45. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1
SUBJECT
- South Vietnam
I wanted to give you some thoughts for your forthcoming trip to Saigon.2 I agree that the next four or five months will be critical in the sense that if a favorable political and military trend does not develop in that period, we will slowly lose our position in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. Thus we have a very short time within which to make the changes in our own organization in the field to produce a coherent effort from the American side.
I have the impression that since last November 1st our own efforts in support of what we used to call the Strategic Hamlet Program have deteriorated badly. I refer to that collection of activities which included the Montagnard program, hamlet militia training, CIDG training, police training, pig and fertilizer programs, etc.; in short, all of the mixed civil and military counterinsurgency programs which about a year ago seemed to be working well.
[Page 78]The two coups obviously have affected the GVN’s efforts, but I am also worried lest our own organization has deteriorated. We have lost [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a rather large and extraordinarily successful effort with the Montagnards on the Central Plateau. Recent reports suggest to me that what we once thought was a solid program is beginning to fall apart in that region. A [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] memorandum3 I have recently read implies that most of the young Vietnamese and tribal dialect speaking Americans who worked in the hill country have been pulled off.
I don’t know what has happened to Trueheart’s rural rehabilitation committee, which coordinated the AID efforts with the military, especially in the Delta. I assume it must be functioning under Nes; but we haven’t had any word about it.
I suspect that Army Special forces, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] have tended to pull their resources away from the populated regions of the High Plateau in an effort to increase their activities along the Laotian border. This may have left the VC behind to attack what we once thought were strong Montagnard hamlets in their rear.
These are only impressions that I have gathered from reading the current reporting, which, as you know too well, is voluminous but uninformative. I have four specific suggestions for you to consider while you are in Saigon:
- 1.
- Minister for Rural Operations. We
should have one manager in Saigon with the responsibility and
authority to run that part of the war which lies between
Lodge’s diplomatic
discourses with the highest level of the GVN on the one hand, and Harkins’ military
responsibility to advise and direct ARVN and conventional U.S. military efforts on the
other. He should have the rank of Minister and be responsible to
Lodge and Harkins. Nes should become
Lodge’s Minister for
Political Affairs and should perform the traditional functions
of DCM in an ordinary Embassy.
The Minister for Operations should be a civilian preferably with
some military background, someone like Hank Byroade. Such a
person would have direct authority over the following parts of
the existing U.S. agencies in Saigon:
- (a)
- The USOM rural rehabilitation organization (i.e., including the USOM representatives in the various provinces).
- (b)
- All USIS psywar-type operations (leaflet printing, films, etc.).
- (c)
- Those Army Special Forces units who are engaged in training Vietnamese irregulars who do not leave their home regions (hamlet militia, SDC, and other local paramilitary organizations as distinguished from regular ARVN units).
- (d)
- Any vestiges remaining of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] paramilitary functions. [Page 79] He should have a call upon MACV, USOM, the Embassy and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for support where necessary.
- 2.
- You might inquire whether the organization of the ARVN itself is well suited to the territorial war. Is the division a useful unit on which to base U.S. and GVN planning and support? Would more decentralization of tactical command, say to the province or district level, tend to tailor military operations more closely to local intelligence and other conditions? I have no expertise at all in such matters; but I should imagine that General Stilwell and Bob Thompson may have some useful thoughts. If you are impressed with Thompson, would it make any sense to associate him more closely with our own efforts-i.e., as an informal member of our country team?
- 3.
- Wouldn’t it be worthwhile discussing with Khanh the possibility of his instructing ARVN subordinate commanders to take their military advisors more seriously? Could this be done on a “burden of proof” basis? If an ARVN unit commander refused to follow U.S. advice and then failed, he would have the burden of showing affirmatively that his decision was the correct one. Conversely, if he followed the advice and failed, he would be given the benefit of any doubt.
- 4.
- The necessity for U.S. liaison with Khanh and his government is greater than ever before. We had no knowledge of this coup; and unless we pull up our socks, we will not ever have the opportunity of dissuading others from starting a new one. The French can be counted upon to stir up trouble. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lodge has to be persuaded that such people do not represent a threat to his authority, if he chooses to give them guidance.