Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 3, 1965, 11:59 p.m.

4038. Ref: Embtel 4003.² Alex Johnson and I have just seen Quat and Bui Diem at the end of the day, who outlined to us the outcome of today’s long and generally fruitless discussions aimed at restoring normalcy to the internal political situation.

At 10 AM this morning, Quat met with most of the former members of the Armed Forces Council. He explained to them the political situation and the constitutional impasse reached between him and the Chief of State. According to one of the military participants, Quat asked for the General’s support, but they withheld any commitment, preferring to hear also the other side of the case from Suu and the Legislative Council.

In order to broaden the discussion in conformance with the Generals’ request, at 14:30 Suu, Quat, the Cabinet, the Generals, and the Legislative Council all met at Gia Long Palace where they palavered for most of the day. Quat himself left the meeting at about 19:00 whereas some of the participants were still hanging about two hours later.

Quat summarized the accomplishments of the meetings as follows. It was agreed that Suu would put out an appeal to the population in the name of the government, the Generals, and the Legislative Council for the purpose of urging greater national unity in these critical times. It is my understanding that this appeal has been made by radio, although I have not yet been able to verify the fact.

Vice Premier Tuyen has undertaken to settle the matter of the two reluctant ministers who do not wish to resign. Quat is strangely vague as to what he expects Tuyen will do. However, Bui Diem seems sure that Tuyen is basically on Quat’s side.

In view of the lack of enthusiasm of the Legislative Council to come to grips with the constitutional issue, Quat seems to consider it to have been satisfactorily arranged to let this matter drag on unsettled.

In order to satisfy the Generals who were very vocal in criticizing the civilians (and particularly but obliquely Suu) for their political bickering while the troops are dying on the battlefield, Quat has undertaken to formulate a statement of stronger policy which will guarantee a more energetic conduct of the war. He obviously did not know what kind of specific measures he might propose: his vagueness suggests that this will probably be more of a literary exercise than a change of behavior.

As Quat finished this summary of the outcome of today’s session, Bui Diem came in, having lingered behind at Gia Long Palace. In response to Quat’s question as to what had happened since Quat’s departure from the meeting, Bui Diem announced that Suu wanted a meeting at 15:00 tomorrow with the Prime Minister and General Chieu of the Legislative Council to discuss the current crisis. This surprised us as we assumed that Quat’s resume represented the consensus of action required to meet the crisis. Quat said that he thought Suu had primarily in mind discussing the Catholic issue and the possibility that the military will return to power if the civilians do not perform better. Quat said that General Thi in particular had become very emotional over the ineffectiveness of the civilian government and had left the meeting early in a rage.

Johnson and I then started asking questions designed to bring out the unsatisfactory nature of the day’s events. I pointed out that there was a contradiction in striving for a stronger policy and a more effective conduct of the war with a decision to stall off a resolution of the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister. The latter could hardly be expected to do better in the conduct of the war with his powers clouded by the present controversy.

We asked why there had been no follow-up on the gambit started yesterday when Quat wrote his letter to the Chief of State, asking for agreement in the dismissal of the Ministers of National Economy and Interior (Embtel 4003). Bui Diem said that this partially completed action had been overtaken by events, but when we pressed him, he conceded that there was considerable merit in trying to carry it through as an easy, face-saving way of resolving the constitutional issue.³

In spite of the general inconclusiveness of today’s conferrings, there is a new, important factor emerging in the form of the reappearance of the Generals on the political scene. They appear to have shown themselves genuinely reluctant to take sides in the Quat-Suu controversy, although their sympathies seem to have been on the Prime Minister’s side. One of them has indicated that they would have declared for Quat had he directly requested it, but no such request was made. While being sharply critical of the civilian politicians, the Generals limited themselves to offering to serve as arbitrators between the contending elements if they were requested. In answer to our question as to what would be arbitrated, Bui Diem replied that it would be the whole question of the nature and content of the constitution and of the government. We agreed that it would be disastrous to bring the Generals back from the battlefield to fulfill such a broad and far ranging mandate.

Quat and Bui Diem seemed tired tonight and to lack incisiveness and self-confidence.⁴ Just as former Prime Minister Huong could not keep off the subject of the menace of the Buddhists, Quat has become similarly fascinated by the dangers represented by the Catholics. He has heard a rumor that Archbishop Binh is now supporting Pere Quynh and his factious priests. He is happy with the fact that in the course of Tuyen’s audience with the Pope, the latter undertook to write Papal Delegate Palmas a letter on the subject of Catholic avoidance of involvement in politics.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received in the Department of State at 12:40 p.m. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Vientiane. Passed to the White House, CIA, and the Department of Defense.
2. In telegram 4003 from Saigon, June 2, Ambassador Taylor reported that he and Johnson had met with Prime Minister Quat to discuss Quat’s meeting with Suu the previous evening. Quat said that Suu had indicated that the problem of the two contested ministerial positions could be readily resolved if Quat would write a letter to Suu, as Chief of State, asking for the dismissal of Hiep and Vinh. Quat signed and dispatched such a letter in the presence of Taylor and Johnson. (Ibid.)
3. According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Ambassador Johnson in Saigon and Leonard Unger in Washington, June 3, Suu did not act on Quat’s letter, despite his earlier assurance. Johnson estimated at that point that the Quat government had only a 50–50 chance of emerging from the constitutional crisis with its position and authority intact. (Ibid.)
4. On the evening of June 4 Bui Diem called Manfull to say that “the constitutional crisis was solved.” Manfull called on Quat for details and found him in good spirits, confident that he had weathered the crisis. He had met with Suu and worked out an agreement on the constitutional questions at issue. The agreement would be embodied in a communiqué, and Quat said that he would send a decree on June 5 to Suu for his signature confirming the dismissal of the Ministers of Economy and Interior. (Telegram 4056 from Saigon, June 4; ibid.)