175. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson1
Dear Mr. President:
I wish to make a further suggestion concerning United States posture toward unconditional negotiations on Vietnam.
Contrary to our earlier expectations, the situation in Vietnam did not receive overriding emphasis in the General Assembly’s general debate—a development due primarily to the sudden eruption of the conflict between India and Pakistan.
Vietnam was, of course, the second topic most frequently touched upon in the general debate. It has been encouraging to find not only that the United States role in Vietnam found considerable support but also [Page 469] that criticism of the American role was neither so severe nor so widespread as had been anticipated. Unqualified criticism of our role and full support for Hanoi was voiced by only the Congo (Brazzaville), the Soviet bloc, plus Cuba, Albania and Cambodia (the latter three predictably exceeded all others in harshness); in addition, somewhat less hostile, but still very critical, statements were made by Kenya, Guinea and Mali. On the other hand, the United States position received support from some eighteen countries, including—and this is worthy of particular note—most of those countries in the Far East which are closest to the threat posed by Hanoi’s actions toward South Vietnam. The remainder of the speeches, some with implied criticism of the United States and some with implied criticism of Hanoi, tended to emphasize one of two themes: first, the impossibility of a military solution and the urgency of beginning negotiations (often combined with appeals for a cessation of all hostilities); second, the advocacy of negotiations, coupled with the argument that continued American bombing of North Vietnam virtually rules out negotiations.
It is clear to me that the relatively good treatment the United States role in Vietnam received in the general debate is a direct product of two factors: the frequent reiteration, in months past, of our willingness to begin unconditional negotiations; the excellent work done in Washington and in our Embassies throughout the world to explain the United States goals in Vietnam. In short, the posture the United States has assumed toward negotiations, besides being correct in terms of substance, has proved advantageous in terms of our international image.
Despite the outcome of the general debate, however, I must report that I have sensed some doubt (even among some of our friends) whether we really want negotiations. This doubt has, of course, been compounded by certain statements made recently, as well as by reports of South Vietnam’s opposition to unconditional negotiations. It is generally expressed not in outright questioning of United States sincerity; it takes the form, rather, of a feeling that United States publicly-expressed interest in negotiations may stem less from a desire to begin negotiations immediately than from a desire to maintain a positive international image while improving our military posture for negotiations in the future.
Senator Mansfield’s speech of October 192 was, of course, immensely helpful in countering this undercurrent of doubt. It would be even more helpful, in my view, if there were to be further periodic reiteration by you and the Secretary of both our continued desire for prompt unconditional negotiations and of our willingness to suspend bombings [Page 470] provided there were some assurance North Vietnam would respond with comparable measures to restrain its military activities in the South. I can, of course, emphasize such statements here, as I have in the past, with good effects on other countries.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Negotiation. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the original letter was in the U.N.-Goldberg correspondence file.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 174.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩