172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1361. 1. Henry Kissinger2 and I had lunch with PriMin Ky at Nha Trang Oct 19. Ky has been in Nha Trang recuperating from a bad cold. In [Page 461] relaxed environment Ky discussed problems of a negotiated settlement and his internal political difficulties with considerable candor.
2. When the subject of negotiations came up, Ky stated emphatically that Vietnam was in no position at the present time to negotiate a settlement with Hanoi. He said there were two basic reasons for this: (A) Fragility of internal situation and the continuing presence of political divisions, especially on the civilian side. The political fabric of Vietnam is weakened to the extent that it could not yet compete with the Viet Cong in many parts of the countryside—not because VC are popular, but because of their ruthless organization. (B) The announcement of the acceptance of negotiations could weaken the morale and will to resist Communism to a dangerous extent—even to the point where the ARVN could lose its will to fight with “many soldiers giving up and going home.” Ky said also that he did not think a cease-fire at the present time would do anything but provide a means by which the Viet Cong would further consolidate their hold over those areas of the country which they now controlled. This would in effect perpetuate the partition of South Vietnam into pro-Viet Cong and anti-Communist areas.
3. He said that he believed that Hanoi had made a great error from its viewpoint in not accepting the offer to negotiate several months ago when South Vietnam was in even worse shape politically. Things were a little better now. Nevertheless, much had to be done in reorganizing South Vietnam before the govt would be in a position to deal with the Viet Cong politically on the ground. Viet Cong cadres remained well disciplined and the re-orientation and re-dedication of GVN cadres was yet to be accomplished. Ky said that the military strength of South Vietnam, supported by its allies, had now reached the stage where pacification and strengthening of the govt’s position could proceed so that hopefully in about one year’s time things would be much better.
4. Ky said that the most important political requirement for the immediate future was the maintenance of unity among the various Generals in the armed forces. He said that the only element able to provide necessary leadership in South Vietnam was the armed forces. Civilian political groups had demonstrated their inability to work together and the age-old problems of regionalism and religious differences were such that any govt built around one group would automatically draw to itself such internal political opposition from others that it could not survive. In the circumstances the armed forces must seek to rise above sectional and religious differences. They were capable of doing so because its various people for years had been used to working together regardless of traditional factional factors.
5. He then described a recent conversation with General Co, Deputy PriMin, and other military leaders in which he had impressed upon them the importance of maintaining their unity. This plea, he said, [Page 462] had been occasioned by the interjection of regional and religious differences over the appointment of certain key officers in the last governmental changes. He claimed that as a result of conversations among the Generals, unity had been reaffirmed and the situation was quieter.
6. Ky said that he recognized the importance of enlisting the support of various non-military elements in the work of the govt. He was hopeful that the recent conferences of province chiefs and provincial council reps was a first step in securing a wider participation of all key elements in the community. He intended that such confs would now take place at the regional level to be followed later by another national conf. In this way people would get to know each other and used to working with each other. It would give him the chance to weed out any Communist sympathizers. A national advisory council drawn from the provincial councils and leading sects and groups to serve as a consultative group for the govt would be created. He would see how the first steps now being taken work before formalizing any such arrangements. Its work should be limited to matters which did not embarrass the govt in the conduct of foreign relations or which did not endanger the security of the state.
7. Finally, Ky said that he was placing great emphasis on the new pacification and rural construction effort which was getting underway under the leadership of General Co and General Thang. Cadre reorganization and training would soon begin and he wanted to get the program in action in primary areas: Danang-Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, and the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh area. He asked for full support from the U.S. for these efforts, which I assured him was going to be forthcoming. He said that over the next year he expected that these efforts would yield great results and he expressed confidence in the ability of the govt to re-organize itself to meet the needs of the fundamental political and social economic struggle in the countryside.
8. When I was alone with Gen Ky after lunch, I brought up our concern over the leakage of info to the Viet Cong about military operations. We knew that it worried him as much as it did us. He agreed and said that this was due largely to the frequent changes which had taken place in the GVN and in the military structure. Whenever there were changes, it gave the Communists the chance to work in. He assured me of his best efforts.
9. I took occasion to express the hope that whenever sentence is passed on prisoners that it be publicly made very clear that the punishment was commensurate with the offense. His treatment of prisoners concerned us very intimately because of the fate of our own prisoners. He said he understood and agreed to cooperate.
10. Coming back to the problem of inflation, I stressed the points which had been put to him by Mann at a previous meeting and went on to make a few suggestions as follows: he should particularly watch the [Page 463] prices of the important staples which the people eat, such as rice, nuoc mam, milk, pork, etc. Ky said that he was having this done. I said that it was not too difficult to watch these and that he was in a position to act affirmatively, and that action was better than words or a futile attempt to set up a big administrative structure.
11. I cited reports of Viet Cong in ARVN uniforms diverting truckloads of rice. I pointed out that the police were not allowed to arrest anybody in uniform and that therefore the Vietnamese military should establish checkpoints to stop these trucks and verify the presence of Viet Cong in army uniform.
12. I especially suggested establishing a few emergency sales outlets in Saigon for children and the needy where the scarce staples could be sold at govt price. This was something simple and it too was action rather than words. Yet it would create favorable sentiment for the govt. He could later consider the question of giving some food away.
13. I referred to the congestion in the port of Saigon. He had obviously thought about this a great deal and felt it was not due to trouble with labor unions, but to a very real labor shortage.
14. He referred specifically to a pier owned by the Messageries Maritimes, a French steamship line under control of the French Govt. This pier was not in use and yet the steamship line refused to make it available. General Ky told me finally he had decided to requisition the pier.
15. Comment: This refusal to make an unused pier available to the Vietnamese or to the American military is widely believed to be a direct manifestation of De Gaulle’s anti-American policy. How this helps the French colony in Vietnam, or how it helps the rank and file French people in France, or how it can be considered the reaction of an ally are questions the answers to which do not exist here.
16. Every time I see General Ky, I am impressed with the way in which he has grown, in knowledge of this job, in judgment and in general stature. If fate enables him to stay on the job for a reasonable period of time, he could become a first class political leader in the best sense of the term. If there are govts in this world which have a man of much better quality and potential than General Ky, then I do not know what they are.
17. When, therefore, I read Dar-es-Salaam’s no. 113 in which Nyerere speaks seriously of “establishing a broader based regime,” I am astounded. I presume the phrase “broader based regime” means putting in the Communists which, of course, means taking out General Ky. I can understand why a Communist would suggest this, but I cannot understand why anyone should consider it other than a crass attempt at gaining [Page 464] by political intrigue what they have not been able to obtain in other ways.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USUN and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 5:52 a.m.↩
- Henry Kissinger recalls that Lodge asked him to visit South Vietnam as a consultant. He toured the country for 2 weeks in late October and early November talking with civilian and military leaders. See White House Years, pp. 231-233. Records of 12 of Kissinger’s “more important” conversations were transmitted in airgram A-285 from Saigon, November 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
- In this telegram, October 18, sent to the Department of State as telegram 757 and repeated to Saigon, Ambassador William Leonhart reported a conversation on Vietnam with Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere. (Ibid.)↩