Office of the Historian

250. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, April 13, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Military Program in Viet-Nam

For more than two months there has been a steady growth in our military presence in South Viet-Nam and in our joint action against North Viet-Nam. These programs are now reaching critical points at which decisions are required about the rate and intensity of our actions in the future, i.e. should these increase, level off at least for a time, or diminish.

Pertinent to these decisions are the openings given for discussion by President Johnson’s speech on April 7 and our April 8 reply to the 17 nation appeal2 and some apparent slowing down of Viet Cong initiatives in South Viet-Nam over the last three or four weeks. On the other hand there are the uniformly negative reactions of Hanoi, Peking and Moscow to those openings.

There are set forth below some of the questions which have come or are coming to the fore with regard to our future military actions and which should be reviewed on the basis of political as well as military considerations:

(1)
In the present period how far North should strikes and air recce take place in North Viet-Nam?

Strikes on the Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong (the latter at latitude 19# 58) Bridge involved us in our first MIG engagement and it may be assumed that strikes further north would increase the likelihood of additional engagements. If strikes proceeded to within about 20 miles of SAM sites (once these are in operation) there could be serious, sharp losses in US aircraft and lives.

(2)
Should our target lists be expanded to go beyond the strictly military?

With the exception of the Thanh Hoa power plant we have confined ourselves to military targets thus far.

(3)
How close should US aircraft fly to Hainan Island and other ChiCom territory? [Page 552]

It was the diversionary flight over the Gulf of Tomkin just off Hainan Island last week which resulted in an engagement with Chinese MIGS, the probable penetration of Chinese air space and, thus, the risk of serious escalation.

(4)
Should support forces be deployed now to South Viet-Nam beyond the 18–20,000 increase specified in NASM 328?3

Ambassador Taylor in a telegram received April 114 refers to a proposal of MACV to increase forces in this category now by approximately 5000 over that agreed ceiling figure.

We have by our military action over the past two months certainly made clear to North and South Viet-Nam and the rest of the world our determination to stay the course. We have also given the North Vietnamese pause by demonstrating our ability almost at will to overfly their territory and destroy their facilities and installations. We have heartened the South Vietnamese and seen a modest stabilization of affairs there and some slight improvement in the military situation. Furthermore, since the President’s April 7th speech, we have taken enough strong military action to make it clear that the stick will continue in action, even though the carrot has been offered, until there is some real indication of a desire for a satisfactory settlement on Hanoi’s part.

Having accomplished the foregoing and bearing in mind that our intention has never been to bring unlimited destruction to North Viet-Nam, it seems to me we now should weigh carefully the choices for the future. Should there be a continuation of military operations by and large at their present level, a continued gradual intensification or a diminution?

Our prime objectives remain, I presume, to separate Peking and Hanoi, to avoid pressing the Soviets into significant military support of North Viet-Nam, to persuade Hanoi to open meaningful discussions and meanwhile to prevent any further deteriorating, at least, in the South. With these points in mind I would recommend a leveling off of military action for the present. Rolling Thunder II (for period April 16–22) incidentally, corresponds fairly closely with this concept.

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos 1965. Secret. Drafted by Unger.↩
  2. See Document 245.↩
  3. Document 242.↩
  4. Not further identified.↩