261. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3432. Following are personal observations of Alexis Johnson which he requests be considered in connection with referenced messages:
“I have just returned from spending greater part of three days in field, one day with PriMin Quat in Pleiku (II Corps) area and two in Da Nang-Hue area. On my return I have seen DOD 152339Z2 and related messages as well as drafts of mission council reply3 with which I most heartily agree, especially on basis of my observations in field.”
[Page 570]My visit in Da Nang-Hue area included extended visits and informal conversations with all of Senior Marine Officers ashore, visiting all four Battalions in their field positions and talks with officers down to company level.
I fully appreciate considerations both internal and external to SVN which impel move on our part to bring this war to successful conclusion as quickly as possible. With this there can be no difference of view. However, I gravely question whether this result can be achieved at this time by massive input of non-Vietnamese military force. As we have learned, we are dealing with volatile and hypersensitive people with strong xenophobic characteristics never far below surface. We have thus far deployed our Marine Battalions to minimize direct contact with local population. This not only from our choice but that of GVN, especially General Thi. On this I think Thi is right. A hasty and ill-conceived deployment of non-Vietnamese forces in combat roles where they are substantially involved with local population could badly back-fire on US and give rise to cries by Buddhists (who are now moving in very favorable direction) and others to “throw out foreigners” and “return Vietnam to Vietnamese”.
In next few weeks Marines deployed in Da Nang area will be testing degree to which non-Vietnamese forces can be successful in:
- (1)
- Acting as reaction force in situations where ARVN has already identified enemy and developed an engagement.
- (2)
- Patrolling in thinly populated VC held areas and developing engagements against an enemy who has always shown great skill in avoiding engagements except on his own terms.
In spite of urgency of situation I very deeply feel that we should not seek to deploy additional non-Vietnamese combat forces into Vietnam until both we and Vietnamese have an opportunity to observe, digest, and evaluate results which Marines are able to achieve. If Marines are able to achieve substantial results in offensive operations (as opposed to their static security missions which there is no doubt they can perform well) there should be climate here respective [receptive?] to further non-Vietnamese forces which will be able to apply lessons that undoubtedly will be learned from Marine experience. If Marine experience is not favorable presumably other forces will be equally unsuccessful and we may find ourselves caught in a situation in which we have taken on price and problems (both in SVN and elsewhere) of large non-Vietnamese combat force without achieving an offsetting gain. On other hand, if we wait reasonable period of time, say 60 days, until we see how Marines make out we should not lose greatly and may gain much.
With respect to para 6 of DOD 152339Z it is difficult to conceive of anything more counterproductive than setting up anything in provinces smacking of US Military Govt. If anything, Province Chief is already [Page 571] smothered with American Advisors and rather than increasing, we should probably in some cases be decreasing their number. However, to reduce and better to coordinate demands by American personnel and agencies on Province Chief and to prevent any suggestions of competition between them, there may be merit in considering appointment from personnel already in Provinces of single Senior American Rep as channel for all American relations with Province Chief. In some cases this might be military officer, and in other cases civilian official. It certainly should not be US military civil affairs officer imposed on top of present American structure in Provinces.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, Folder D. Top Secret; Exdis.↩
- Document 256.↩
- Document 260.↩