Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

133. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, September 1, 1965.

Today’s long and fumbling session with Rupert produced a very few elements useful in a diagnosis of the Hanoi position but hardly anything that would advance negotiations. Although Rupert insists he has been consistent throughout discussions he seems to fluctuate in phase with Hanoi’s pronouncements and this evening he took a stiff line in an obvious effort to parallel that taken by Pham Van Dong in declaration² published in today’s Le Monde. Principal points to emerge were:

(a) According to Rupert, any “final solution would have to include a withdrawal of U.S. troops (Pham Van Dong appears to call for their withdrawal now), and in any case troops would have to have left before elections could take place. This was first time Rupert had made this link.

(b) U.S. bombing, especially its intensification north and south in the last fifteen days, could only be interpreted as attempt to force Hanoi to negotiate. Also, U.S. insistence on “counterpart” concessions by Hanoi was psychological warfare and unacceptable. Still, according to Rupert, bombing was unilaterally undertaken; it must be stopped unilaterally immediately, totally, and definitively; then and then only would there be a different atmosphere and a possibility for negotiations. There could be no question, he said, of accepting conditions laid down by U.S. ahead of time as price of suspension of bombing.

1. X opened by remarking that his conversations with Rupert had aroused a lively interest among his friends in Washington, of which Rupert would find evidence in TV interview of Secretary Rusk (August 23).³ Rupert would find some familiar expressions in this discourse and he would also find confirmation that U.S. policy was the same as that expressed in the four points which X had proposed to Rupert.

2. X read extensively from the interview and left the text with Rupert. He noticed that the latter showed particular interest in Rusk’s expression of confidence in elections in the south which Rupert seemed to find fantastic. He derided the Saigon Government as U.S. creatures and jeered at its instability and said that practically all Vietnamese, especially since Diem’s oppression of nationalist elements, utterly rejected it. X observed he could not of course accept this evaluation and said whatever it was southern population wanted he and Rupert both knew that they didn’t want Hanoi imposed on them. Whatever procession governments in Saigon indicated it clearly showed U.S. was not imposing a regime. Rupert retorted with the Vietnamese proverb to the effect a sorcerer can raise phantoms but after a while they control the sorcerer.

Rupert indicated that that might be but Hanoi had no intention of imposing a regime in the south.

3. Discussion of bombing followed X’s quotation of Rusk TV remarks on subject and was intermittent throughout the rambling discussion. X recalled Rupert’s inquiry about U.S. Aide-Memoire⁴ and read excerpts from the Memoire. Also left with Rupert handwritten rough translation of pertinent paragraphs on bombing. Also referred to British White Paper⁵ and the phrase “appropriate and commensurate” in connection with desired type of response from Hanoi.

4. Rupert’s temperature here rose to something approaching heat. He denounced U.S. proposal as psychological warfare, as an effort to impress world opinion, etc. He said that the intensification of military activity in the south and bombing north and south, particularly in the last two weeks, showed U.S. trying to compel Hanoi to the conference table. In these conditions there could be no question of Hanoi’s yielding. It was left with no alternative but to continue the war. He insisted that U.S. requirement of a counterpart was unrealistic; that U.S. began the bombing unilaterally and should stop it unilaterally and stop its “aggression” as well. He claimed to believe U.S. demanding as counterparts concessions tantamount to abandoning Hanoi’s entire military position (X cannot recall just what particulars Rupert cited).

5. Rupert again resorted to phrase about “allegations” re activity of 325th North Viet Division. Later when X said—you apparently now deny 325th Division in the south, Rupert said he did not deny it. He claimed, however, that the 325th not now engaged in military operations.

6. X suggested that he preferred Secretary’s word “signal” to Rupert’s word “counterpart”. U.S. not asking Hanoi to abandon all its military leverage but wanted at least a token that U.S. gesture in stopping bombing was understood as move toward peaceful settlement. He quoted the U.S. Aide-Memoire to suggest other possibilities for a response by Hanoi, such as stopping infiltration and reducing level of incidents. On latter point X also referred to Algerian precedent when French found it easier to come to conference table when incidents dropped below certain level. X said U.S. could not be expected to halt bombing under circumstances which made it look as though it had found the going too rough and too rude and was accepting military reverse.

7. Rupert at no time rose to bait on stopping infiltration or reduction of incidents. All he would say (and repeatedly) was that if the U.S. stopped the bombing unilaterally there would be a new atmosphere and a new deal.

8. X then went so far as to ask Rupert to comment on handling the problem of a Hanoi response through device of parallel but ostensibly unlinked courses of action, i.e., U.S. to halt bombing while there would be simultaneous actions by Hanoi possibly synchronized by “third party” unspecified.

9. Rupert appeared interested but would say only in effect that if U.S. so acted one would see. However, he then repeatedly revived other Hanoi conditions, including acceptance of the program of the “Front”, halting of U.S. “aggression”, etc.

10. X again insisted he and Rupert losing time using words like “aggression”. Rupert said he willing to substitute “war”. X’s reply to charge that U.S. aggressively interested [intensified?] bombing was that Hanoi had been unilaterally making war on the south for four years previously, to which answer Rupert sharply interjected accusation about Diem’s activities.

11. According to X his friends in U.S. wanted some sign Hanoi understood what halt in bombing meant. Rupert should be aware restraint in U.S. bombing policy. Although it could easily do so, U.S. not interfering directly with harvest, had not destroyed Haiphong, was not at the present time breaking up industry. Of course there was a rising curve in military actions, especially as military machines on both sides took hold and passions were aroused, but this is what he and Rupert had the opportunity to prevent.

12. Rupert quite excitedly said X was wrong, that thousands were being killed, that he had the figures to show it. It was more obvious than ever before that Hanoi and VC, both north and south, are being grievously hurt. For present, however, Rupert would only say that these bombings more than ever made it inevitable that Hanoi would continue the war for as many years as might be necessary.

13. X rehearsed his earlier arguments, that Hanoi could not obtain a decision, U.S. could not be forced out, escalation could only mean stepping up foreign activity (U.S. and Chinese), north and south, and could threaten continuance of U.S. policy of restraint in bombing.

14. X then undertook to begin review of positions reached by him and Rupert in current talks. Said although we wide apart there seemed to be somewhat less difference of opinion re withdrawal of troops and unification. In reply Rupert made point, new in these discussions, that U.S. troops would have to be withdrawn before elections could take place. On being pressed to state his own understanding of what he and X discussed he affirmed that “any final solution would have to include (comporter) withdrawal of U.S. troops”, but this time added that such withdrawal would have to precede elections. He claimed it was X who had introduced the idea of “stages” in conversation. (X supplied the word but Rupert if anything was ahead of him in endorsing the idea.)

15. X did not say whether this timing was acceptable to his friends but did repeat that U.S. wanted fundamental rights of Vietnam as presented in Geneva Accords agreed. U.S. wanted independent, unified, possibly non-aligned Vietnam, and were willing to put our policy to the test, including free elections without outside intervention. If U.S. troops withdrawn it could not be under conditions which left other outside forces, i.e., Hanoi, free to influence results.

X observed that Rupert had not previously made this point on withdrawals, and took occasion to observe that while Pham Van Dong and Rusk interviews demonstrated awareness X/Rupert conversations, Pham Van Dong had taken a harder line while press widely commented on Rusk’s determination to seek peace and had even used phrase “de-escalation”.

16. As to reunification and X’s claim that he and Rupert seemed not too far apart, i.e., with respect to international decision by free consultation, north and south, timing and supervision, Rupert said Hanoi was not imposing any decision on the south (meaning the “Front”). Therefore the timetable would be as the south and north should agree. (X again referred to fact that most South Vietnamese probably did not want unification on Hanoi terms.)

17. X asked Rupert to try to resume where he and X stood. Rupert reviewed the positions he had just taken on bombing, reunification, and claimed these represented no change in his prior position. He confirmed that he had noticed in French press account taken by Secretary Rusk and others of these discussions. With reference to internal regime he again insisted on program of the “Front”. X again said it was unrealistic to expect strongest power in the world to accept adversary fiat on agenda, withdraw all its troops prior to negotiation, and accept a priori installation of “Front” as sole negotiating agent and government in south. Latter would certainly find a role to play in national life and reconstruction and could also be included in North Vietnamese delegation. (Rupert sneered at latter idea.) If, as Rupert claimed, Front represented everybody in south X said they would be triumphantly returned by elections. However, X doubted it.

18. Early in interview X had indicated desirability of meeting next week and Rupert agreed to Tuesday,⁶ at which time X promised refined French text of pertinent parts of U.S. Aide-Memoire to other governments, as well as of parts of TV interview.

At close of meeting X said he would “retain” particularly two of Rupert’s points, i.e., position that cessation of bombing could not be conditioned on prior promise or performance by Hanoi of counterpart undertaking, and point that withdrawal of foreign troops must be completed before elections. He expressed obvious reservations, but said he would reflect and consult on these points, and confirmed meeting for Tuesday.

Rupert said a further meeting might be worthwhile if there were anything new, but said discussions thus far had produced little that was new or useful. X said he thought talks had taken a “zig-zag” course and that last previous meeting had seemed “constructive”. This clearly worried Rupert who demanded confirmation that he had always taken a consistent line.

General impressions:

X had stronger impression than previously that Rupert fearful of getting out of line with Hanoi. Rupert obviously worried at implication that in current talks he had ever veered. Indeed, he may already have done so in appearing on earlier occasion to be too relaxed about timing of U.S. troop withdrawals. X suspects some of Rupert’s waverings reflect difference within Hanoi Government, pulling and hauling with Front, Chinese, etc.

Although on surface Rupert position on halting bombing and on withdrawal U.S. troops seems notably unfruitful, Washington may wish to consider whether a third party might not be enlisted (not French) to receive from Hanoi assurances that if bombing suspended there might be some action on the part of Hanoi; also what would be time relation between withdrawal U.S. troops and: (a) popular consultation with respect to unification, and (b) with respect to voting on internal regime of South Vietnam, (c) convening of a conference, (d) putting Geneva Accords into effect; also relation of these measures to international control? Should we ask Rupert these questions?

X’s general impression is that talks very unfruitful at this point and unless something gives difficult to see beyond next one or two sessions. He thinks Hanoi does not want to talk at this point. In a month’s time it may be different.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis; XYZ. The source text is a copy that does not bear a telegram number or a time of transmission or receipt. For additional information, see the source note, Document 120. In United States-Vietnam Relations, the meeting described in this telegram is incorrectly dated September 3. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 106-107)
2. Pham Van Dong’s National Day report on August 31 was broadcast in English over Hanoi Radio on September 1. For excerpts from the text, see ibid., pp. 103-106.
3. For a transcript of the interview, in which Goldberg and McGeorge Bundy also participated, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 431-444.
4. Not further identified.
5. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 444-447.
6. September 7. Mai Van Bo did not show up for the meeting on September 7.DRV officials indicated that he was “sick.” Gullion and Mai Van Bo held no further meetings. Paul Sturm (“Y”), who replaced Gullion, had an unproductive meeting with Mai Van Bo on November 18. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 107-109)
7. The source text bears no signature.