Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

340. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)¹

MACJO2

Saigon, September 6, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Assessment of the Military Situation

1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might be useful to give you my assessment of the military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the rather substantial progress which we have already made and, more importantly, the great potential for additional progress. I also describe military problem areas. These, as you know, are many; but all are susceptible to solution assuming that political stability can be achieved, and that the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, remains intact and unified in its purpose. Under the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the Armed Forces is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the Armed Forces together, I address this matter first.

The Key Military Issue:

2. It seems to me there are certain conditions which must be met in order to preserve the structure and effectiveness of the RVNAF:

a. The officers of the RVNAF must be protected against purge, solely by reason of religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General Staff and the Commanders down the line, must be given some assurance that their careers and reputations will not be sacrificed for political expediency to the ambitions or interests of political or religious blocs.

b. The officers’ corps must be assured that its members will not be punished or expelled from the Armed Forces if they faithfully execute the orders of constituted authority in connection with the maintenance of law and order. They must be assured that their superiors will not accede to the arbitrary demands of pressure groups whose interest it is to destroy the discipline of the Armed Forces and to render ineffective the forces of law and order.

3. If I interpret correctly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these minimum conditions have been met. To the contrary, actions best calculated to destroy the morale, the unity, the pride and confidence of the Armed Forces have transpired in a manner which leads me to believe that a relative free hand has been given to those who aim to destroy the Armed Forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefect of Saigon and the Director of National Police, to name a few, appear to be blows directed at the heart of the security forces which stand between the Viet Cong and victory. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of the nation to accede to these demands. To the contrary, I am persuaded that acceptance is a formula for political and military disaster. While aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by military means alone, I am equally aware that without a strong military foundation no program will ever achieve victory. I am concerned that the Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance down the wrong road in dealing with its Armed Forces. I do not know whether the Armed Forces will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable, they will make a desperate move to regain power. Neither course is compatible with the objective we seek.

4. What follows is highly sensitive to the assumption that the provisional government can and will take extraordinary steps to restore morale and rekindle a unity of purpose within the Armed Forces.

Favorable Trends:

5. There is room for some optimism about the ability of the RVNAF to execute the military portions of the pacification program. Over the last few months there have been measurable increases in military means and improvements in operational methods; and more are in sight. Thus, the prospect is for a continuing rise in combat strength and tactical proficiency. To be sure, the VC are making gains in these same areas. However, we estimate that the rate of improvement of overall US/GVN military effectiveness will be much more rapid than that of the VC—barring, of course, great escalation of DRV support. There follow certain specifics on which this estimate is based.

6. Manpower and Morale:

a. The strength of the Armed Forces has been steadily increasing since May. The Divisions of III and IV Corps have just received a large, and badly needed, infusion of replacements. There are currently some 10,000 regulars in the National Training Centers and [are] reportedly doing well. In the revitalized volunteer program, results have been close to target. Intakes of conscriptees have only been 50% of program—but that program was overly ambitious. It is estimated that the 31 December goals will be achieved in early 1965.

b. From January forward, the High Command has developed and implemented a series of policies and programs aimed at improving the morale of the fighting forces. The most important are:

(1) Significant pay raises for the Regular and Regional Forces; and reasonable added emoluments for the Popular Forces.

(2) A new awards and decorations program featuring additional medals, decentralization, on-the-spot action, and good publicity of presentations.

(3) Establishment of a centralized promotion board for officers and senior NCO’s; and decentralization of promotions below grades E8 to Corps and Division Commanders.

(4) Greatly expanded dependent housing construction program (including some housing for Regional Forces dependents).

7. Strengthening of U.S. Advisory Effort:

a. Additional advisors are being introduced at the level of infantry and artillery battalions and armored troops. Also, additional advisors are being placed with the VNAF and VNN. These increases should serve to enhance substantially the overall military effectiveness of the RVNAF.

b. [paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. One C–123 squadron and one Caribou Company are also scheduled for deployment in order to provide more effective support for the larger advisory effort throughout the country.

8. Development of a Pacification Focus:

a. The Hop Toc Plan (Intensification of Pacification in the Saigon Area) has been accepted and is being implemented by the GVN. The Commander of III Corps has been designated as the coordinating authority and he is being assisted and supported by representatives of various civilian ministries. Emphasis has been given to the role of police; and their quality and numbers are being increased. Hop Toc has served as a vehicle for bringing about better coordination among the elements of the U.S. Mission in support of integrated pacification operations.

b. The GVN has ordered certain important troop redispositions which give substance to the priority accorded the Saigon area by the national plan. The 25th Infantry Division is being moved from II Corps into the provinces of Long An and Hau Nghia. This move should increase not only the troop density in this high priority area, but also improve management and direction of the pacification campaign.

c. Two additional 18 tube 105mm Howitzer Battalions have been organized and positioned with divisions supporting the pacification of priority areas.

9. Augmentation of Air Capabilities:

a. The VNAF will shortly have 4 fully combat ready A–1H squadrons (and has the capability to build up a total of 6 by 1 December 1965). In addition, by the end of December, the 2 Farmgate A–1E Squadrons will be at full operational strength with a total of 50 aircraft. (Present holding is 30.) All 4 VNAF H–34 squadrons will be trained and operational by the end of the year. The efficiency of the VNAF pilots is improving, particularly in night operations. The air-ground operations system is being steadily improved by better communications, improved training, and the provision of air liaison and control teams at regimental level. Finally, procedures, designed to maximize capabilities, have been developed for mutual cooperation and support between USAF, VNAF, and Army aviation.

b. Two additional transport helicopter companies will arrive in country by 1 December and they will enhance materially the mobility of ARVN and its capability to react to VC attacks.

c. Detailed procedures for quick reaction forces and counter-ambush tactics utilizing aircraft are being developed on a sound and practical basis.

10. U.S. Special Forces are being substantially increased by additional “A” teams; and supervision will be strengthened by the introduction of additional “B” and “C” teams. The present CIDG (Strike Force) strength of approximately 19,000 is programmed to increase steadily until the goal of 30,000 is reached in July 1965. This buildup should lead to greater success in disrupting infiltration routes across the borders and within SVN. In addition, these forces will figure importantly in operations against VC base areas.

11. Increased Effectiveness of Naval Forces:

a. Recent acquisition of 2 PCEs and early arrival of 4 PGMs will add considerably to the capability of the Sea Forces.

b. Thanks to expedited deliveries of 15 LCM8s, by end December the lift capability of the River Forces will have increased by 50% (from 6 to 9 Infantry Battalions). The balance (primarily patrol craft) of the additional River Assault Group, making a total of seven in country, will be on hand by July 1965.

c. The first keels of the additional 90 motorized junks will be laid next month. Beginning January, these junks will take their place in the coastal force at the rate of ten per month.

12. Intelligence agencies are exchanging information to a much greater degree and effecting better coordination at all levels down to and including province (sector). In this connection, all sectors have now established operations and intelligence centers; and most are functioning with some success.

13. The RVNAF logistic system is being partially reorganized to improve the logistic support of the paramilitary forces. The Administrative and Direct Support Logistic (A&L) Companies, until now integrated into the Regional Forces for their immediate support and that of the Popular Forces, are being incorporated directly into the ARVN logistic system, increased in strength, and extended to the subsector level by addition of logistic contact teams.

14. Communications are being further developed and are becoming more reliable. An alternate tropo scatter route is opening between Saigon and Pleiku. Southern Aid microwave circuits are now carrying military traffic. Advisors are equipped with mobile communications for field use and for greater flexibility of air-ground operations.

15. Finally, there are perceptible improvements in operational techniques and tactics throughout the fighting forces. For instance, I am encouraged by the better integration of the capabilities of the combined ground arms; by the increasing number of joint ground and naval operations; and by the effectiveness of night operations conducted by certain units. We are beginning to develop sound plans for disruption of War Zones C and D, by both ground and air operations. In this connection, our work with IR, and successful exploitation of this technique, convinces us that it represents a real potential for detecting and hitting the VC in terrain which heretofore has provided him sanctuary.

Problem Areas:

16. There are many problem areas under constant study and surveillance by my headquarters and subordinate elements. The major ones include:

a. Deficiencies in leadership training and development, particularly of junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Because this is of central importance, it is given special emphasis at all advisory levels, and particularly at the National Training Centers.

b. Development of capabilities for conscription and recruitment of manpower to meet the requirements of approved plans and programs.

c. Development of a viable paramilitary concept and force structure responsive to security and political requirements. The problems here are equitable division of responsibility between the national government and the local community; the preconditions for community commitment to local defense, and insuring that the two efforts are mutually reinforcing.

d. The determination of an optimum deployment and utilization of U.S. Special Forces. A comprehensive study and analysis of this problem is underway which will undoubtedly lead to the redeployment of a number of Special Forces detachments into the areas where they may be expected to be more productive in attacks against VC bases and in the interdiction of actual VC routes, both into and within the country. We are also studying the problem of the legal status of the CIDG forces. We are not yet sure of the impact of giving the CIDG Strike Companies a legal status similar to the Regional Forces.

e. Orientation and training of military units for their pacification tasks. A principal requirement is preparation of selected units for participation in various aspects of population and resources control operations. Another is the entire area of peasant/soldier relationships.

f. Tactical deficiencies. This runs the entire gamut. We continue to work to improve the rapidity and effectiveness of reaction forces; to develop methods of detecting and punishing VC ambushes; to make ARVN conscious of the essentiality of thorough ground reconnaissance and patrolling; to exploit and increase means of acquiring combat intelligence.

g. Continued efforts to improve coordination and integration of effort between the agencies of the U.S. Mission in support of pacification.

h. Lack of authority to disrupt the VC infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian corridor.

Status of Contingency Planning:

17. MACV planning for Special, Contingency, and Emergency actions by the U.S. and its Allies reflects more realism than at any previous time. This applies equally to Component and Supporting Commands.

a. Special OPlans 37 and 34A have been partially implemented. Planning for further operations is well ahead of anticipated authority to execute. CINCPAC is integrating all his Special Plans (33, 34, 99) for actions in SEAsia into OPlan 37 by 1 November. 34A, 37, and DeSoto actions are either limited or held in abeyance. Unilateral MACV and U.S. component planning is so well advanced that minimum reaction time to execute external combined air operations with RVNAF will be required. Combined US/RVN planning for limited surface operations in Laos has been authorized and is in process.

b. Contingency Plans for counterinsurgency (32 Ph II) and for countering DRV/ChiCom aggression (32 Ph III/IV) have been brought up to date by U.S. Component and ZI Commands. Counterpart SEATO plans are comparably up to date. U.S. unilateral plans will be more realistic when bilateral planning with the Thais is completed and when similar planning is effected wit-in the GVN.

c. The U.S. Emergency Evacuation and Security Plans (60–64, 61–62) have been thoroughly reviewed, refined, and steps taken to expedite and facilitate execution as may be directed.

d. Preliminary combined planning with GVN against DRV aggression resulted in tentative working level agreement on the nature of the threat and a concept of operations. It also surfaced a potentially serious problem in US/RVN command relationships. Continued combined planning with GVN was deferred as the.estimate of possible DRV reaction to the U.S. Golf of Tonkin actions failed to materialize.

W. C. Westmoreland²
General, United States Army

1. Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.