252. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3384. Recent actions relating to the introduction of US ground forces have tended to create an impression of eagerness in some quarters to deploy forces into SVN which I find difficult to understand. I should think that for both military and political reasons we should all be most reluctant to tie down Army/Marine units in this country and would do so only after the presentation of the most convincing evidence of the necessity.
[Page 555]Before the Marines had been introduced in the Danang-Phu Bai area, there were at least four reasons for justifying the bringing in of US ground forces, among which was the need to assure the GVN and DRV of our determination to stay in SVN to the finish. Now that the Marines are ashore, that requirement is met and, in my opinion, no more US forces are needed to make that particular point.
There remain three arguments for further reinforcements: (1) the need to do essential military tasks which GVN forces are unable to do; (2) the need to do essential military tasks faster than the GVN forces, unassisted, are able to do; and (3) the desirability of making provision for possible future crises and contingencies. Singly or in combination, these arguments could be adduced to justify almost unlimited additional deployments of US forces if such deployments did not raise counter-arguments which sooner or later outweigh the three points for the affirmative. The mounting number of foreign troops may sap the GVN initiative and turn a defense of the GVN homeland into what appears a foreign war. The increasing presence of more Americans will give Peking grounds to press military reinforcements on Hanoi. Frictions will grow between the Vietnamese and their white allies; it will become increasingly difficult to steer US and GVN policy on parallel lines. The net effect may be not an expediting of victory but its retardation.
I mention these countervailing factors to make the point that it is far from an unmitigated advantage to bring in more US forces. A consideration of the disadvantages convinces me that, while logistic preparations should be made now to be able to receive additional forces, the forces themselves should be held outside of SVN just as long as possible and until their need is incontrovertible. From a purely military point of view, it is essentially wasteful of the specialized mobility of Marines and airborne troops to commit them prematurely to restricted land areas. Politically, it is undesirable to seek authority for their introduction until a clear and specific need exists which assures them an unreserved welcome from their GVN hosts.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received in the Department of State at 7:57 a.m.↩