Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

197. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge)¹

Washington, November 10, 1965.

Dear Cabot:

This personal letter is something of a comment on your 1377² which gives much room for thought.

At present we do not see, through all of the processes of diplomatic “osmosis”, an indication that Hanoi is prepared to enter seriously into negotiations on the basis of stopping their aggression against South Viet Nam and establishing peace in Southeast Asia. It is my impression, and this has been reflected by some comments in the Communist world, that there may well be divided views within Hanoi. But these shades of difference do not indicate any decision in Hanoi to hold their hand and make peace.

It may well be that Hanoi and the Viet Cong would prefer to pull back de facto rather than through negotiations. This was the way the Greek guerrilla affair was wound up. From Hanoi’s point of view, a de facto cessation would avoid their having to confess that they were ever doing anything against the South and would avoid commitments with respect to the future. We should always be very alert to significant signs that they are in fact pulling out—but I have not yet seen them.

The subject of “negotiation” is complex and difficult. I am convinced that one of the important strengths of our situation, both at home and abroad, is the demonstration that the obstacle to peace in Southeast Asia is not the United States. I have just finished talking with more than 70 Foreign Ministers—most of whom were here for the opening session of the General Assembly. It seems evident that we have made the point convincingly that the obstacle to peace in Southeast Asia is Hanoi and Peiping. The principal means by which this has been achieved has been a demonstrated readiness on our part to have “negotiations without preconditions”, as the 17 non-aligned nations phrased it, or “unconditional discussions” as the President phrased it.³ The rejection by Hanoi and Peiping of many peace efforts has clarified the policy problems very well.

I also believe that this is an issue which has to do with what might be called “war leadership” of the American people. There is no more peace-loving people in the world. But the American people will do what has to be done if they are convinced that the object is right and that there is no honorable alternative. Our attitude toward negotiation is an integral part of the willingness of our own people to sustain a mean disagreeable struggle half way around the world.

The point which would concern me most would be the idea that the war must be continued because the South Vietnamese authorities with whom we are dealing are afraid of peace. I find it hard to accept the view that the South Vietnamese people would be the first people in history voluntarily to accept a Communist regime through genuinely free elections.All of our effort in South Viet Nam for more than a decade has been based upon the assumption that the South Vietnamese people do not want communism, do not wish it imposed by force, and would not have it if they had a choice. In any event, I see great difficulty in accepting the internal political difficulties of the South Vietnamese as a war aim of the United States. I had supposed that American combat forces are in South Viet Nam because of the infiltration of large numbers of men and large quantities of arms by North Viet Nam into the South. We are there to defend South Viet Nam against external aggression—an attempt to impose a political solution by force upon the South Vietnamese against their own wills.

Frankly, I do not know whether the negotiations will come about in the near future or at all. I do know that it will be contrary to our most fundamental policy to permit negotiations to accomplish what we have resisted by force. It may be that Hanoi and Peiping recognize this elementary point and, therefore, see no possibility of accomplishing their purposes through negotiation. If so, they are well advised.

I realize that the current crop of GVN leaders may be nervous about the idea of negotiations. But they must realize that we have not made the effort and undertaken the burdens of supporting a free South Viet Nam in order to throw in our objectives at a conference table.

I was much interested in the recent conversation you had with the Apostolic Delegate and we shared your skepticism. But if there is any reality in this possibility, nothing could give the entire effort out there a bigger shot in the arm than something important along that line.

We think of you daily and are grateful for the quality and dedication of the job you are doing.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (A). Personal and Secret; Nodis.
2. Document 176.
3. For text of the appeal by 17 nonaligned countries, March 15, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 843-844. President Johnson expressed U.S. readiness for “unconditional discussions” in his address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7; the text is ibid., pp. 848-852. See also vol. II, Document 245.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.