Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 29, 1964—8 p.m.

1431. For the Secretary of State from Lodge.

1. Believe that it would be healthy to tell General De Gaulle that we have many reports from particularly responsible sources about French neutralist plot, French money, and French agents, and request him to cease these activities.² Even though he would undoubtedly not comply with our request, it is well for him to know that we know what is going on, and that we suspect a secret agreement between him and the ChiComs. We should give him a sense of pressure. It is good tactics to start making a list of the things which he is doing which are against our vital interests. We can decide what use to make of the list later on. In a situation of this kind, we simply must start somewhere and then watch for the breaks. What is being rumored is too responsibly vouched for to be ignored.

2. As to General Khanh he is profoundly disturbed by his expectation of a strong move towards neutralism by the Government of Vietnam which he thinks will take place either tomorrow or Friday. He thinks if it is not vigorously crushed, it might succeed because of war weariness among the Vietnamese, including the Junior ARVN Officers. His other views are:

a. French inspiration in all of this he believes to be very strong. When pressed at my suggestion by Colonel Jasper Wilson, I Corps MAAG Adviser, he identified Generals Don, Kim and Xuan as talking publicly against neutralism, but as actually dealing with the French. He said that Kim and Don are former French OSS Officers, that they are still French Nationals, that they are “rabidly pro-French”, and added that General Dinh would go along for the money.

b. Khanh considers General Dinh [Minh?] to be an “honest patriot”, but he is “isolated”. But even he has sent money to France at Christmas time and has bought a home in France.

c. General Khanh, therefore, says “we want to be in a position of strength”. When he says “We”, he says he means himself, General Khiem of the III Corps, General Tri of the II Corps, 90 percent of the Army and 70 percent of the existing Civil Government.

d. He wants U.S. assurance that we are opposed to neutralism. In reply to this, Colonel Wilson pointed to my statement in the press which General Khanh said was totally satisfactory to him.

e. Then he wants U.S. assurance that we will get his family, who are now in Da Nang, out of the country, if required. I said that I could not give asylum anywhere but in the Embassy in Saigon, but that I would provide a plane in Da Nang provided General Khanh’s family could get to the plane.

f. He wants to use Colonel Wilson as his exclusive contact with us and has asked Wilson to stay in Saigon and, if possible, to obtain two [garble—radios?] so that he and Witson might maintain radio contact because of the insecurity of the telephone system. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

3. I believe all the above should be closely held on a “need to know” basis, and am limiting knowledge of this to Harkins and De Silva. My assessment is that General Khanh is considered to be the most capable general in Vietnam, that he controls the I and II Corps, which is the most orderly part of Vietnam, and that in addition to being a capable soldier, he has the reputation of being politically perspicacious.

While I have no great faith in Xuan, I continue to believe that Generals Don and Kim are patriotic Vietnamese. Therefore, what General Khanh says about them goes against my own deepest instincts. But, General Khanh’s reputation for perspicacity gives me pause, even though I hardly know General Khanh at all.

4. The allegations which he makes against General Don, specifically, are contrary to what I have understood to be the case. For example, I was told that General Don was the first Vietnamese in the French Army who publicly gave up the French Army and burned up his insignia. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

5. Khanh is contacting Wilson again later today, so there may be more to report.

6. I am not reporting anything to the GVN as yet.

7. General Harkins has seen this message and agrees.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30, 1964. Secret: Nodis. Received at 8:03 a.m.

2. In telegram 1413 from Saigon, January 28, Lodge made a similar suggestion as follows:

   “Department might consider telling Gen. De Gaulle that U.S. has secret information indicating that there are persons purporting to be under the strong influence of the French Government who are working directly against U.S. vital interests in Viet-Nam, and requesting him to call off his dogs.” (Ibid., POL 27 VIET 5)

   The Department responded in telegram 1138 to Saigon, January 28, 7:22 p.m., as follows:

   • “1. Our relations with De Gaulle at this time are such that approach to him would be fruitless.”
   • “2. We believe it would be worthwhile to sound out General Khanh on sources and reliability his information and also whether he had informed General Minh”.
   • “3. Would appreciate Country Team assessment significance these reports and what action you are taking in Saigon.” (Ibid.)