Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 3, 1965.

1544. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram.

1. American popularity—You would have been proud of the U.S. troops at the Vietnam National Day celebration on last Monday, November 1. They looked lean and hard—and tall coming after the Vietnamese. The white and Negro soldiers were inter-mingled—a powerful psychological stroke to a crowd conservatively estimated of non-whites. What particularly impressed me was that when, with their massed flags, they appeared, they were the only troops which drew a great roar of applause from the public. Other formations had drawn applause from the reviewing stand but the crowd of rank and file people on the sidewalk applauded only the United States.

When I attended this same celebration two years ago, the public was nowhere to be seen and was not allowed to be present. Today was the first time everyone was allowed to see the parade. The government’s self-assurance was justified, for there was no terrorism.

In the afternoon I attended the National Day ceremony at the Buddhist Institute. Mine was the only vehicle, either diplomatic or Vietnamese, which, with its flag, received warm and grinning applause from the crowd outside the pagoda.

We Americans are definitely not considered colonial. They think they know us and our non-imperialistic record in the Philippines and Korea and elsewhere. They know that our soldiers are helpful and friendly. Unfortunately the Army of Vietnam still makes enemies.

2. Economic—Happily, retail rice prices continued their slow downward trend despite a continued decline in rice stocks on hand and despite the fact that prices normally rise at this season. Saigon’s needs in rice, which are largely met from private stocks, should be provided for at a reasonable price.

The cost of other local and imported products continued to rise, however, and the retail price index was up 3 percent over last week.

American and Vietnamese representatives agreed on a number of measures to speed up cargo handling and reduce congestion in the port of Saigon.

3. Military—For the third week in a row the pace of the war quickened with the Viet Cong attacking in regimental strength in Phu Yen Province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia Province and against the U.S. Marines’ perimeter outside Danang. Heavy fighting mostly in a battle zone stretching from Phu Yen Province north to Thua Thien Province led to increased casualties on both sides.

The total number of Viet Cong incidents decreased slightly reflecting a decline in the number of anti-aircraft fire and propaganda incidents but the number of Viet Cong attacks went up and terrorism and sabotage increased slightly.

4. Basic political—The number of Viet Cong military or political cadres who came over to the government side during October increased slightly over the September figure continuing a slight but steady upward trend since June.

5. Psychological—Press comment reflected optimism and hopefulness that traditional differences among South Vietnamese religious minorities were diminishing. Press attitudes toward the GVN were generally favorable although complaints continued concerning rising and fluctuating prices and the preference for an elected government.

6. Pacification—Minister Thang of Rural Construction (Pacification) is in the final phase of organizing his Ministry so that he will be free for field supervision of the pacification program in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh starting November 5. After considerable neglect of the program these past two years, and the resignation of most of the Ministry’s civilian staff after the death of Minister Ung, Thang has worked hard to get a competent staff, a doctrine designed to win the voluntary support of villagers, with democratic elections in villages as one major goal, and to make some order out of the many types of cadres assigned to this work by past governments. He got GVN approval for his selection of Colonels Lac, Chau, and Anh to be his chief assistants. All three are highly regarded by Americans for their experience and competency in pacification; the latter two have been outstanding province chiefs.

The political action team training center at Vung Tau, started, funded, and guided by CIA, will be made into a national training center for what the Vietnamese call rural construction and which is truthfully translated as community building. I have visited this center and was favorably impressed. Now the Vietnamese want it to play a key role in building a political structure in this country from the ground up. Also, 73 selected graduates of the National Institute for Administration (NIA) are being given a special course in pacification. Thang, who has been participating in this training of selected civil service civilians, will assign the top third in the class to be assistant district chiefs (or district chief, if this is required) in areas selected for priority attention; the middle third of the class will be used at Vung Tau to strengthen the instructor staff; the last third will be used in the Ministry.

7. Medical program—With a party of journalists, I visited USOM aided hospital at Can Tho where major surgery cases went from 86 in 1963 to 170 in 1965 and minor surgery from 30 to 623 in the same period. Outpatient cases went from some 3,300 in 1964 to some 6,600 in 1965.

I also used the opportunity to have a long private talk with the Corps Commander (one of four political satraps in this country) about the importance of national unity and of everyone pulling together.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:34 a.m. McGeorge Bundy sent a retyped copy of this telegram to the President with the observation that it was “more cheerful than usual.” There is an indication on the White House copy that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVI)