184. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

SUBJECT

  • Farmgate Restrictions in the Republic of Vietnam (C)

JCSM–160–65

1.
Over the past several months, there has been a series of messages, letters, and discussions regarding the status, markings, mission, and Vietnamese participation in the operation of the two US Air Force air commando squadrons in South Vietnam. You are aware of the long history which accounts for their mission, the VNAF markings on these aircraft [Page 406] and the ground rule which requires VNAF observers on each mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the restrictions placed upon air commando operations and believe that these ground rules have been overcome by events.
2.
The mission of the air commando squadrons clearly has changed. Originally, they were in the RVN for a combination of combat and training purposes with the emphasis on training. Because of operational necessity their combat contribution has increased until they are now over 80 per cent combat committed. In this respect, their mission is US support of the RVNAF in exactly the same way as US Army and Marine helicopters, US Air Force and Army transport aircraft, and more recently US Air Force tactical fighter and light bomber squadrons. The Government of Vietnam seeks this support and there should be no adverse propaganda results since the Viet Cong have long been charging that the entire air war is conducted by the United States.
3.
Information from COMUSMACV reveals that difficulties are continually encountered in locating VNAF personnel to fly in the A–1Es at critical times. A typical example occurred on 27 February 1965 in which an air strike was requested in Kontum Province while the VNAF was either committed or standing down in preparation for other operations. Four air commando aircraft were alerted and prepared to meet the operational request, but no Vietnamese observers or pilots could be located to accompany the aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it is a matter of operational necessity to relax the requirement of VNAF personnel to be aboard air commando aircraft.
4.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe also that it is logical and proper to change the markings on air commando aircraft to identify US units with our own insignia. COMUSMACV reports that the Vietnamese prefer it. No adverse press reaction is anticipated when this is evaluated against the background of US jet strikes both within the RVN and against targets in the DRV. The press would find it difficult to believe that any important policy decision was involved.
5.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the training mission of the air commando squadrons is clearly the lesser of its responsibilities. However, the training mission is essential to the development of the VNAF 5th and 6th A–1H squadrons. Consequently, the air commando training mission will be essential for at least another year. There is no reason why this training cannot or should not be conducted with US Air Force markings.
6.
In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:
a.
The task of the air commando squadrons include:
(1)
Training as necessary in support of the VNAF.
(2)
Combat operations in support of the RVNAF.
b.
Air commando A–1Es be permanently marked with US Air Force insignia for both in and out of country operations.
c.
Air commando A–1Es be authorized to conduct combat operations without VNAF personnel aboard.
d.
The action proposed in the attached draft message2 be approved.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin File: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.
  2. Attached, but not printed.