Office of the Historian

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, May 26, 1964—8:45 p.m.

2086. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Ref: Embtels 2284,2 2314,3 2319,4 and others. Your tireless efforts to bring about constructive attitudes among the bickering elements in Viet Nam are greatly appreciated here. It would seem that your work with Oanh, the Buddhist hierarchy, and the responsible Catholic leaders is already producing dividends.

However, we remain worried about two specific elements of discord which could be potentially troublesome. The first concerns the trial of the generals. It is still not clear to us here that the evidence which Khanh expects to introduce against General Kim and which might implicate General Minh is convincing and authentic. The very fact that much of it is being drawn from Diem documents would seem to make it difficult to sustain publicly. If you feel that there is no alternative to a trial in Dalat this week, you should urge Khanh to have it speedily and quietly completed and “elegant” disposition of the generals put into effect immediately. From our point of view, however, it would be a disaster if one of the results of this trial were to be a deposition of General Minh.5

Subsequent message coming tonight6 explaining we here in Washington believe that fuse is shortening with respect to North Viet Nam, both because of events in South Viet Nam and because of events in Laos. We believe it imperative therefore, that the maximum facade of national unity be maintained in Saigon at this time, to avoid the appearance of political debacle just at the moment when we are making major decisions of national and international significance.

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The other area which concerns us immediately is the activity of Vice Prime Minister Hoan and to a lesser extent, Minister of Information Pham Thai. We trust you will move in on them just as you have with Jack Oanh and just as effectively. The Dai Viet preoccupation with politics as usual could produce the worst sort of dilettante confusion in these days of crisis.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sullivan, cleared by William Bundy, and initialed by Rusk.↩
  2. Document 165.↩
  3. Document 175.↩
  4. In telegram 2319, May 26, Lodge reported that Khanh had accepted his suggestion that he talk to the three Vice Prime Ministers to explain to them “what is the proper role of a cabinet minister and their relationship with General Khanh.” Lodge told Khanh that he had already had a “heart-to-heart” talk with Oanh and informed him that cabinet ministers should not try to be “political personages in their own right.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)↩
  5. As reported in telegram 2332 from Saigon, May 28, Lodge made these suggestions to Khanh who stated that he hoped the Generals would admit their errors and then they could be pardoned and allowed to return to private lives. Although Khanh was surprised by Lodge’s suggestion that it was not the right time to depose Minh as Head of State, Khanh said he understood and would act accordingly. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)↩
  6. Apparent reference to the message Document 181.↩