Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

445. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 12, 1964—5:54 p.m.

1266. For the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Meeting today again underscored great concern of highest authority for fullest possible Country Team efforts bring various political groups into support for GVN.² Would be helpful if your next status report could cover attitudes of key groups and summarize various U.S. contacts and types of effort with each, indicating how effort coordinated by you or Deputy Ambassador. For this purpose key groups would appear to include Buddhists, military, Catholics, students, sects, and perhaps such groups as Montagnards, indigenous press, civil servants, as you believe these important.

In our discussions, the problem of immediate priority was obviously relations between Buddhists and GVN and Buddhists and U.S. which seemed to be developing into major confrontations. We are particularly concerned that communications between Buddhists and GVN/U.S. are deteriorating. We thought some of the following ideas on the method and substance of communications with the Buddhists which were developed here were worth passing on to you.

A. Attempt to get across to Buddhist leaders a sense that, (1) unlike summer 1963, their cause does not now have wide-spread popular support outside Viet-Nam and;

(2) A direct confrontation with the Government at this time could, in our judgment, render it virtually impossible for us to undertake some of the measures which we think would be useful in dealing with the VC threat directed and supported from the North. These thoughts might be conveyed by:

a. A direct approach to Buddhist leaders by Emboffs at appropriate level.

b. Play-back of appropriate U.S. press commentary by VOA.

c. Public statements here in Washington.

B. Letter from Ambassador Lodge to Tri Quang. Embassy views on what might be said obviously better than our own. Such letter might, however, include thought that essence of democratic government which Buddhists say they want is building of orderly methods of taking political action without causing chaos and collapse of entire structure of government, If this idea seems worthwhile, we will be happy to approach Lodge with Embassy draft.

C. In order provide Buddhists with a possible attractive stake in enterprise, we might devise methods of funneling material aid through Buddhist leadership so that they may become involved in supporting their adherents at village and hamlet level in conjunction with pacification effort. Perhaps active Buddhist social welfare organizations could be created, both in Viet-Nam and possibly also in U.S., which could act as brokers between American official and unofficial aid programs and Buddhist laymen in Viet-Nam in same way as Catholic and Protestant missionaries work to support their followers in provinces. Possibly Catholic or Protestant advisor, American or Vietnamese, could be found to help the Buddhists set up program and deal with necessary paper work.

D. GVN might seek prominent Buddhist interlocutor who could formulate Buddhist grievances in responsible and respectable manner so that GVN could at appropriate time promptly and publicly give satisfaction in order to cut some ground out from under hard-line Buddhist leaders.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

We would appreciate your comments on these ideas plus any others you may have of your own. We are trying to. develop further specific thoughts on actions which might be taken with other groups listed in Para 1 of this message.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared in draft with William Bundy and the first sentence cleared in substance with McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Also discussed at the meeting, which was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William (Chairman) and McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Cooper, McCone, Vance, McNaughton, and Admirals Mustin and McDonald, were air operations in Laos, deployment of Hawk missiles to Vietnam, infiltration, third country briefings, and OPLAN 34A. (Telegram 1265 to Saigon, December 12; ibid., POL 27 VIET S, and JCS 2339/164, December 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218. ICS Files)