Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 1, 1964—3 p.m.

1467. CINCPAC for POLAD. Herewith my preliminary assessment of the new government in Viet Nam. It is very much subject to change as we move along.

1. General Khanh’s coup was obviously extremely disconcerting at first blush. We felt we were beginning to make real progress here with the Minh government-in the conduct of the effort against the Viet Cong; and in making General Minh into a popular figure. To overthrow a government which was progressing fairly satisfactorily seemed like a violent and disorderly procedure. In a country in which there are so few able men, it seemed a waste no longer to have the services of Minh, Don, and Kim. One wondered whether the coup was anything more than a crude, if skillful, power grab.

2. On second thought, however, one realized that Generals Don and Kim had never at any time foresworn the possibility of a neutral solution at what might seem to them to be the proper time. They had clearly been working, and working effectively, to strengthen the effort against the Viet Cong. But none of us had ever discussed what the next step would be after the Government of Viet Nam had reached a position of strength. Perhaps they did favor the French neutrality solution at that time. We had all concentrated exclusively on winning. Then I remembered an evening at which I had tended to belittle the effect in Viet Nam of what the French were doing and had said that it took more than mere words to stop a program on which the USA and GVN agreed. On looking back on it, I remember a stony look on General Don’s face and total silence when he should have said something. Finally, Ambassador D’Orlandi of Italy, who is one of the shrewdest men here, has thought ever since November that the Minh government was actively in support of General De Gaulle’s ideas and would turn overtly neutralist at proper time. He had said this to me several times and had made much of the fact that both Don and Kim were still French citizens, had been aides to Marshal de Lattre when he was here, and had actively worked in the French Secret Service in the past. Therefore Khanh’s opinion of the French intentions for neutralization coup might be correct.

3. Also the forward steps of history are often not made by one man or group of men. In U.S., for instance, the men who manage a successful campaign for the party nominations are often not the same as those who manage the election campaigns and they, in turn, are not the same as those who occupy the big posts after the election is won. Similarly, the group that ended the Diem regime and cleaned out much of its dry rot has rendered a service and now a new man has the job of winning the war.

4. Finally, in this country it rarely occurs to anyone that an election is an efficient or appropriate way to get anything important accomplished. The traditional way of doing important things here is by well planned, well thought out use of force. What General Khanh has done does not appear to have shocked the Vietnamese. From the Vietnamese who I see every day, that is, my cook, no. 1 boy, and driver, I hear expressions of admiration for the smoothness of the technique. However, numerous Vietnamese have expressed the opinion to members of my staff that it was a pity that General Minh was removed because he is a “good man”.

5. The real question is, therefore: Is Khanh able? Will he really supply some drive in connection with the effort against the Viet Cong? The evidence to date is that he is able, that he has got a lot of drive, and that he is not tolerating any delay. General Westmoreland was in Can Tho yesterday morning and reports that none of the officers there feels any lack of a definite policy or definite directive from on top.

1. [6.] If Khanh is able, his advent to power may give this country one-man command in place of a junta. This may be good. We have everything we need in Viet Nam. The US has provided military advice, training, equipment; economic and social help; and political advice. The Government of Viet Nam has put relatively large number of good men into important positions and has evolved civil and military procedures which appear to be workable. Therefore, our side knows how to do it; we have the means with which to do it; we simply need to do it. This requires a tough and ruthless commander. Perhaps Khanh is it.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House, JCS, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and CIA.