I attach a summary of the Vietnamese situation which I think is better
than the spate of confusing cables from all and sundry that we have had
in the last two or three days. At the end of this memorandum (by my
staff man Cooper) two choices are offered. One is to let the political
mess play itself out in its own way, and the other is to try to keep it
pinned together in roughly its present form at least until March. The
latter is Cooper’s choice, and it
is clearly Max Taylor’s as well.
It has the advantage that in March under cover of a new National
Assembly meeting there could be a reconstruction of the government
without Huong.
The one additional thought I have is that we might make one more effort
to talk sense to the Buddhists through some American that they trust.
Their particular hero is Cabot Lodge, but the dangers of sending him are
obvious. The only way it could be done is on the basis of a direct
invitation from Max Taylor, and
I have asked my brother Bill to consider
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whether the idea is sufficiently promising for us
to ask Max if he would like to do it. I feel sure myself that in this
context Lodge would be a team player and I would be glad to know your
own feelings about this.
Keep Lodge out of it.2
See if you can find a way of using him.
Leave it to Taylor.
Finally, I continue to believe that a general discussion of Vietnam
with Rusk and McNamara and myself is one of the two pieces of
business that should be conducted before anyone goes to London.3 The
other piece of business is a Middle East problem on which I will
report separately. I have asked Jack
Valenti to check with you on these two
appointments.4
Attachment5
Washington,
January 26,
1965.
Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the
National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
SUBJECT
- Vietnam—The Present State of Play
The Situation
In General:—Political maneuvering continues
between the civilians and the military, between the Buddhists and
the government and between various elements within the military.
Indeed the situation in Saigon, Hue and one or two other cities is
so fluid and (literally) flammable that we may, at least for the
moment, have lost our ability to exert any significant degree of
control or influence. Meanwhile, no unusual
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VC military activity has been
reported, and GVN forces report
several successful operations.
Political:—The weekend’s attempt by Khanh to get Suu and Huong to resign has not yet run
its course. Khanh saw
Johnson today6 and insisted that both Suu and Huong had offered their resignations over the
weekend (you remember that Huong denied this). Khanh claims he has made a deal with the Buddhists
which involves inter alia the two chief troublemakers leaving the
country. Johnson feels Khanh is encouraging the
Buddhists by such dealings and may be thinking about taking over and
assuming a Sihanouk-like role and posture.7 He also thinks the
events of the past few days (especially the on-again, off-again
pressure on Huong)
indicates that the Generals are deeply divided.
Meanwhile, security forces have surrounded the Buddhist Institute in
Saigon and banned all unauthorized entry. In Hue, local authorities
have declared martial law, and have reportedly marked some areas
where there are U.S. installations as off-limits to marchers. Press
reports stated that one crowd of marchers had approached the U.S.
Consulate, but all U.S. dependents have been relocated within the
MACV compound. Most of the
demonstrators have been orderly, but the theme of exhortations to
them is anti-government and anti-Ambassador Taylor. The homes of the
Vietnamese information director and of the local national police
director were burned by students. A general strike in both Da Nang
and Quang Tri, a sit-down strike in Nha Trang, and demonstrations in
Hoi An, capital of Quang Nam Province are also underway.
More than 200 arrests have been made, including a number of monks.
The government claims that some monks arrested have not been bona
fide. Meanwhile, the Buddhists over the weekend called for further
sacrifices, similar to that of the first monk last year to commit
self-immolation. There are press reports indicating that some of the
five monks on a hunger-strike may be in poor condition, but they are
unidentified. However, government officials had a rumor that
Tri Quang hoped to make
Tam Chau, already frail, a
martyr by allowing his death. A bonze-ess has burned herself to
death in Nha Trang, and a Catholic was set on fire by a Buddhist in
Saigon.
A State Department outgoing cable over the weekend8 suggested that the Buddhist problem might be
defused, and a Khanh-Buddhist cabal, if any, curbed if Huong undertook a course of
action which would
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maintain
a firm posture against disorders, but simultaneously issue a policy
statement guaranteeing freedom of religion and offering to meet
Buddhist leaders and resolve any legitimate grievances. It was felt
that this might undercut any developing Buddhist support. Huong, however, continues to
indicate a preference for firm measures, isolating the Buddhist
leaders by trying to separate sects from the United Buddhist
Organization, and publicly attacking the Buddhists as tools of the
Communists. No reply has as yet been received from Saigon.
Military Situation
The VC has ordered a cease-fire for
the period of the New Year (31 January through 6 February); unarmed
“rebel” (ARVN) forces will be
permitted to go through VC lines to
visit their families. However, there are reports that military
activities in the Saigon area are to be stepped up in the days
immediately preceding the New Year. The detonations in the MACV compound yesterday (no
casualties) may have been in response to this order. In general,
however, VC activity during the past
week was at a relatively low level.
The ARVN has been active during the
past week or so. There was a very successful operation in the Delta
which netted 51 VC killed and 26 PWs.
Two other operations, both south of Saigon, were described by MACV as “highly successful”.9
Evacuation
Johnson approached Huong and Deputy Prime Minister Vien on the evacuation issue.10 They expressed concern
over the effects on SVN morale, but
agreed to think the matter over, especially in the light of possible
compensating military reinforcements. Bill Bundy’s sounding of the
Australians here was inconclusive; the Ambassador felt the effect
would depend on future U.S. policy and operational moves.11
In line with our conversation on Sunday,12 I am urging State to query nearby Far East
posts on available school facilities. I am also looking into the
question of AID establishing a
special boarding school nearby (perhaps moving the school now in
Saigon). We have not yet received a breakdown of dependents, but
preliminary data indicate that about 60% are children.
Outgoing to Saigon today gives DOD OK
to Hawk battalion for Saigon, and puts evacuation in context of “if
and when”.13
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Infiltration
The edited, updated infiltration study was given to relevant
Congressional Committees yesterday;14
Saigon gave a backgrounder today (preliminary reports indicate no
static; questions mostly technical);15 Bill Bundy and I are backgrounding late this
afternoon.16
Outlook
We have two broad options:
- A.
- Let the situation continue to slip and slide, use our
presently limited assets to influence, guide and protest,
and hope that the forces involved will reach some modus
vivendi.
- B.
- Take a more active role in a last effort to get a fix that
will last at least until the National Assembly meets in
March (at which time Huong can be replaced with some measure of
legality).
I favor the latter in full recognition that it is easier said than
done and that it may mean difficulties with Taylor, State and sundry others. I
will have some specific, if far-out, ideas by noon tomorrow.
