Office of the Historian

38. Report From the Executive Director-Comptroller of Central Intelligence (Kirkpatrick) and the Station Chief in Saigon (de Silva) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)1

Saigon, February 10, 1964.
1.
With regard to the conduct of the war, we must judge that the situation at this moment must be characterized as one in which the population at large appears apathetic, without enthusiasm either for the GVN or the VC sides but responsive to the latter because it fears the VC. The most important single factor continues to be whether or not the rural population will be willing to defend itself against the VC and to support GVN actions against the VC. In this sector, there now seems to be less conviction and resolution, and a more widespread inclination to avoid the problems of opposing the VC, and to play both sides in hopes somehow of getting along peacefully and without personal commitment.
2.
Obviously this gradual abrading of the popular will to resistance, if such is indeed taking place as it appears to be to us here in Saigon, is of the most fundamental importance, and constitutes a trend which must be altered and reversed. What is needed in this regard and very soon are a series of GVN successes in the military sphere which would go [far] toward implanting and nourishing a popular attitude that the GVN has the means of bringing security and a sense of ease to the rural population, and is clearly determined to do so on an everbroadening front throughout the countryside. Only within some such atmosphere of hopefulness can the will and the resolve to oppose the VC be strengthened, and it must be if this war is to be won.
3.
The new regime will enjoy stability in direct proportion to the degree it galvanizes and energizes the government apparatus and in particular the Vietnamese military establishment in terms of an aggressive and successful prosecution of the fight. If the present regime should give an impression of uncertainty, apathy, or irresoluteness, it would appear logical to assume that its days as a government would inevitably be numbered, and it would also seem logical that its successor would be a regime destined to lend itself to solutions to end the fighting on conditions which we would find highly undesirable. In short, the present regime can be a stable one if it takes the initiative and forces it on a government structure and a population waiting to be led and hopefully still willing to be led in an anti-VC cause. If the regime falters and appears to be failing in this regard, there are undoubtedly elements in Vietnam who will be willing to make their move and seek other solutions.
4.
Mr. Kirkpatrick’s personal comment is as follows: I agree with the above but must note that even armed with your pessimistic comments following your last visit I have been shocked by the number of our (CIA) people and of the military, even those whose job is always to say we are winning, who feel that the tide is against us. Admittedly this is based on a limited number of discussions here and in Danang in three days. There are ominous indications that the VC are able to mount larger operations than in the past using bigger arms, including anti-aircraft. Vietnamese Government reactions are still slow, defensive and reminiscent of French tactics here a decade ago. There are still really no fundamental internal security measures of any effectiveness such as identity cards, block wardens, travel controls, etc. Extensive use by the VC of the waterways leaves the GVN handcuffed. It is evident that a major factor in VC victories is their superior intelligence based on nationwide penetrations and intimidation at all levels. This also is a factor in their military victories where internal agents turn guns on defenders. Finally, with the Laos and Cambodia borders open, this entire pacification effort is like trying to mop the floor before turning off the faucet.
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–75. Alternate Proposals. Secret. The source text is a copy of the report that the CIA sent McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum explaining that this analysis was not being formally disseminated because it was a reply to a personal request from McCone.↩