461. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President1
Embtel 1826.2 As you have seen from our recent cables, we are in the midst of another first-class governmental crisis in Saigon. The infighting is going on on three fronts: the govt versus the Generals, the Generals versus the US Ambassador and the Buddhists versus the govt.
On the first front, negotiations are now in progress between PriMin Huong and General Khanh to find way to patch up the situation precipitated by the acts of the Generals on December 20 in undertaking to abolish the High National Council and in arresting some 22 officials and politicians. We are urging Huong to drive a hard bargain with the military, insisting at a minimum on refusing to recognize the validity of the abolition of the High National Council, on the release of the political prisoners to the govt and on a public declaration of support by the Generals for Huong govt and statement of their willingness to cooperate with and participate in it if requested. At the moment Khanh is insisting on acceptance of the abolition of the High National Council and is acting as if he intended to hold the prisoners hostage until the govt gives in. I am doing my best to keep Huong bucked up but it is hard to put starch into him because he believes the Buddhist threat is his foremost problem and thus feels he cannot afford to alienate the military at this time. I have assured him that he has an important trump in his ability to threaten resignation if his [Page 1032] conditions are not met. I have the feeling that General Khanh and the other Generals are most anxious to keep him in office and have no satisfactory replacement for him.
With regard to the Generals versus the Ambassador, the former are acting greatly offended by my disapproval of their recent actions privately expressed to four of their number3 and resent our efforts to strengthen the Huong govt against their pressures. One unfortunate effect of our action in opposing the Generals has been to drive them closer to Khanh who senses the opportunity to solidify his military position by pursuing an anti-Taylor, anti-US line. Although it is to neither of our interests to conduct public quarrel, I am afraid that Khanh intends to make publicly offensive statements which it will be hard to ignore. Once the immediate heat has subsided and the Generals have reverted to a more reasonable mood, I shall try to restore normal relations with them.
The Buddhist front has been relatively quiet. Indeed, we have received intimations they are deliberately laying off the govt while it is being threatened by the military. Although Huong has always suspected some collusion between Khanh and the Buddhists, our contacts among the latter indicate nothing but dislike for him. However, the Buddhist issue is still with us and may flare up again at any time.
In summary, we still do not know the outcome of the political events of the weekend. We are telling Huong that he has only two choices which are acceptable: (1) To stay in office after imposing hard conditions on the Generals or (2) to resign and force the military to take responsibility for their actions. I am afraid he may be tempted to temporize and carry on with the challenge of the military unanswered; but if he does so, it will be only to postpone the showdown and will leave us with a cowed government which cannot make decisions with any assurance of being allowed to carry them out. Particularly since such situation would further aggrandize Khanh, who is already pretty insufferable, it would be very difficult for us to work with such a lineup.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1916 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to another copy, the telegram was drafted by Taylor. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T–157–69) Telegram 1916 was received in the Department of State at 8:33 a.m.↩
- Document 447.↩
- See Document 451.↩
- Telegram 1916 bears this typed signature.↩