Office of the Historian

350. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, September 13, 1964—2 p.m.

838. I have just had one hour meeting with Khanh who out at General Ky’s headquarters Tan Son Nhut (porch was thronged with foreign and Vietnamese newsmen), surrounded by Ky, Thieu, Kang (Marine Corps) and Colonel Thao. Also Ranger captain who had defected from Duc.

I told Khanh of my conversations with Phat and Minh and at my urging he immediately dispatched messenger to ask Minh to meet him. Told him felt Minh could and was ready to play useful intermediary role.

Khanh said that he planned to go slow with any military moves against dissidents and rather seek defections. He was encouraged by defection of Ranger captain in less than an hour of his arrival. Khanh agreed every effort must be made to avoid clashes between Vietnamese forces. Also agreed important to give face-saving way for Duc and company to retreat without feeling under compulsion to fight. Said would permit them and families leave country without reprisals and if negotiations appeared useful would offer permit dissidents have some representation on Supreme National Council or otherwise give tangible satisfaction. He said originally this morning through intermediary he had made three demands which he did not find insurmountable:

1)
Colonel Thao must be dismissed,
2)
The four Dalat Generals could not resume active duty, and
3)
There must be a strong central government.

However, this overtaken by violent Phat radio broadcast attacking Khanh personally.

Khanh asked and I agreed recommend to Washington:

1)
We make statement disapproving of coup effort,
2)
Indicating our support continues to be given to triumvirate and the govt of General Khanh,
3)
(This and 4) added at my suggestion) Continue to feel that program for formation national council provisional.
4)
We deplore bloodshed between GVN forces.

[Page 769]

I strongly recommend release of such statement2 and its play over VOA as it now seems clear Duc and company have little political viability. Even if outcome is fall of Khanh, Duc and company are not likely to be ones running country. I also gave full and fair warning to Phat this was our position.

Johnson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash. Repeated to the White House, the Department of Defense, CIA, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 5:26 p.m. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1971, 94F. The Department of State file copy is apparently in error in giving the time of transmission as 2 a.m.↩
  2. A statement along these lines, transmitted to Saigon in telegram 657, September 13 at 7:11 p.m., was released to the press at 6:45 p.m. Washington time. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩