239. Memorandum From the Secretary of State 1s Special Assistant for
Vietnam (Forrestal)
to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)1
Washington, July 22,
1964.
I attach a preliminary summary made here of the anticipated deployments
of the additional military personnel requested by General Taylor for Vietnam.
[Page 559]
The picture is still incomplete, but I think you should note that
approximately 1,600 U.S. officers and enlisted men will be assigned to
the field, either with battalions or in district headquarters. This will
probably mean that American servicemen will accompany more Vietnamese
units into combat, increasing their exposure at the battalion level by
some 40%.
The presence of approximately five U.S. servicemen in each of the
critical 45 districts will also have an appreciable effect on exposure,
since their job would presumably be to accompany district military
forces into combat with the Viet Cong.
I think the issue we have to think about is whether it is better simply
to let casualties increase over the next few months or whether we should
anticipate the possibilities of such casualties by announcing in general
terms that we are increasing our advisory presence in the field.
My own inclination is still to do the latter, not by talking about
specific numbers, but rather by indicating informally to the press that
our civilian and military advisory effort is going to be increased as
the situation demands and that the result of this will probably be more
exposure of U.S. personnel.
Attachment2
Washington, July 21,
1964.
SUBJECT
- Additional Support for RVN
1. The request for additional military support from Ambassador
Taylor can be broken
down into three main categories. These are: advisors and special
forces in the field, logistic and combat support personnel, and
items of equipment. A general breakdown of the above categories
derived from incomplete information follows:
A. Advisory Personnel in the Field
(approximately 1600)
- Army
- Bn/Dist Adv—700
personnel
- Spec Forces—592 personnel
Battalion advisors will be increased from 3 per battalion to 5. A
district advisory detachment will be assigned to each of 45
districts in the 8 critical provinces. The breakdown will average 5
US personnel
[Page 560]
per district.
The duties of the personnel at district level and the exact number
in each specific district has not been determined. The increase in
the Special Forces contingent in Viet Nam will include a group
headquarters. The Special Forces increase will allow for extension
of the program on the border, increased guerrilla type operations
and will provide for full A detachments at all Special Forces camps
instead of 1/2 A detachments which are now in many Special Forces
camps.
- Navy
- Navy Adv Group—73 personnel
This increase will provide US Navy advisors with [to] greater number
of Vietnamese naval craft
- Marine Corps
- Navy Adv Group—8 personnel
This increase will provide additional Marine advisors to Marine
battalions in essentially the same number as additional Army
advisors provided to Army battalions.
- Air Force
- ALO/FAC—149 personnel
This increase provides Air liaison officers and forward air
controllers.
B. Support Personnel
(approximately 2100)
The additional personnel fall into three categories: additions to
MACV staff, additions to
logistic support activities and additions to combat support
activities. The bulk of the personnel will be provided to fly and
maintain the aircraft of one Air Force C–123 squadron (16 aircraft),
one Army Caribou company (16 aircraft) and 2 Army UH–1B helicopter
companies (total 50 aircraft). The majority of these personnel will
probably wind up in the Saigon-Tan Son Nhut area.
C. Items of Equipment
Major items of equipment required will be 16 USAF C–123 aircraft, and 106 Army aircraft to include
77 UH–1B and 16 CV–2B (Caribou) aircraft, 336 one-quarter ton
trucks, 478 radios and medical equipment for a ten-bed field
hospital.
2. In summary, the number of US advisors is nearly doubled at the
lower echelon and the number of locations of US advisors at the end
of communications and supply lines is nearly doubled. The increase
of personnel at the lower level coupled with the increase in
[Page 561]
helicopter units will
undoubtedly create a situation in which a great many more Americans
will be exposed to hostile fire than are at present.
