302. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
3424. Vienna eyes only Secretary.2 Embtel 3416.3 Salinger had further four hour lunch conversation today with Sagetellyan and “Vassily” who identified himself as “Sergeev”, latter dominated entire conversation, and told Salinger he was speaking this time officially and not as “an individual”.
“Sergeev” said that after further discussion of idea put to Salinger in previous conversations and after additional clearances it had been decided that proposal as originally formulated was not feasible. He made it clear that the Sovs could not afford to be middleman in scheme and if US govt should be interested in pursuing contact in private channels, middleman would have to be some Eastern European Socialist country and not Sovs. “Sergeev” was unwilling specify which Eastern European country would be suitable channel but when Salinger indicated that he had good contacts with Yugoslavs, he said Yugoslavia was not most suitable contact.
Moreover, “Sergeev” made clear that if idea should be pursued it must be amended to exclude possibility of American military presence in South Vietnam after neutralist-type govt agreed on and established as indicated para number three Embtel 3416. If this agreeable and if satisfactory Eastern European contact established then and only then would Sovs be able play role.
Confronted with this change in signals, Salinger attempted to probe Sov interlocutors for reasons. In doing so he expressed view that obviously Sovs after checking with appropriate allies had discovered that if they went through with scheme as originally outlined they ran real risk of being accused both by ChiComs and DRV of engaging in real sellout. “Sergeev” admitted this was fairly close to the facts.
In course conversation “Sergeev” said it would be very helpful in playing out scenario if President Johnson could take some “positive” [Page 663] action which would clearly indicate a real spirit of compromise. For example, the President might take certain undefined steps with regard to crisis in Dominican Republic or he might proclaim his willingness to take more conciliatory attitude toward Cuba. Salinger made clear this sort of proposal would be non-starter.
Sovs also disclosed during conversation that it has become clear that ChiComs do not want conference on Cambodia and, according to Salinger, clearly implied that since this was case Sovs would be unable to go along with Cambodia conference idea.
“Sergeev” asked Salinger to remain in Moscow for at least one more day to lunch again with Sagetellyan and him and suggested that it might be useful if he could bring along as guest Gordon McClendon, (Texas businessman, head McClendon Corporation—radio and TV broadcasting), who now visiting Moscow. Asked why he should bring along McClendon, “Sergeev” indicated that since McClendon very close to Johnson perhaps he too, like Salinger, in Moscow on special mission. Salinger vigorously refuted this idea pointing out that, like him, McClendon was here in Moscow on purely personal business. Salinger said, in any case, he could not remain in Moscow for another day. He planned depart in accordance with his original schedule. Salinger said that he would give a full report of his conversations with Sagetellyan and “Sergeev” to Washington on Monday. “Sergeev” said that he should continue to consider Zinchuk as Washington contact but only to inform Sovs of Eastern European country worked out as “drop”.4
- Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Secret; Immediate;Nodis. Repeated to Vienna. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State on May 14.↩
- Rusk was in Vienna for anniversary ceremonies for the Austrian State Treaty.↩
- Telegram 3416 from Moscow, May 14, reported on a dinner conversation on May 13 among Salinger, Sagetellyan, and Vassily Sergeyevitch, who was identified as a Foreign Office representative. In the course of a 4-hour conversation, the Soviet official confirmed the general nature of the proposal put to Salinger initially by Sagetellyan. Sergeyevitch told Salinger that the Soviet Union was prepared to convey such a proposal from the United States to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but would do so informally through Sagetellyan, so as to be in a position to disavow the contact if news of it leaked. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 142, Project Mayflower)↩
- Kohler concluded, in telegram 3426 from Moscow, May 15, that the Soviet approach to Salinger was authorized by senior officials in the Foreign Office and elsewhere in the Soviet Government, but was vetoed by higher levels in the government, probably after discussing it with the North Vietnamese Ambassador. Kohler suggested that Rusk mention the Soviet approach to Salinger in his conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna, to further test Soviet intentions. (Ibid.) Rusk responded, in Secto 27 from Vienna, May 15, that he viewed the Soviet approach as genuine, but he was not inclined to raise it with Gromyko unless Gromyko brought it up. Rusk did not believe that the substance of the Soviet proposal offered a promising basis for negotiations. (Ibid.) Ball called President Johnson at 10:40 a.m. on May 15 about the collapse of the Salinger channel, stating: “Our guess is that they [Russians] had talk with North Vietnamese Amb. in Moscow and cold water was thrown on it.” (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam I)↩