Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

439. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 7, 1964—9 p.m.

1746. Bangkok eyes only for Ambassador. Together with Westmoreland and Alex Johnson I met today with Prime Minister Huong, Deputy PriMin Vien and General Khanh. I gave them a paper translated into French² following very closely the lines of my instructions³ emphasizing necessity discretion and secrecy.

All three read the paper soberly and carefully and we subsequently had extended discussion in which two main points of concern on their part emerged. First, while accepting the listed concrete specifics of indications of governmental effectiveness, concern as to what we really meant and whether they would be able to meet the broad conditions precedent to undertaking Phase 2, concentrating particularly on “a stable effective government capable of conducting successfully the campaign against the Viet Cong” and “a government in Saigon able to speak for and to its people.” The second concern related to failure of the paper to say anything with respect to Cambodia and the help to the Viet Cong that comes through Cambodia.

With respect to the first point, I detected an undercurrent of disappointment on the part of the Prime Minister that he felt that the paper implied that he had not been carrying on government in a capable manner. He pointed out that the army and the police have been responsive to his direction and that “what we have done up to now proves we have control.” I pointed out that we were by no means criticizing, in fact we were very impressed with his conduct of the govt up to now but that we were expecting to have a period during which the govt would be able to demonstrate its ability to continue such control and that the Buddhist agitation was giving an impression, false to be sure, that a large segment of the population was against the govt The PriMin asked what proof he must present to demonstrate that the Buddhist Institute does not represent the overwhelming majority of Buddhists in Vietnam.

In regard to the second point, both the PriMin and Khanh spoke at some length concerning the provocative attitude of Cambodia and help for VC coming through Cambodia. I pointed out that the whole program was directed towards Hanoi which was the key and if this was dealt with the problem of Cambodian support to the VC would take care of itself.

In conclusion the PriMin agreed that while reserving on details for later discussion they generally approved our proposals. It was agreed that the same group would meet again at 8:00 Wednesday⁴ morning for further discussion and at that time I plan to table what we are prepared to offer the GVN to help strengthen the govt.

Meanwhile I perceive no objection to going ahead with proposed discussions with other allies.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared with Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 9:18 a.m.
2. A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A–468 from Saigon, December 15. (Ibid.)
3. Document 435.
4. December 9.