Office of the Historian

294. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, August 5, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Security Council Session on Tonkin Gulf Incident and its Implications—Action Memorandum

The first session of the Security Council dealing with the North Vietnamese attack on our vessels and our response could hardly have gone better today.2 After a procedural hassle in which the Deputy Soviet Representative, Morozov, made a pro forma protest at holding the session today without an opportunity to get instructions from Moscow, Ambassador Stevenson delivered the statement essentially as you approved it in the wee hours this morning.3

Despite his allegation of unpreparedness, Morozov replied to Stevenson immediately at some length and introduced a resolution requesting the DRV be heard. While fairly long, the Soviet statement seemed largely improvised and based on press accounts. By normal Soviet standards, Morozov’s statement was moderate. He pleaded lack of factual information about the incidents. He said, in general terms, that the Soviet Government expects the United States to put an immediate end to military activities against the DRV, adding that if this were not done, the United States “shall bear heavy responsibilities for the consequences.” One almost had the impression that he was not defending a fellow Communist regime, or at least not his kind of Communist regime.

The only other speakers delving into the substance of the issue were the UK and China, who fully supported our action as justifiable self-defense within the UN Charter.

The French Representative professed inability to speak on substance at this point and merely supported hearing of [from?] the DRV. However, like several other Council members, he believed this could and should be arranged without a formal resolution such as the Soviets had requested.

[Page 636]

Pursuant to your guidance,4 Ambassador Stevenson intervened a second time to say that the U.S. did not object to someone from Hanoi explaining their aggressive acts to the Council, but he pointed out that since these attacks were an extension of the war against South Viet Nam, a representative of the Republic of Viet Nam should also be invited.

The session concluded when the Council President, Nielsen of Norway, found a consensus in favor of scheduling no meeting for tomorrow and permitting the day to be used for consultations both on the manner in which North and South Viet Nam would be invited, and on the date of the next meeting.

In the absence of further hostilities or serious Communist threats the Security Council deliberation will resume, probably on Friday, in less of a crisis atmosphere and with a possibility that the sessions will be extended over a long period. We now need to consider with you where we want to go in the UN forum from here on in. The debate will inevitably broaden—particularly when and if representatives from Hanoi and Saigon appear. Now that we have discharged our reporting responsibility, we must reflect in longer range terms what if any UN action we can usefully seek to help cope with the vexing problems facing us in Southeast Asia. I very much hope that Ambassador Stevenson’s presence here tomorrow will provide an opportunity for us to review this question with you.

Late Bulletin: In a corridor conversation after the Council meeting, the Soviets have displayed uncertainty as to whether DRV would accept the invitation to appear in New York, even if it is tendered. Apparently, this feature of the Soviet role today was also improvised.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/UN. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Cleveland and sent to Rusk through S/S.↩
  2. Discussion of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin before the U.N. Security Council began at 3 p.m. on Wednesday August 5 and continued at the same hour on August 7. For records of the discussions at these sessions, see U.N. docs. S/PV .1140 and 1141. Ambassador Stevenson’s statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pp. 272–274.↩
  3. A draft of this statement, which is essentially the same as U.N. doc. S/PV .1140, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.↩
  4. See Document 288.↩