Office of the Historian

16. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon1

Washington, January 22, 1964—3:56 p.m.

[document number not declassified]. Ref CAS Washington [document number not declassified].2 Summary of Board of National Estimates study on probable reactions to various courses of action with respect to North Vietnam:3

A.
Communist reactions to most of these operations would be slight.
B.
Communist reactions would be sharper in cases of operations against Haiphong and railroads near borders of China. Reactions would be felt primarily in South Vietnam and Laos, but would not be so extreme as to change character of hostilities in those countries.
C.
Operations would not be likely to lead to appreciably increased Chinese Communist involvement in area. Neither would operations lead Soviets to believe that United States had made significant change in its policies.
D.
Proposed sabotage operations, taken by themselves, even if all were successful, would not convince the DRV leadership that their continued direction and support of insurgent activities in South Vietnam and Laos should cease.
E.
It is possible, however, that North Vietnamese Government might see these operations as representing significant increase in vigor of U.S. policy, potentially dangerous to them. If so, they would probably wish to halt new developments at early date and would therefore try to arouse international pressures for conference to settle problem of Vietnam before it expanded into more general conflict in Far East. In such case U.S. could probably expect little political support from its major allies.
F.
Principal determinant of DRV prosecution of war will not be damage suffered from such small scale operations, but course of war in South and degree of risk Hanoi believes will be involved in its prosecution.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Also sent to the Department of State Eyes Only for Hilsman, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Eyes Only for McNamara, to the JCS Eyes Only for Krulak, and to the White House Eyes Only for McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to Honolulu Eyes Only for Felt. Rusk initialed the source text.↩
  2. See footnote 2–4, Document 13.↩
  3. Reference is to a memorandum from the Office of National Estimates to McCone, January 2. (Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1964)↩