135. Memorandum From the President’s Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- A Cease-fire in South Viet Nam
In seeking possible ways of ending the insurgency in South Viet Nam, I have noted with some concern that some of our best friends often consider that at some early point in the procedure it would be desirable or even essential to declare a “cease-fire”. Senator Mansfield in his recent speech2 bore down heavily on the need for a cease-fire and a stand-fast which, he indicated, might start at the outset of negotiations.
If the users of this word, cease-fire, mean it in the sense of a cessation of all use of firearms, it is no more reasonable to talk of a cease-fire in South Viet Nam than of one between police and criminals in a crime-wave. The hostile acts of the Viet Cong which must be brought under control—terrorism, sabotage, oppression of the rural population, recruiting and infiltration—do not depend on the use of weapons. The prevention of these acts by the government does. Hence, a cease-fire without something else would give the Viet Cong the opportunity to continue to harass the population, impress recruits, expand their areas of control and prepare for greater depredations.
The “something else” which would have to be added to make the situation tolerable from our point of view must include provisions for the continued maintenance of law and order by government forces, at least outside of those areas which might be conceded to be normally under Viet Cong control. The government could offer to cease bombings and clearing operations in these Red areas and, in exchange, the Viet Cong/Hanoi would undertake to cease all incidents anywhere in South Viet Nam and all infiltration from outside South Viet Nam. Our side should retain the right of unarmed air reconnaissance of infiltration routes in North Viet Nam and Laos.
In summary, instead of talking of a mutual cease-fire we should talk of a cease-fire on our side in exchange for a cease-aggression on theirs. A fair offer would be for our side to cease all bombing in North and South Viet Nam, and all new clearing operations in Viet Cong held territory, but [Page 377] to retain the right to use force to maintain law and order outside of specified Viet Cong-controlled areas. Additionally, we might agree to freeze foreign force levels but should retain the right of unarmed air reconnaissance of infiltration routes in North Viet Nam and Laos. Their side would cease all incidents in South Viet Nam and infiltration of men and equipment in South Viet Nam. Both sides should have the right on short notice to denounce the agreement for cause.
I believe that the foregoing discussion suggests how involved a cessation of hostilities is in a guerrilla situation such as we have in South Viet Nam. In many ways, the requirements are as demanding as for the negotiating of a final peace settlement. Even, if achieved, the agreement would be susceptible to breach without warning either by a deliberate decision of the Communist leaders or by an act of indiscipline or carelessness by any of the hundreds of thousands of armed men on either side. All of these points need careful consideration before we allow ourselves to become involved in a so-called cease-fire which can be a trap.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos. Secret. Regarding Taylor’s role as a part-time consultant to the President, see Swords and Plowshares, pp. 358-366.↩
- The text of Mansfield’s September 1 speech to the Senate is in The Congressional Record—Senate, September 1, 1965, pp. 22560-22562.↩