Office of the Historian

92. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)1

Washington, March 20, 1964—5:58 p.m.
1.
We have studied your 17762 and I am asking State to have Bill Bundy make sure that you get our latest planning documents on ways of applying pressure and power against the North. I understand that some of this was discussed with you by McNamara mission in Saigon, but as plans are refined it would be helpful to have your detailed comments. As we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations of McNamara mission with General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the North at the present would be premature. We here share General Khanh’s judgment that the immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this reason our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest possible military and [Page 185] political base for possible later action. There is additional international reason for avoiding immediate overt action in that we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties soon and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown. But if at any time you feel that more immediate action is urgent, I count on you to let me know specifically the reasons for such action, together with your recommendations for its size and shape.
2.
On dealing with De Gaulle, I continue to think it may be valuable for you to go to Paris after Bohlen has made his first try. (State is sending you draft instruction to Bohlen, which I have not yet reviewed, for your comment.)3 It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon that your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head, and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. I have made this point myself to Mansfield and Lippmann and I expect to use every public opportunity to restate our position firmly. You may want to convey our concern on this point to General Khanh and get his ideas on the best possible joint program to stop such talk in Saigon, in Washington, and in Paris. I imagine that you have kept General Khanh abreast of our efforts in Paris. After we see the results of the Bohlen approach you might wish to sound him out on Paris visit by you.4
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. The message was drafted in the White House and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram 1484 to Saigon, which is the source text.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Telegram 1487 to Saigon, March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S). For the instructions sent to Paris, see Document 96.↩
  4. Telegram 1484 does not bear President Johnson’s signature.↩