Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

443. Memorandum of a Conversation¹

Soviet Embassy, Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• South East Asia

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

In response to the Secretary’s remark that he wished to discuss the situation in South East Asia, Mr. Gromyko said he had also wanted to discuss this matter. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to ask what intentions the U.S. had in that area. As the Soviet Union had stated on a number of earlier occasions, it believed that the U.S. had made a great mistake by getting involved in South Vietnam, because there were no U.S. interests involved in that area. But the U.S. had its troops in South Vietnam and was now increasing them. This was not in accord with the U.S.-expressed desire to reduce tensions in the area. Consequently, the question arose as to what the real U.S. intentions were. The Soviet Union had no troops or experts in the area and had taken no action similar to the actions taken by the U.S.

The Secretary observed that on the basis of Mr. Gromyko’s remarks, it appeared that there was no problem between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in South East Asia. Unfortunately, Hanoi and Peiping were very active in that area. Our position was very simple: if Peiping and Hanoi left their neighbors alone, there would be no U.S. troops in that area. We had no interests and we sought no bases there, and all we were doing was because of Hanoi and Peiping. The Secretary hoped that there was no difference between our two countries as to the facts of the situation. In 1959, Hanoi had made the decision to go after South Vietnam, and that decision had been made public in 1960. North Vietnam was sending men and supplies to South Vietnam. Hanoi was in control of daily operations, and we knew that command lines went from the Viet Cong to Hanoi. There were constant infiltrations, which particularly increased in 1964. Infiltrators came through Laos. which was a direct contravention of the 1962 accords. There were more and more men in South Vietnam who had been trained in the North Vietnamese forces, and they were North Vietnamese rather than some South Vietnamese who might have undergone training in North Vietnam. Perhaps some people on the Soviet side said that this was a war of liberation, but we regarded the situation as pure aggression. The Secretary repeated that if Hanoi and Peiping left their neighbors alone, we would not be there; otherwise, he stressed, we were in a serious situation. He hoped the Soviet Union would in no way encourage Hanoi and Peiping and would use its influence to restrain them. Again, he could only say that if Hanoi and Peiping left the area alone, we would come home; otherwise, there would be a real scrap.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that the U.S. had prevented elections from taking place in Vietnam as provided for under the 1954 agreement. Thus, the U.S. had blocked the chance for unification. The U.S. had sent troops to South Vietnam and now it could see what had developed. He also wished to point out that U.S. troops had been sent not in response to any action by Hanoi and Peiping; rather, they had been there from the very beginning.

The Secretary asked what period Mr. Gromyko was talking about.

Mr. Gromyko replied he had in mind the entire period after the 1954 Geneva agreement. He said the U.S. was trying to tell the Vietnamese how to resolve their problems. The Soviet Union knew that the U.S. sympathies were with South Vietnam; on the other hand, the Soviet Union was in sympathy with North Vietnam. Yet the difference was that the U.S. had troops in South Vietnam whereas the Soviet Union had no troops in North Vietnam. If the Soviet Union were to match the U.S., it would have troops in North Vietnam.

The Secretary said that as far as the 1954–55 period was concerned, it had become very clear that no free elections were possible in North Vietnam. In that period, Hanoi had asked the Soviet Union for help, and the Soviet Union gave it. South Vietnam had asked for assistance from the U.S., and we met their request. At that time, we had had no troops, but only assistance missions in South Vietnam. In any event, it was clear that no free elections could have been possible. The Secretary noted that neither South Vietnam nor the U.S. had signed the 1954 agreement, although we had accepted it and had said that a violation of the agreement would have serious consequences. But even if, for the sake of argument, one accepted the view that one of the clauses of the agreement had been violated, that was no justification for military action and aggression. He did not know the extent of the Soviet responsibility with respect to Hanoi, but he wished to point out that even though there had been no Soviet troops in Greece or Korea, there was no doubt about Soviet involvement in those situations. The Secretary reiterated once again that the only problem in South East Asia was that Hanoi and Peiping did not wish to leave their neighbors alone.

[Here follows discussion on Laos.]

He [Rusk] then said he wished to point out that as far as U.S. troops in South Vietnam were concerned, we had fewer troops in South Vietnam than North Vietnam had. He suggested that Mr. Gromyko and he should not tease each other. We knew perfectly well who those personnel were, what routes they followed, etc. The situation was one of pure and cold aggression.

Mr. Gromyko suggested the U.S. was committing aggression against North Vietnam.

The Secretary said there seemed to be ideological differences on this point between our two sides. Were we aggressors because we helped others defend themselves?

Mr. Gromyko inquired who had asked the U.S. for help. There had been several governments in South Vietnam, they changed all the time, and none of them had popular support.

The Secretary noted we had been told that policies would continue even if personalities change.

Mr. Gromyko commented the methods of change in South Vietnam were rather curious. In any event, the Soviet Government regarded the U.S. policy in South Vietnam as contrary to the interests of peace. He reiterated that elections should have been held in Vietnam. Although he did not know what their outcome would have been, the fact was that the 1954 agreement had been violated.

The Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko whether he seriously believed that free elections were possible in North Vietnam.

Mr. Gromyko replied in the affirmative. He said the election procedure was set forth in the 1954 agreement and had been developed with U.S. participation. What he thought had happened was that the U.S. had probably decided that the North Vietnamese would obtain a majority. This was the only explanation of the U.S. refusal to accept elections. Thus, the U.S. had one policy regarding elections in Germany, and another policy regarding elections in Vietnam.

The Secretary asked whether this was not true in the case of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gromyko said no, adding that the U.S. had troops in South Vietnam whereas the Soviet Union had no troops in North Vietnam.

The Secretary said we were not against peaceful discussion of the South Vietnamese problem. However, North Vietnam should stop its activities and leave South Vietnam alone.

Mr. Gromyko again asked by whom the U.S. had been invited to South Vietnam. Was it by the man who had been overthrown and since forgotten?

The Secretary said we had been invited by all the governments which had served in South Vietnam.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that none of those governments had been supported by the people.

The Secretary wondered why Hanoi did not want to leave South Vietnam and Laos alone.

Mr. Gromyko suggested that this question be asked of the North Vietnamese Government at the conference. He observed that the Secretary’s remarks did not open good prospects for the future.

The Secretary said Mr. Gromyko’s remarks implied that Hanoi would continue its activities.

Mr. Gromyko contended the Soviet Union had no information regarding the presence of any North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Any information about infiltrators or guerrillas from North Vietnam was strictly a U.S. responsibility. He said perhaps South Vietnam and Laos were sending infiltrators in the other direction.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 16 and approved in the Executive Secretariat on December 30. Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 19th session of the U.N. General Assembly, which began December 1.