Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

168. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 14, 1965, 8 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DINNER FOR RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER Manescu

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Assistant Secretary John Leddy
  • Ambassador-Designate Richard H. Davis
  • Raymond E. Lisle, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs
• Rumanian
  • Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Mircea Malita
  • Ambassador Petre Balaceanu
  • Ion Baschiru, Counselor, Rumanian Embassy
  • Sergiu Celac, interpreter

The Secretary said there is no lack of means for communicating with Hanoi, Peiping or Moscow, but we have no evidence yet that they are prepared to talk. We have the impression that Hanoi might be willing to talk, and that Moscow would like to see talks take place, but that Peiping is the real obstacle. Nevertheless, there has been some progress. Hanoi no longer denies the existence of infiltration into South Vietnam from the North, and they no longer insist upon a complete withdrawal of US forces as a precondition for discussions. They still insist, however, that any settlement must be on terms imposed by the NLF—a condition which the US can never accept.

The Rumanians, according to Manescu, have some contacts with Hanoi. Since Hanoi is no longer insisting on withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam as a prerequisite to negotiations, it is unfortunate that the United States apparently cannot consider the cessation of bombings.

The Secretary said we very definitely can think of stopping the bombing. The Government has promised its own people—and this should be convincing—that American troops will be withdrawn as soon as North Vietnam ceases its attempt to impose its system on the people of South Vietnam by force. But Hanoi still insists on acceptance of the NLF program as a prerequisite to negotiations. We cannot accept the imposition of the NLF on South Vietnam—whether by Hanoi, a combination of Hanoi and Peiping, or of Hanoi and Moscow. The Secretary said he was prepared to go to Geneva tomorrow if Hanoi would agree to negotiate without preconditions. There is hope that we may see moves toward peace in Vietnam early next year. It appears that there are divided counsels in Hanoi. The Foreign Minister said he hoped the Secretary was not being too optimistic. The US may be taking external signs as indications of division in Hanoi.

The US has sufficient contact with Hanoi and with Peiping, according to the Secretary. Apart from our own regular contacts, there are many people who are constantly offering their services. At critical moments, however, when there seems to be possibility for agreement, Peiping moves to get in the way of a settlement. Mr. Manescu asked whether the four points made by NVN are unacceptable. The Secretary replied that three of the four points are negotiable. One is entirely unacceptable—imposing the NLF program on the people of South Vietnam.

The Foreign Minister said that one of his colleagues had suggested that, in view of Rumania’s relations with Hanoi, it should try to do something. Mr. Manescu had replied that in his view a solution could be reached only by direct talks and that Rumania could not act as a mediator.

The Secretary said that we have our own contacts with Hanoi and he was not asking Mr. Manescu to act as a mediator. One could never tell, however, what channel, direct or indirect, might be used. If Rumania should pick up a signal he would only ask Mr. Manescu to make sure that the signal was not blocked. The Foreign Minister replied that he would inform his Government of this request.

Rumania wants its relations with the US to be better than “normal”. The present situation in Southeast Asia could create very great problems. The Foreign Minister said that so far as Vietnam is concerned, he would be saying too little if he said only that we were in disagreement. Rumania cannot understand the US position. The dangers of escalation are always high and the ladder of escalation is one which is very difficult to descend. In the Rumanian view a military solution is impossible; the problem of Vietnam can be solved only by the Vietnamese.

The Secretary pointed out that we had suffered a great disappointment in Southeast Asia. President Kennedy had come into office and taken a new look at Laos and concluded that if the Laotians were left alone they would not be interested in killing each other. Both the President and Khrushchev had agreed at Vienna that everyone should leave the Laotians to themselves. Thus the Geneva Conference of 1962. We had withdrawn our military, but Hanoi had never accepted the agreement, and had never had less than 6,000 troops in Laos. Nor has NVN stopped using Laos as an infiltration route into South Vietnam. We do not hold Moscow guilty of bad faith, but it is a disappointment to us, since we had hoped it would be the first step to peace in Southeast Asia.

The Foreign Minister asked, “How do you think that the US will emerge from this mixed-up and venturous program in Southeast Asia?”

The Secretary replied that he did not know. The choice is between peace, which is possible if North Vietnam leaves South Vietnam alone, or war. This is the agonizing problem. The US would not object if South Vietnam should decide by free and peaceful means to join with North Vietnam. We cannot permit North Vietnam to impose this unity by force, however. We will remain only so long as Hanoi persists in seeking to impose its solution by force. If North Vietnam continues to use force for 20 years, we also will be there for 20 years. If North Vietnam thinks it can wait until the US loses interest and withdraws its forces, it is wrong. Moscow understands that we cannot accept a forceful change in the status quo, just as Moscow itself would not accept a change in the status quo by force. But Hanoi does not understand this.

The Foreign Minister suggested that perhaps the US should look at the opinions of other countries, to which the Secretary replied that we had done so and are doing so. The 17 unaligned nations have urged negotiations without conditions; we have agreed, but Hanoi has said no. The British Commonwealth had tried to send a group to Peiping, but China had responded by calling the British Prime Minister a nit-wit. Hanoi had sent a delegation to Moscow, but Peiping had moved to block all possibility of agreement.

The Foreign Minister remarked that Cambodia had put forward a sound proposal some years ago, but the US had rejected it. The Secretary pointed out that we had thought that before there was a general conference there should first be bilateral discussions between Cambodia and Thailand, and Cambodia and South Vietnam. We had used our influence to that end, but Prince Sihanouk had been unwilling to discuss any problems with his neighbors. At any rate, that was three years ago. The Laotian settlement of 1962 had been a critical moment in the move toward peace, but Hanoi had rejected it.

In response to a remark that in the long run everyone might say that the Chinese were right, the Secretary said that China is being rejected by one country after another—even Indonesia. The Chinese doctrine of military conquest has not been accepted either by the Socialist world or by the Free World. China is headed either to a basic change of policy or to catastrophe. Fortunately many of the Chinese leaders are practical men who are more prudent in actions than in words. The US is not looking for a pretext to attack China. After all, Chinese nuclear capability within the foreseeable future will always be trivial as compared to that of the US. We are not seeking an opportunity for a preventive strike—all that we want is that smaller nations within the range of China be allowed to live in peace. The Rumanians have a stake in this—it is important to establish that the presence of a great power does not mean that small powers in the area must lose their independence or security. We cannot forget that Hitler moved into the Rhineland and into the Sudetenland without opposition, as Japan moved into Manchuria. These developments led to World War II, for which we were partly responsible. We are not going to make the same mistake again. There is one important element which might bring the opposing parties together in Southeast Asia. Peiping and Hanoi continue to talk of the 1954 agreement, as do we. Both parties have also referred to the 1962 Laos agreement. There is some reason to think that these agreements can be the basis for peace in Southeast Asia. If there are disputes, let them be solved by peaceful means. This is basically the position of Moscow, although it cannot fail to support North Vietnam because of its own dispute with Peiping.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Lisle and approved in S on November 26. The source text is labeled “Part I of III.” The meeting was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State.