Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 20, 1965.

1356. For Secretary from Ambassador. Your 1058.²

A. I believe that substantially increased deployment such as is envisioned in Phase 2 would have a good political effect because it would enable us effectively to destroy or neutralize the VC main force units and destroy their present redoubts more quickly than is now the case. This would surely help the GVN in getting an effective community building pacification program going.

B. Clearly an increase in U.S. personnel has possibilities for friction, but I think a long, drawn out American military presence creates more friction in the end than a shorter presence with the people.

C. The contemplated timing is satisfactory.

D. CIA believes and I concur that the VC is working hard to restore the old balance which our U.S. presence has upset. In other words, we have achieved some momentum and should not only maintain, but increase it if we can.

Comment: The President, Secretary McNamara and yourself can take pride in both the diversified scope and thoroughness of the present American effort here, which I believe is quite unprecedented. The extent to which all Americans are pulling together is noteworthy. I feel that some very big things are being created of which Phase 2 is an important part. But if for any reason you cannot undertake Phase 2, I believe we can still do big things with what we have, although it will take longer. If a feeling should catch hold among the people that they have a real stake in this government, things could go very fast indeed. Of this, however, there is as yet no dependable sign.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central File, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:26 a.m.
2. In telegram 1058, October 19, Rusk asked Lodge to send him privately his reaction to three questions concerning the proposed second phase deployment of U.S. troops to Vietnam. The answers provided by Lodge would aid in the consideration of the issue in Washington. The first question concerned the need for such substantially increased deployment, the second related to the problems such deployment might create in Vietnam, and the third question dealt with the best timing and phasing for such deployment if the U.S. Government decided to undertake it. (Ibid.)