Viet Cong prestige among the populace which they may try to recoup. Despite these failures terrorism remains a potent Viet Cong weapon, and the Viet Cong can be expected to make concerted efforts to embarrass and harass Americans through terrorist attacks.
9. “There are growing signs of declining morale among Viet Cong military units as well as in the population in Viet Cong-dominated areas. This decline appears to be the result of tactical setbacks and the impact of sustained U.S.-GVN air attacks on Viet Cong areas. It is reflected in the growing rate of deflections and Chieu Hoi ralliers, as well as in captured documents, statements of captives, and the defensive tone of Front propaganda. Although the Communists have overcome morale setbacks before through extensive indoctrination programs, no significant improvement in Viet Cong morale is likely in the absence of some successes on the battlefield which they are certain to seek.
10. “Viet Cong economic fortunes have been mixed. Their propaganda is actively exploiting the rising cost of living throughout Viet-Nam. Viet Cong efforts to disrupt the economy further and thereby add to inflationary trends are reflected in their continuing sabotage of communications lines and their imposition of an embargo on the flow of goods to markets in some GVN-controlled areas. On the other hand, economic hardships are increasing in Viet Cong-dominated areas. There are indications that their tax collections are not sufficient to meet their financial requirements despite increasingly heavy tax rates. Moreover, the income of farmers has been further reduced by the restrictions on delivery of goods to markets.
11. “In view of their mixed prospects, it is pertinent to review the alternatives which the Viet Cong may adopt in pursuing their aims in South Viet-Nam. The broad alternate approaches open to them are: a) major overt escalation in order to seek an early military decision; b) continuation of the current strategy of augmenting their capabilities for the gradual transition to conventional warfare; c) reversion to a lesser scale of insurgency; or d) a negotiated settlement.
12. “Although the first course offers prospects for quick success, it carries with it the risk of triggering a massive U.S. response. While North Vietnamese ground forces possess considerable strength, disruption of the lines of communication in the north by U.S.-GVN airstrikes may have restricted the size of forces which could be supported in a conventional invasion of the south. The extent of this restriction has not yet been determined. North Vietnamese air capabilities remain weak, and while these could be augmented by the commitment of Chinese Communist air units, the latter course would risk U.S. retaliation against the Chinese [Page 566] Mainland. Despite its continuing propaganda bombast, Peking has shown no inclination to risk general war with the U.S., and its actions in support of North Viet-Nam have been essentially defensive in scope. U.S. airstrikes on the north and the deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Viet-Nam must have raised doubts in Peking regarding their image of the U.S. as a “paper tiger,” and created uncertainties as to how the U.S. would react to any further escalation of the war. Peking may also hold back because it sees no need to change its past strategy, except to strengthen its support to the DRV.
13. “The second alternative—continuing the build-up for transition to conventional warfare—may be viewed by the Communists as carrying less risk of provoking any new major escalation by the U.S. This course is in accordance with Chinese and North Viet-Nam’s doctrinal concepts of “liberation wars,” and any deviation from it would be difficult for them to rationalize to their adherents. Both Hanoi and the Liberation Front had stated that their major aim for this year was the build-up of Viet Cong capabilities to achieve a strategic balance of force as a prelude to the general counteroffensive. There is evidence that they concluded this summer that this goal is still attainable, despite the build-up of U.S. and allied forces, and that they have undertaken new measures to restore the balance. Lines of communication from the north are adequate to sustain the infiltration and operations of a limited number of additional North Vietnamese Army units. Although the Viet Cong have suffered substantial losses in large-scale operations, their replacement system appears effective and the Communists do not seem thus far to have been deterred from continuing such actions. The Communists may calculate that this alternative, combined with extensive terrorism—a course which proved successful against the French—offers the best prospects for wearing down the will and determination of the U.S. to continue the war. If their build-up permits them to regain the initiative and momentum on the battlefield which they enjoyed earlier this year, they may feel that the impact on ARVN and civilian morale will cause a resumption of political instability which could prove decisive on the outcome of the war.
14. “The third alternative—reversion to a lesser level of insurgency—would entail serious risks to Viet Cong morale. The Communists might feel that, by foregoing large-scale attacks and diverting their main forces units to support of local forces in small-scale guerrilla actions, their vulnerability to air attacks and large-scale sweeps by U.S.-GVN forces would be reduced. The Communists would encounter substantial problems, however, in rationalizing this doctrinally. Moreover, the loss of momentum would almost certainly cause a major drop in the morale of Viet Cong troops and political cadres, and result in a substantial increase in defections which could reach disastrous proportions for [Page 567] the Viet Cong. It would similarly enhance the confidence of the civilian populace int he ultimate defeat of the Viet Cong. Although guerrilla activity would continue to disrupt lines of communication and harass pacified areas, U.S.-GVN forces would be able to devote more support of rural construction programs and permit the gradual extension of GVN control into areas now held by the Viet Cong. Thus the Communists would risk substantial—and possibly irretrievable—losses to their position by adopting this alternative.
15. “The fourth alternative—seeking a negotiated settlement—also offers mixed blessings to the Communists. The Viet Cong would first negotiate to gain time to build their strength and undermine ours and second to gain a satisfactory settlement. Doctrinally, negotiations would be a feasible alternative if their outcome assured attainment of their ultimate goals, which are unchanged. If their position became progressively weaker through the failure of other alternatives, so that a favorable settlement were not feasible, they might prefer a withering away of the Viet Cong insurgency to embarking on fruitless negotiations. In any event, they are unlikely to seek negotiations, unit they are convinced that victory through other means is not possible.
16. “Current indications point to the second alternative—continuation of the build-up of Viet Cong capabilities for conventional operations. These indications include: a) evidence of the infiltration of additional military units from North Viet-Nam; b) the build-up of main force units at the expense of village guerrilla units; c) captured documents of late July stating that Viet Cong goals for 1965 remain unchanged; d) continued confidence and determination to press the war as reflected in Hanoi and Liberation Front statements; e) final construction of a motorable supply south through Laos; f) resumption of large-scale attacks despite losses suffered in previous actions; and g) the marked increase in Viet Cong activity since early October; h) continued development of North Viet-Nam’s air defense capabilities, with Chinese and Soviet support, to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. air strikes and enhance the ability of the DRV to survive them; and i) the continuing fragility of the GVN and its vulnerability to Viet Cong pressures.
17. “In conclusion, we believe the enemy will continue for the next several months at least on his current course of action. We believe the Viet Cong are forming new main force units within South Viet-Nam, and will infiltrate additional units—perhaps the equivalent of one or two divisions—from the north. By doing so, the Communists will hope to restore a strategic balance of forces in order to regain the initiative through a combination of large-scale attacks and widespread guerrilla action. Their purpose will be to expand their base areas, inflict maximum attrition on U.S. and GVN elite units, erode U.S. determination to continue the war, and weaken Vietnamese morale with a view to creating conditions [Page 568] favorable for the collapse of the GVN. We do not expect the Viet Cong to revert to a lesser level of insurgency or to seek a negotiated settlement until they are convinced that their current course will not succeed. The point is not likely to be reached until the capabilities of the forces now being created and deployed have been neutralized or impaired in battle. The units recently infiltrated from North Vietnam will probably be ready for battle within a month after arrival. It may be three months before units now being created are ready for combat.”