Office of the Historian

97. Memorandum of Meeting of Principals1

Washington, February 10, 1965, 1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • Vice President Humphrey
  • State
    • Under Secretary Ball
    • Ambassador Thompson
    • Assistant Secretary Bundy
    • Ambassador Unger
  • Defense
    • Secretary McNamara
    • Deputy Secretary Vance
    • Asst. Secretary McNaughton
  • JCS
    • Admiral McDonald
  • Treasury
    • Secretary Dillon
  • CIA
    • Director McCone
  • USIA
    • Director Rowan
  • White House
    • McGeorge Bundy
    • Chester Cooper

Secretary McNamara raised several questions with respect to retaliation for the attack on the enlisted men’s barracks at Qui Nhon (Biet Cuong Hotel):

1.
Should we retaliate?—McNamara thought we should with a joint US-GVN operation;
2.
When should we retaliate?—McNamara felt strongly that this should be done at the first daylight opportunity;
3.
Against what targets?—McNamara recommended three targets: two just north of the 17th parallel (barracks), and one 50 miles north (supply base).
4.
What should be the rationale for retaliation?—McNamara felt we should point to the recent terror against South Vietnamese civilians, including the blowing up of a railroad bridge, and the blowing up of the barracks.

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Much of the rest of the discussion centered on the timing and composition of the attack. State (especially Ball and Thompson) and Vice President Humphrey felt that we should hold up the attack until Kosygin had returned to Moscow, or, in any case, until after he left Peiping following his visit to North Korea. The argument centered on the effect of an immediate attack on Sino-Soviet relations and the degree of commitment the Soviets might be forced to make. State felt that Kosygin’s trip to North Korea was an affront to the Chinese and that an immediate attack would submerge or paper-over the difficulties that the Chinese and Russians would otherwise confront when Kosygin saw the Chinese on his way back to Moscow.

If a retaliatory strike were to be launched immediately, State felt that it should be a GVN rather than a U.S. effort. McNamara, and most of the others present, felt that the President would be hard-pressed to explain to the American people why U.S. planes did not retaliate immediately, especially in the light of our reprisal against the Pleiku incident.

While recognizing the merit of this, Ball emphasized that the biggest single question we confronted was how to avoid a substantial Soviet commitment to North Vietnam. Such a commitment might be postponed or minimized if we could delay our reprisal, or if the VNAF alone made an immediate reprisal.

Most of the participants discounted the effectiveness of a VNAF attack. McNamara pointed out that the VNAF attack had hit the wrong target the night before and, in any case, the difference between a VNAF strike and one which would involve U.S. planes would not make a significant difference in terms of the Soviet reaction. This phase of the meeting ended with several people, including McGeorge Bundy and Thompson and the Vice President, musing on the merits of delaying the retaliation for a few days, not only because of the Sino-Soviet matter but because of the remaining dependents.

The President joined the group at approximately two o’clock, at which time the NSC meeting began (to be reported on separately by Bromley Smith).2

CLC
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret. Prepared by Cooper on February 11. The source text bears the letters “OK” in McGeorge Bundy’s handwriting at the top of the first page. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.↩
  2. Document 98.↩