Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

94. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Senator Mike Mansfield¹

Washington, February 9, 1965.

Dear Mike:

The President has asked me to respond to your long and thoughtful memorandum of February 8² on the subject of Vietnam. The President feels that your careful questions deserve a prompt reply, and as he himself is heavily occupied today with other matters, he has asked me to answer in his behalf.

Let me attempt to comment in order on the important points of your memorandum.

1. We agree that the episode at Pleiku and our response to it create pressures on Kosygin, but in our judgment responsibility for this pressure rests with Hanoi and not with us, and we believe that the Soviet Government will recognize this fact. Given the character of the attack at Pleiku, we are unable to see what other course was open to the President than to make an appropriate reply. We think that inactivity by the United States would have made it even more tempting for the Soviets to enlarge on their support for North Vietnam.

2. Our intelligence estimators are clear in their judgment that it is most unlikely that these events will have the effect of driving the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists closer together. Our Embassy in Moscow points out that the Soviet statement contains at least two elements which will be energetically disapproved by the Chinese Communists: it speaks of the desire for good relations with the United States, and it specifically limits its offer of assistance to defensive weapons.

3. In our efforts to defeat Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, we must recognize that any U.S. action carries some risks of wider Chinese involvement, but we aim to keep the risk of that involvement as low as possible. As your memorandum generously recognizes, the President has always emphasized his own desire to avoid actions which would lead to direct conflict with the Chinese. We are making it clear in every statement and by every avenue that our central concern in Vietnam is to turn back the aggression in the South, and that our limited actions against the North imply no intent whatever to “liberate” or conquer North Vietnam.

4. We agree with you, of course, that there are important political problems of governmental stability in South Vietnam, and that there is a problem also in the degree to which the Communists have intimidated the local population and made it reluctant to report Viet Cong movements. If we had a stable government and if there were no fear of the Viet Cong, we would not have the problem that we do in Vietnam. Unfortunately stating the difficulties does not solve them, and it remains our best judgment that the vast majority of the people of South Vietnam do not wish to fall under Communist domination. The President has repeatedly made it clear that we cannot ourselves solve all the problems of South Vietnam. He has also insisted, however, that every possible step be taken to make our support for the Vietnamese people more effective and efficient. My own understanding of your position is that you agree with this course and do not wish to see us pull out of Vietnam or decrease our present assistance to the Vietnamese.

5. The President certainly shares your view that military security should be as effective as possible within the limits of our basic policy decision not to deploy large American combat units for guard duty in Vietnam. Able American professionals are giving their full attention to the problem of military security around installations such as Bien Hoa and Pleiku. The President is satisfied that General Westmoreland is an outstanding officer, and I myself observed the energy with which he followed up on the Pleiku incident. It remains true that in a contest as fluid as this one, in which small units are able to move undetected through large parts of the countryside, there can be no full guarantee against episodes of this kind. As in all warfare, we learn as much by experience as by forethought, and it was my observation that important lessons had been learned in the Bien Hoa incident. Undoubtedly lessons will be learned from Pleiku as well. The hazard of guerrilla attack will nevertheless continue until the course of the struggle has been turned strongly against the Viet Cong.

6. I can assure you that the decision to make a retaliatory response was in no sense unilateral. I talked myself with General Khanh and I talked with Ambassador Taylor just after his conversation with Prime Minister Oanh.³ From these conversations and from earlier talks with Vietnamese leaders, I know they warmly support a policy of response against outrages like that at Pleiku. This general attitude was expressed to me by Vietnamese leaders from many different groups, and indeed no different judgment was expressed by any of the Vietnamese citizens with whom I talked during my visit.

7. We recognize the danger of war weariness among the population of South Vietnam, but it seems to me wrong to conclude that the great majority of the population will give us no significant assistance. The fact is that while American losses come home with particular force to Americans, it is the Vietnamese who are taking the bulk of the casualties. The performance of Vietnamese armed units in recent months makes it clear that they are tough and resilient fighters and that their morale remains high. Moreover, when energetic programs of pacification are pursued, our junior officers report that the population is invariably responsive. The problem is one of maintaining the necessary energy and effectiveness, not just sporadically but on a constantly growing basis throughout the country. This task is certainly difficult, but I met no American in Vietnam who thinks it impossible.

8. You are certainly right to call attention to the wider environment of Southeast Asia, but your judgment on some of the countries involved seems harsh. We have had strong support from the Thais, for example, especially with respect to Laos, which is necessarily of most direct concern to them. Moreover, our own sea and air forces make us a most formidable opponent, as long as we are careful and measured and disciplined in our use of them.

9. More generally, it does not appear to me that the power of the United States around the world is “stretched too thin.” We have been able to keep our commitments around the world for a quarter of a century and our country has never been richer or more at ease. While every single American casualty gives the President personal sorrow, we cannot say that the current level of American sacrifice in Southeast Asia is unduly heavy. We made a vastly heavier sacrifice in Korea—and one which was fully justified—and yet the stakes there were certainly not greater than those that are now on the table in Southeast Asia.

10. The President has considered your suggestion that we take the matter to the United Nations. He regrets that previous discussions of the question in the United Nations have not indicated any desire of the members of that body to take any action whatever. From the Secretary General on down, we are unable to find any expert on the UN who sees any prospect that it can act effectively in the present situation in Vietnam. Neither is the President aware of any prospect that any other conference or forum would currently lead to an agreement by the Communists to end the fighting on any terms other than those of surrender. But the President asked me to say again how much he will value any further suggestions you may have on this problem.

11. I think you know from our association in recent years how great is my personal respect and regard for you, not only as the leader of the majority in the Senate but also as one of the outstanding public servants of our time. I therefore regret that your judgment and that of the Administration should be at variance on this most important issue, and I beg you to understand that while I have tried to write directly and straightforwardly, I have done so with a feeling of deep respect not only for you but for your deeply held convictions.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam—Mansfield Memo and Reply. Confidential.
2. Document 92.
3. For a record of McGeorge Bundy’s conversation with Khanh on February 5, see Document 73. Bundy’s conversation with Taylor and Taylor’s conversation with Oanh have not been further identified.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.