322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3989. For the President. We have spent most of the last week trying to work out a solution to the political impasse which arose when Quat tried to reorganize his cabinet.2 I am sorry to say that no solution is yet in [Page 702] sight. Quat evidently did not have his ducks properly aligned when he held a public ceremony last Tuesday3 to introduce the new members of this cabinet to the National Legislative Council and Chief of State Suu. He had neglected to obtain the resignations of two ministers he was dropping for incompetence and incompatibility,4 and he had not anticipated that Suu would yield to the urgings of disaffected southerners, militant refugee Catholics, and out-politicians to interpose constitutional objections to the PriMin’s right to fire Cabinet members. The provisional Charter of October 20, 1964,5 unfortunately is not specific on this point, though it seems pretty clearly the intent of the drafters that the PriMin would have the right to choose and dismiss his ministers and that the Chief of State would have no right of interposition. The confrontation between Quat and Suu which at the outset seemed little more than a misunderstanding susceptible of prompt settlement has now become an open battle between the followers of the PriMin and the Chief of State with the goal of the latter the fall of the Quat Govt.
Because of this situation, I felt obliged to postpone my return to Washington until it can be resolved—how long or how short this delay will be is hard to say. We have been meeting with the principal contenders daily to urge that the crisis be solved quickly and to impress on all concerned the over-riding importance of political stability at this time of increasing U.S. commitment and support.
The impasse has been another reminder of the basic lack of cohesion among the Vietnamese and of the irresponsibility of many of their leaders.
The impatience of the military with this state of affairs was made clear by Air Force Commander General Ky in an after-dinner speech made in the presence of Quat and other civilian leaders; in effect, Ky warned that the generals would feel forced to resume political power if the civilians did not soon resolve their differences. The danger of military intervention will grow the longer the confrontation drags on.
A hopeful sign in this otherwise darkened political scene was the generally successful carrying out of municipal and provincial elections on Sunday. Although results from the provinces are not yet all in, it looks as though about 70 per cent of those registered exercised their vote. I visited some of the polling places in Saigon and while there was no air of great excitement, the voting was orderly and seemed well conducted. Present plans call for an electoral law to be promulgated by the end of [Page 703] June for elections to a national assembly to be held in October. Reports from Sunday’s elections seem to show that voting in populated areas is feasible and that the Viet Cong are not a serious obstacle to balloting.
The upward trend in military activity which began last month continued during the early part of the week and peaked sharply at its end. There was a general increase of attacks, ambushes and sabotage of roads and bridges. Most of the increased activity occurred in the I and II Corps areas and reached a climax two days ago in the combat near Ba Gia, not far from Quang Ngai city. This was a sharp fight in which govt forces came out second best with two ARVN battalions decimated. There were disturbing indications of failures of leadership on the part of a number of key officers in the second division from which the troops came. General Westmoreland is having a close analysis made of this action to learn all possible from it. It may prove to be the opening engagement of the offensive which we have suspected the VC to be preparing during recent quiet weeks.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department on June 1 at 9:11 a.m. and forwarded to the White House.↩
- The developing political crisis in Saigon prompted extensive reporting from the Embassy during the last week in May. Telegrams 3902 from Saigon, May 26; 2712 to Saigon, May 26; 3931 from Saigon, May 28; 3953 from Saigon, May 29; and 3978 from Saigon, May 31 all dealt with the political impasse. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)↩
- May 25.↩
- Minister of Economy Vinh and Minister of Interior Hiep.↩
- The text of the provisional charter was transmitted in telegram 1204 from Saigon, October 20, 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XX, Cables)↩