Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, December 4, 1964—10:18 p.m.

3669. A. In talks with Peck and Stewart (UK) on December 3 and with Waller and Laking² jointly on December 4, Bundy explained general decisions made here during Taylor’s discussions along following lines:

1. We deeply concerned about fragility internal GVN situation. Huong himself has guts and his areas of inexperience are partially supplied by Deputy PM Vien and on military side by Khanh, who appears be cooperating reasonably well although not as fully as we would wish. Thus, GVN as whole does have some promise settling down and slowly improving its performance if it can deal with major Buddhist threat now building up. On security side, armed forces have held together well and such factors as recruitment showing improvement. Nonetheless, situation is still slowly deteriorating although little likelihood really major VC military successes at least in next two months or so.

2. USG believes this fragile situation makes any dramatic action unwise for this reason alone but that it does require some additional elements that would tend to lift SVN morale and would also convey slightly stronger signal to Hanoi. USG therefore proposes immediate program including two new elements: (a) intensified US “armed reconnaissance” strikes against infiltration routes in Laos, (b) reprisals against any dramatic VC action in south such as Bien Hoa attack, preferably with reprisal occasion involving GVN and not solely US elements. Reprisal targets would be carefully selected, probably infiltration installations, between 17th and 19th parallels. Actions in Laos would necessarily require Souvanna’s concurrence.

3. Time table for above calls for Taylor consultations with GVN on his return to obtain agreement series GVN actions in return for above program and additional US undertakings, support forces increases, economic measures, etc. (These will be worked out in Saigon and announced there.) Sullivan will thereafter talk to Souvanna about 10 December and Martin will concurrently brief Thai rather fully. Laos air actions would be initiated about 15 December if RLG has concurred.

4. Para 2 program now worked out only for initial 30-day period. May then be continued or we may at some time move onward into program of gradually increased pressures through air attacks on DRV with GVN forces playing major role at least at outset. This second phase not yet decided but clearly preferred to any alternative of more sharp and dramatic military action. Crucial determinants will be whether GVN settles down and whether Hanoi shows any signs of responding to Para 2 program designed to impress them with our determination and to foreshadow possible future actions.

B. Following this briefing, Bundy went on to say prospect possible more serious decisions made it more than ever vital have increased third country contributions. Suggested UK increase numbers of police advisors, Australia consider 200-man augmentation combat advisors, and GNZ likewise seek to increase its contribution markedly. Indicated President had deep personal concern this aspect, would discuss this with Wilson, and would send personal messages to Menzies and Holyoake early next week.³

C. In response to presentation:

1. Peck and Stewart indicated personal support these decisions and expressed belief HMG would support all points and would be relieved we not contemplating early drastic action. At same time, they noted that if military action did increase, HMG at some point would be under great pressure take some lead in seeking a reconvened Geneva Conference or other visible negotiating avenue. We said we would be alert for all indications Hanoi and Peiping changes of position but we are opposed any visible negotiations at least for some time to come and in absence clear indications they could produce our objective of independent and secure SVN. British also raised question of possible ChiCom reaction and tended agree our judgment major response unlikely unless actions carried so far as to appear to threaten existence of DRV or China herself.

2. Waller and Laking likewise raised question re negotiations and Commie reactions. They further asked about scale Lao operations to which we responded exact program being worked out and would in any case depend on RLG acceptance.

D. To Waller and Laking only we mentioned that planning for possible second phase had considered possibility introducing division-size ground forces into northern SVN to pre-empt any ground reaction by DRV. We said such a force would be much more effective if it included at least small units from GOA and GNZ. They responded that Malaysia commitments increasingly onerous but that they would pass suggestion on for comment.

E. Above is for information Ambassador Powell⁴ and Charges only at this time. Ambassador Bruce⁵ is being briefed here. You will be further instructed, but may discuss above with senior officials if they raise with you. We stressed vital importance avoiding press leaks that go beyond formal statements here or possibly later in Saigon.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and initialed by Ball. Also sent to Canberra and Wellington.
2. John K. Waller, Australian Ambassador, and George R. Laking, New Zealand Ambassador.
3. Copies of the letters to Menzies and Holyoake, dated December 12, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Memos.
4. Herbert B. Powell, Ambassador to New Zealand.
5. David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to the United Kingdom.