Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

232. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 2, 1965, 2:05–3:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting² attended by the President, Vance, McNaughton, Wheeler, Rusk, McNamara, William Bundy, Gaud, Carl Rowan, Amb. Taylor, Fowler, McGeorge Bundy, and McCone

The meeting was delayed for an hour because of a prior meeting between the President and representatives of ADA.

Bundy reported on the ADA meeting. The discussion was extended because they started out by opposing the bombing of North Vietnam and apparently had requested the meeting to protest U.S. actions. Bundy reported that the President converted them, and it is his impression that the group were unanimously in support of the U.S. policy and actions when they left the meeting.

Note: I would like press reports and also reports in Democratic journals to see what the actual expressions were after the meeting.

Rusk reported on the seventeen-nation appeal and stated that within two days he would have a carefully worded, serious and restrained reply which would be made public. Similar replies would be made from the Government of South Vietnam. Rusk expects replies from Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, and stated that if their replies were antagonistic, belligerent, and uncompromising, our position in world opinion would improve. If on the other hand they were serious and restrained, it possibly might indicate an area was open for useful negotiations. Rusk commented that the House of Commons debate turned out favorably, there was no loss of UK support, the gas issue was quieting down, the South Vietnam internal political situation appeared somewhat more hopeful, although the Quat Government remained a new government totally untried—however, he was hopeful. Rusk then went on to review some of the non-military actions which had been approved.

Vance then reviewed roughly the military actions which had been approved, making a passing reference to the change in the mission assignment³ (there was no discussion of this point). He noted that Viet Cong actions had been down for the past four weeks, indicating that this might be the result of our bombing and other military measures.

Bundy then discussed the plan that is being developed for regional, social, and economic actions. What is envisaged here is U.S. plan to create some sort of Asian organization for the economic and social development of Asia with Western support, but with Asian sponsorship. This is not a South Vietnam question nor is it a bait to North Vietnam, but what is involved is a plan which will improve the U.S. and for that matter all Western standing in Asia. (Cooper is working on this and I suggest that some of our people discuss the plan with him.)

Ambassador Taylor then reported on his appearances before the House and Senate committees. He said the House was friendly, sympathetic, and cooperative. The Senate on the other hand was inclined to be critical and dealt harshly with him on the questions:

a. How about the reports that we are going to send several divisions of ground troops to South Vietnam?

b. Do you think this permissible under existing legislation?

c. What about the carrot that we are reading about?

Taylor felt that he responded satisfactorily. He ran into no direct antagonism but no great friendly support.

Carl Rowan reviewed actions taken by USIA, which are quite extensive and should be reviewed by DDP as I believe he is undertaking a number of actions in which we have had considerable experience and can be helpful.

General Wheeler summarized the discussion at last night’s meeting, the decisions taken,⁴ and again made a passing reference to the change in mission.

In response to a request by the President for a comment from me, I stated that I could add nothing to the evaluation given last Friday; however, I wished to point out that the air strikes have not brought an indication that the DRV are softening in their attitude—if anything they have hardened their position. I stated that I felt we must consider this carefully in view of yesterday’s decision to change the mission of the ground forces. (I feel the President did not “hoist this point aboard” and I, therefore, asked McBundy to place a copy of my letter to Secretary of State, et al. in the President’s reading file tonight. This Bundy agreed to do.)

The meeting was held up by an exchange between the President and Ambassador Taylor in which Taylor said he had everything he wanted, complete cooperation, and was going home satisfied with his week here. The President was most complimentary of Taylor.

Following the meeting I told Taylor that of the twelve points we proposed,⁵ I thought it was essential to initiate a covert program of political action to strengthen Quat and also a covert program among the generals to promote cohesion. I said that DDP would have specifics of their plans either in his hands before he left on Saturday or by the time he reached Saigon. He said that he would be very glad to entertain our proposals.

1. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
2. For another record of this meeting, see Document 231.
3. See paragraph 7 in Documents 230 and 242.
4. See Documents 229 and 242. Wheeler informed Sharp and Westmoreland of the decisions in JCS telegram 1181–65, April 3. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
5. See the attachment to Document 222.