456. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
1320. In support of your efforts to persuade military at least partially undo damage Saturday’s2 actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might apply in the event you concluded it was necessary.
If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any pending US assistance actions and letting this become known. You are in best position evaluate whether these would impress generals or conversely hurt Huong’s position. In addition, following steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to us:
- 1.
- Suspend Operation Barrel Roll. We not clear whether this would have significant effect on attitude of generals, and whether they are aware of our operations and value them at least psychologically. We also concerned suspension might give wrong signal to Hanoi. On other hand, publicity or aircraft loss under present circumstances might have adverse effects both here and in Saigon. Since next operation not scheduled until 24 December would appreciate your comments for further review this possibility. Obviously, any action in this connection should not be discussed with generals since this might imply commitment to resume or increase if they behave.
- 2.
- Instruct all or selected corps and division advisors make known [to] their counterpart our dissatisfaction with blow by military at structure civilian government, perhaps suspending for the time being further contacts with their counterparts.
- 3.
- Stand down temporarily Farmgate.
- 4.
- Suspend logistical airlift where critical supply shortages do not exist.
On balance, we inclined believe none except possibly first and second steps would produce desired results. Obviously any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if continued for very long.
We have also considered and rejected possibility of cutting essential POL and direct military supplies. Similarly, we do not favor suspension or interruption CPI, since it would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong Government.
[Page 1026]We are prepared consider any other suggestions which Mission may have on means of bringing home to Armed Forces Council necessity of restoring reality of civilian government.