355. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
903. CINCPAC for POLAD. US Mission Council met for two hours with Vietnamese National Security Council morning Sept 18. Atmosphere of discussions was more frank and more concrete than previous such meetings and Khanh obviously felt much more comfortable with his current cabinet team than he had in earlier days when Hoan, Khiem and Phat were members of the group. He touched upon several internal Vietnamese problems with more bluntness than he has done on previous occasions.
Meeting addressed two fundamental agenda points. First was formality of assigning specific tasks to joint US–GVN staff committees which had been created prior to hiatus which developed over past month. These talks had been worked out in specific detail at staff level and it is expected committees will begin functioning on these matters immediately.
Second major agenda point, which consumed bulk of meeting, concerned problems associated with execution of Hop Tac plan. In this discussion, we ventilated and in some measure resolved four significant points:
- (a)
- First item was structural organization for direction of Hop Tac undertaking. Khanh himself will initially head pacification task force in his capacity as MinDef and will meet at least weekly with similar US group headed by Westmoreland. I urged Khanh that he appoint deputy for Hop Tac who will be able to give it time and attention it requires. He agreed. Civilian reps of VN ministries and US agencies will sit in this body.
- (b)
- Associated with this question is problem of field organization for Hop Tac. Currently III Corps exercises field command responsibility but does not control Gia Dinh Province or Rung Sac special zone. Khanh will study possibility integrating these two areas under III Corps but said quite frankly that issue involved defense of capital military zone and capacity for dissatisfied elements to execute coup against capital if area immediately surrounding Saigon all placed in hands single authority.
- (c)
- Third matter of significance discussed concerned legal authority for civil and military police to arrest suspected Viet Cong, Viet Cong sympathizers and Viet Cong agents who have committed no ostensible breach of law. It was agreed that authority for such arrests currently exists under Diem regime law but that need remains for [Page 777] clarifying directives to police and provincial authorities stipulating manner in which these decrees can be executed. US advisors will work with GVN authorities in developing this clarification.
- (d)
- Finally emphasis was laid upon need for civilian ministers and ministerial authorities to accord first priority, both personnel and resources, to Hop Tac requirements. Newly appointed Inter Min Vien has been assigned general responsibility for pacification matters, relieving erstwhile Vice PriMin Hoan (whom Khanh described as attempting to use pacification cadres to execute nationwide coup). Vien, who has privately discussed Hop Tac with Alex Johnson and myself, seems excellent choice for job since he appears to recognize urgency of Hop Tac operation and to be relatively able man.
In general, I [garble—came from?] meeting with satisfactory resumption of bilateral effort which we have attempted infuse into these national security level sessions. It brought into relief the many areas where preparatory work needs to be done before the Hop Tac operation can be considered truly underway. In recognition of this fact, we agree to set October 1 as the date for the formal initiation of Hop Tac and to utilize remainder of September to bring up to date the preparatory measures which have slipped during the recent political turmoil. It is our belief that appropriate pressure forcing GVN to grapple with pragmatic issues involved in Hop Tac may not only raise level administrative competence on their part but, if they are successful, could induce that measure of confidence in their own abilities which is now so conspicuously lacking in both Saigon and the provinces.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to CIA. the Department of Defense. and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC.↩