Office of the Historian

353. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, September 16, 1964—4 p.m.

870. CINCPAC for POLAD. This message discusses the problems of politico-military coordination which are expected to arise in Southeast Asia as the decisions of NSAM 3142 are implemented during the coming months. The recent ad hoc conference in Saigon on September 113 showed clearly that some of these problems are with us now. [Page 773] What appears necessary is to anticipate future requirements by formalizing a coordination procedure which can be quickly invoked as and when needed.

The political agencies involved in current and projected military activities are the Embassies in Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon. The military agencies are MACV and the Seventh Fleet (both subordinate to CINCPAC) and the armed forces (particularly the air force) of SVN, Laos and Thailand. The overall problem is how to mount quickly effective military operations in Laos and NVN by military forces of one or more of four nations on satisfactory political terms. Obviously this will take some doing.

While the determination of the coordination machinery is a joint State-DOD responsibility, I venture to suggest as a possible solution the creation on a Noforn basis of a politico-military Southeast Asia coordination committee reporting to State/DOD with seat at Saigon. The political component would consist of the DCM’s of the Embassies of Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon under chairmanship of Alex Johnson. (This would not exclude attendance of Ambassadors if desired.) The military component would consist of COMUSMACV-T (chairman), a senior representative of CINCPAC/Seventh Fleet, a senior military representative from Bangkok, and a military representative from Vientiane. CIA or other agency representation would be arranged as required. The coordination committee would meet on call of any of the three posts or Washington, as required, either as a single body or by components. The US Ambassador Saigon could be charged with providing administrative and logistical support This is one way to accomplish the needed coordination. There may be other and better ways. As it appears important to get early agreement on some way, it is recommended that the matter be taken up by State-DOD as a matter of urgency.

I am sending Sullivan to Bangkok and Vientiane to furnish background on this matter to Ambassadors Martin and Unger who will undoubtedly wish to comment to Washington.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC.↩
  2. Document 345.↩
  3. See Document 346.↩