Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

171. Draft Memorandum for the President Prepared by the Department of Defense¹

Washington, May 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Scenario for Strikes on North Vietnam

There are two alternatives for the United States in Vietnam—to try to improve the situation in the South without strikes on the North, or to try to improve the situation in the South with strikes on the North. Recent moves to extend Pathet Lao control over Laos and to intensify Viet Cong pressures in South Vietnam—as well as our belief that additional efforts regarding the Cambodian border, in Laos, and within South Vietnam will not by themselves prevent further deterioration there—caused us to consider strikes on the North in some detail.

The scenario below, in summary, provides simultaneously for military pressures on and political contacts with North Vietnam. (The military attacks would probably be by South Vietnamese, not Farmgate or U.S. aircraft initially, and would continue despite political communications, until there was clear evidence that North Vietnam had stopped its subversion of the South; the parties to the communications might soon include South Vietnam, North Vietnam, the U.S. and Communist China.) The military actions would start only after appropriate assurances were obtained of Congressional support for such actions.

SCENARIO

1. Stall off any “conference” on Vietnam until D-Day.

Mid-June

2. Intermediary (Canadian?) tell North Vietnam in general terms that U.S. does not want to destroy the North Vietnam regime (and indeed is willing “to provide a carrot”), but is determined to protect South Vietnam from North Vietnam.

D–19

3. Get Khanh’s agreement to start overt South Vietnamese air attacks against targets in the North (see D-Day item 14 below), and inform him of U.S. guarantee to protect South Vietnam in the event of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.

D–19

4. Squeeze Khanh to take certain steps (re imprisoned generals, re trial of Major Sy, re internal bickering) which we have been trying to get him to take and which would improve the image of his regime in U.S. Use as leverage the difficulties anticipated in gaining backing of Congress and American public for actions against the North.

Concurrently: An effort should be in process to strengthen the posture in South Vietnam. Integration of U.S. advisors into the military and civilian elements critical to pacification, down at least to the district level, might be undertaken. And encadrement or expanded training of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps by U.S. military personnel might be done.

D–18

5. President spell out plans (probably in specific terms) to Congressional leadership and lay groundwork for appropriate expression (probably in general terms) by Congress of its support.

D–17

6. Groundwork of item 5 followed by implementing steps, such as Presidential speech or message to Congress, to obtain appropriate Congressional expression of support.

D–17

7. Consult with Thailand and the Philippines to get permission for U.S. deployments. Ask them, plus U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan, for their open political support for the undertaking and for their participation in the re-enforcing action to be undertaken in anticipation of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation. (See Attachment A, on page 8, for suggested participation.) Talk to certain NATO allies. Start moves in the UN.

D–17

8. Release an expanded “Jorden Report,” including recent photography and evidence of the communications nets, giving full documentation of North Vietnamese supply and direction of the Viet Cong.

D–17

9. Start moving U.S. dependents.

D–16

10. Direct CINCPAC to take all preparatory actions necessary to ready the forces listed in Attachment B (at pages 9–12), making the necessary movements and completing the necessary plans on the assumption that strikes will be made on D-Day. This will include moving the B–57s to Saigon in augmention of Farmgate and may involve the initiation of low-level reconnaissance of North Vietnam if not previously begun.

D–10

11. Khanh makes speech demanding that North Vietnam stop aggression, threatening unspecified military action if he [it?] does not. (He could refer to a “carrot.”)

D–3

12. President informs U.S. public (and thereby North Vietnam) that action may come, referring to Khanh speech (item 11 above) and declaring support for South Vietnam.

D–1

13. Khanh announces that all efforts have failed and that attacks are imminent. (Again he refers to limited goal and possibly to “carrot.”)

D-Day

14. Launch first strikes. Initially, mine their ports and strike North Vietnam’s transport and related ability (bridges, trains) to move south; then against targets which have maximum psychological effect on the North’s willingness to stop insurgency. These latter targets would comprise those related to North Vietnam’s military power (e.g., POL storage, selected airfields, barracks/training areas, bridges, railroad yards, port facilities, communications) and those comprising their industrial assets. Initially, the strikes would be by South Vietnamese aircraft; they could then be expanded by adding Farmgate, or U.S. aircraft, or any combination of the three.

D-Day

15. Call for conference on Vietnam. State the limited objective: Not to overthrow the North Vietnam regime nor to destroy the country, but to stop DRV-directed Viet Cong terrorism and resistance to pacification efforts in the South. Essential that it be made clear that attacks on the North will continue (i.e., no cease-fire) until (a) terrorism, armed attacks, and armed resistance to pacification efforts in the South stop, and (b) communications on the networks out of the North are conducted entirely in uncoded form.

Responses to the above actions are estimated to be as follows:

To South Vietnamese Air Strikes—

North Vietnam: Has limited capability to deal with very low-level bombing even by A–1H aircraft. Would stir world opinion. Would request ChiCom air defense. Would probably increase ground strength in Laos (including in the Panhandle), and if the strikes began to hurt, would probably stimulate increased Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam.

Chinese: Would probably supply North Vietnam jet air defense and buttress their anti-aircraft capability. Would possibly (but not likely) undertake troop deployments along the South China border and, on a limited basis, into North Laos.

Soviets: Would probably do nothing more than make strenuous diplomatic efforts, including a probably successful effort to convene a UN meeting on Southeast Asia.

To Farmgate (B–57) Air Strikes—

North Vietnam: Same as above.

Chinese: Same as above except might attempt retaliatory air attacks against the South and somewhat more likely to undertake troop movements (above). Would make diplomatic-propaganda efforts to attribute attacks to U.S. and to label U.S. as aggressor.

Soviets: Same as above.

To Overt U.S. Air Strikes—

North Vietnam: Same as above except might be fearful enough to be willing to reduce its support of VC (perhaps also of PL), but would probably be prevented by Chinese.

Chinese: Would attempt to provide North Vietnam with air defense, but would hesitate to commit its limited air power against U.S. high-performance aircraft. Might attempt retaliatory air attacks against the South. Would probably move troops to South China border, and, on limited basis, into North Laos, and perhaps Burma and Thailand. Might engage in harassing actions elsewhere (e.g., off-shore islands). Not likely to send ground forces into South Vietnam unless North Vietnam is invaded by ground forces or China is bombed.

Soviets: Would intensify diplomatic efforts. Possibly take limited “threatening” military action and engage in harassing actions elsewhere (e.g., Berlin, Cuba).

Chinese/North Vietnamese Capabilities (if no interdiction):

In the wet season (May–November) they could initially deploy and logistically support in Southeast Asia, less Burma, about 9 infantry division-equivalents—some 95,000 troops. This force would probably be armor and artillery deficient. In the dry season, some 250,000 troops could be initially deployed, with more armor and artillery. The wet season forces are capable of starting their movement within one or two days; all could be across borders within 10 or so days. Wet season movement against light opposition would be at a rate of 6–8 miles per day (dry season movement at about 12 or so miles per day). The Chinese could simultaneously deploy up to 7 infantry division-equivalents into Burma. The North Vietnamese have no significant air force but have substantial AA capability (radar-controlled 57mm, 85mm and new 100mm guns), particularly against medium-height aircraft. The Chinese could deploy about 400 MIG-15, -17 or -19 jet fighters and about 150 jet light bombers, plus a few piston light bombers. The Chinese-North Vietnamese naval capability is limited, their major threat being Chinese PT boats and submarines (reportedly some 40 PT boats and 4–6 submarines).

16. The possible enemy military reactions described above are arranged below in ascending order of magnitude (and, probably, in descending order of probability). With respect to each such reaction, the possible U.S. military responses are considered:

a. Greatly expanded insurgency in South Vietnam (possibly with sizable infiltration by the North Vietnamese army).

(1) Redouble efforts with existing South Vietnamese forces augmented by U.S. ground forces prepositioned in South Vietnam or on board ship nearby.

(2) Intensify operations against North Vietnam; tell them that increased actions are in response to increased insurgency.

b. Drive toward Mekong by Pathet Lao with substantial North Vietnamese augmentation.

(1) Neither FAR/Neutral, Thai, nor prepositioned U.S. brigade in Thailand could deal effectively with this threat. Meeting the challenge on the ground might require an additional two or more brigades plus additional tactical air.

(2) Intensified operations against North Vietnam

c. Chinese “Farmgate-like” attacks on South Vietnam.

(1) Defend with prepositioned U.S. interceptor capability.

(2) Destroy on the ground their aircraft based in North Vietnam.

d. Overt Chinese Air Strikes.

(1) Same as c(1) above.

(2) Attack bases in China. May be necessary to augment U.S. air capability to gain air supremacy.

e. Overt North Vietnamese Invasion of South Vietnam and Laos accompanied by Chinese occupation of North Laos.

Step up air attacks, and provide the following forces (implementing OPLAN 32,² Phase III) in addition to the D-Day forces:

(a) Ground—	3 divisions
	1 reduced division
	1 division in reserve
	1 airborne brigade
	1 mechanized brigade

(b) Air—10 tactical fighter squadrons to Southeast Asia and Western Pacific

(Note: All of this force could be deployed by 45 days from “go.”)

f. Chinese/North Vietnamese invasion of Southeast Asia with up to 24 divisions (some 250,000 troops).

(1) Provide the following forces (implementing OPLAN 32, Phase IV) in addition to the D-Day forces:

(a) Ground—	4 divisions
	1 reduced division
	2 divisions in reserve

(b) Air—13 tactical fighter squadrons to Southeast Asia and Western Pacific

(c) Naval—1 attack carrier group

(Note: All of this force could be deployed by 60 days from “go.”)

(2) Alternatively, or additionally, deploy additional air and naval forces to the Western Pacific for the purpose of attacking mainland China with the objective of causing the Chinese to stop their aggression.

[Paragraph (3) (less than 1 line of source text) not declassified]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. X, Memos. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attachment A, “Possible SEATO Nation Contributions,” and Attachment B, “Major Forces Deployed and Alerted on D–12,” are not printed.
2. CINCPAC OPLAN 32–64, November 6, 1963, “Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia.” (Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Paper, Nov. 64, Vol. IV, JCS)