Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

223. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 31, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with Ambassador Taylor—31 March 1965

1. In response to Taylor’s request I summarized the current estimates of South Vietnamese, NVN, ChiCom and Russian reactions to the bombing, reporting along the lines of my report to the NSC on March 26th.²

2. Advised Taylor of concern over paucity of photographic reconnaissance of South China. Advised him that if ChiNats would not agree to fly, I intended to send a special representative to see Chiang Ching Kuo, and in all probability request authority to fly American pilots over South China in U-2 planes.

3. Advised Amb. Taylor of the analysis of communications indicating that the NVN 325th Division Headquarters, now located in SVN, was in communication with 11 components in the area and also in direct communication with Hanoi and we thought this was probably associated with a plan for a concerted action against some point in the northern part of South Vietnam.

4. In answer to the Ambassador’s questions, I stated that we could not interpret the low level of VC current activity to necessarily be attributable to the air operations or orders from Hanoi. It might be explained as a cyclical situation similar to those we have observed before. The Ambassador observed that the period of low level of activity was somewhat longer than experienced before and this apparently is true. I stated that there is no question but what the bombing in the north has interrupted, but not stopped, the flow of cadres and materiel into SVN. Likewise, the tighter coastal patrol and the successful interdiction of several supply ships has had its effect.

5. Then told the Ambassador we felt more must be done to encourage the people of SVN to support the government and its purposes. Taylor countered by saying that this could only be brought about by a successful military effort and as long as there was discouragement on the part of the people, they would either be apathetic or disinclined to actively support the government. I did not fully agree, and then explained that the President had asked me for recommendations as to what more we could do in South Vietnam to help the U.S. cause. I had Taylor read the attached March 31st memorandum to the President and DDP’s memorandum to me.³ Taylor said that he could not take exception to any of the points that we made. He felt all had possibilities but naturally wished any particular action to be spelled out in detail prior to his approval. He asked that we expand on one or all of the proposed actions, transmit the ideas to Peter de Silva (whom Taylor holds in the highest regard), and he then would consider any recommendations de Silva made.

6. With respect to Item 7, Taylor said he had authorized substantial expansion of the program, mentioned 200 teams of 40 men for a total of 8,000 personnel to be trained and equipped and directed in this operation. Taylor said he was afraid that quality might erode away as the numbers grew and of course this is a possibility. He did not mention “regularizing” this activity by placing it under USOM, AID or MACV.

Action: I concurred that we would forward specifies to de Silva.

7. Throughout the discussion I said that CIA felt there was a need for a very considerable amount of covert political and civic action and work with organizations such as religious groups, labor groups, farm groups, etc., which would parallel the more overt and formal actions of the regular agencies. I expressed the opinion that CIA had very good civilian resources which were not being used and that the United States cause in South Vietnam was suffering on this account. At this point I said that the loss of Montagnard support, which was an outgrowth of Operation Switchback and MACV’s handling of this entire area, was in my opinion unfortunate. Taylor countered by saying that the Generals, most particularly Khanh, were very suspicious and resentful of the training of the Montagnards. He felt they were traditional enemies of the South Vietnamese, were considered totally unreliable, and would turn on the government or the SVN people at any moment. For this reason the Montagnard program was abandoned at the insistence of the SVN government.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.
2. See Document 217.
3. Document 222.