220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington,
March 30, 1965, 8:31 p.m.
2131. For Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland from Ambassador Taylor. Following informal memorandum of conversation is transmitted for your information. It has not been cleared by all participants. No action should be taken on decision items until confirmed through normal channels:
- 1.
- Ambassador Taylor met with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 29 March. After a general review of the military, political and pacification situation the discussion turned to: additional US and 3rd country force deployments and missions; Rolling Thunder targeting and reconnaissance; aerial mining and finally Popular Force equipment and funding.
- 2.
- Force deployments and missions:
- a.
- The JCS has recommended to the Secretary of Defense the early deployment of a three division force with appropriate combat and logistic support. This force would include the entire MEF and I Corps area. An Army Division in the high plateau, and a Korean Division, location [Page 493] unspecified. The Chairman, JCS emphasized the urgent necessity to deploy a logistical command and the forward deployment of tactical fighter squadrons as well as the earliest possible construction of the airfield at Chu Lai and a runway at Da Nang.
- b.
- Ambassador Taylor indicated that 3 divisions seemed high; that Quat was not persuaded that more troops were necessary; that anti-American sentiment lies just under the surface and that finally there are two very real limitations on the number and rate of introduction of US or 3rd country forces. First is the absorptive capacity of the country and second logistical limitations.
- c.
- The Chairman, JCS outlined the importance of establishing a goal against which logistics planning could proceed.
- d.
- The Secretary of Defense indicated that further US deployments must be accompanied by deployment of Koreans for reasons of domestic reaction.
- e.
- After an exchange of views on the missions and
operating methods of US forces the Secretary of Defense
stated that he was impressed with the adverse force
ratios and favored deployment of US forces conditioned
by:
- (1)
- political (psychological) absorption capacity
- (2)
- logistical absorption capacity
- (3)
- operational absorption—(that is operational requirements).
- f.
- For consideration later in the week OSD and JCS are laying out the various force increases, force ratio implications, and deployment schedules.
- 3.
- Rolling Thunder
- a.
- Strikes against lines of communication will be stepped up starting next week including the Thanh Hoa bridge. Subsequently and in due course the rail lines leading northeast and northwest of Hanoi will be struck. The limitations now being considered are to avoid the Haiphong area and the GCI range of MIGs around Hanoi.
- b.
- The necessity for low level recce is recognized. A policy statement (formula) is being drafted to provide within over-all sortie limitations unescorted low level recce as required anywhere in NVN as long as it serves the purpose of building up a bank of required targeting information. The Haiphong area and MIG range of Hanoi would be excluded.
- 4.
- It was agreed to reexamine the question of aerial mining of the port of Haiphong as a more effective, less expensive equivalent of blockade. It was thought that this action might become necessary in the period 4 to 12 weeks out ahead.
- 5.
- Lastly Ambassador Taylor pointed up some equipment problems associated with the Popular Forces. At a cost of $28 per man a poncho, blanket, mosquito bar and ruck sack could be provided. The [Page 494] Secretary of Defense directed immediate funding for up to 200,000 Popular Forces.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Taylor and approved by William Bundy.↩