Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, October 18, 1964—3:47 p.m.

859. From Secretary for Ambassador. Bob McNamara and I have following reactions to political moves you have reported during last week.

A struggle seems to be developing between Minh and HNC on one hand and Khanh and Young Turk military on the other. Between these two groups it seems to us our best interests are served if Khanh comes out on top. We have little confidence that Minh can serve as effective chief executive especially in light of weakness his support and strength of his Young Turk opposition. Problem, therefore, is how to get government with Khanh in a leading role, ideally as chief executive unless some strong civilian shows up who is not now apparent. At least Khanh should remain as leader Army with co-equal position to civilians in a government whose mandate will run for at least 18 months.

It seems important to make effort find acceptable civilian leadership which can work with Khanh and military. Our only thought from this end is that Vu Van Mau might form center of such civilian leadership. He might serve as chief of civilian side of government with Khanh as chief of military side. Whether or not this is in realm of possible, we believe it should be made clear that US does not support Minh as powerful chief executive.

This is consensus here and we would much appreciate your comment.²

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared in substance with McNamara, and initialed by Rusk.
2. On October 19, Taylor replied that he had reached the same conclusions. He was optimistic that U.S. officials had convinced the Council to reduce the powers of the Chief of State, leaving real power to be exercised by the Prime Minister and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and speculated that an acceptable arrangement could be worked out if a satisfactory civilian Prime Minister could be found and if he and Khanh could then work out a role for the armed forces. Taylor did not think Vu Van Mau would “pan out,” but felt former Foreign Minister Quat might be possible. (Telegram 1183 from Saigon; ibid.)