Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

145. Talking Paper Prepared for the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)¹

Washington, May 7, 1964.

SUBJECT

• General Khanh’s Conversation with Lodge

In the conversation which Lodge reported in his telegram No. 2108,² Khanh touched upon but did not fully explore a great many matters of fundamental significance affecting the future of US policy in Viet Nam. Because of the growing intimacy of US relations with the Vietnamese Government, it seems advisable that Secretary McNamara and Ambassador Lodge should take advantage of the Secretary’s forthcoming visit to Saigon to explore these matters in greater depth. The nature of our relationship with the Diem Government over the years has never permitted a full and frank exchange of US-Vietnamese views.

The Secretary and the Ambassador should try to find out why Khanh made the statements which Lodge has repeated. Does Khanh believe his current program will not succeed and does he believe that he is merely “prolonging the agony by this program. Although the issue which precipitated Khanh’s discourse was the question of a mobilization declaration, it is clear from Lodge’s report of the conversation and from his subsequent reply to our questions that Khanh is searching for some basic understandings with the US about the immediate and long-run future of his Country. He wants and needs to know more explicitly about the nature of our commitment.”

“In their public posture, the Vietnamese must naturally continue to assume the position that they ultimately wish the reunification of their Country. We, ourselves, can lend moral support to this ultimate objective. However, we must make clear to the Vietnamese and they must fully accept the fact that we do not intend to provide military support nor undertake the military objective of rolling back” Communist control in North Viet Nam. Our purpose is to force the North Vietnamese to cease their ambitions to extend their control both in South Viet Nam and in Laos. Complementary to that, our purpose is to provide enough strength in both South Viet Nam and in Laos that those countries will not offer temptations to the North Vietnamese as opportunities for subversion.

Once this is understood, Khanh should be assured that our commitment has no artificial limits. We are prepared to provide whatever assistance is needed in whatever form is considered most effective to assure the attainment of our objective. This commitment does not rule out the use of US force either directly or in association with South Vietnamese force against North Viet Nam. Our purpose in employing that force, however, should be understood by General Khanh in the context of its contribution to his ultimate success in gaining control over the population of South Viet Nam and eliminating the Viet Cong menace. In that sense, as Secretary McNamara has previously said publicly, such actions must be supplementary to and not a substitute for successful counterinsurgency in the South.

It, therefore, becomes important for us and for Khanh to gauge the ability of the South Vietnamese Government to move successfully in extending its protection to increasingly large portions of the population in South Viet Nam. We believe the program which Khanh has laid out in the “oil stain” pacification plan is sound. We believe that the actions he has taken in seeking to reorganize his military and paramilitary establishment for the execution of that plan are correct. We believe that the effort to decentralize authority down to the Corps and Province level represents steps forward which we have been long urging upon previous Vietnamese Governments. In brief, we believe that Khanh has made a good beginning and that shortcomings in the execution of his plan derive from the weakness of human and material resources rather than from its concept.

Fortunately, the provision of temporary human and material resources to assist Khanh and his Government are well within our capabilities. We have made available military advisors and military support units. We can make available additional civilian elements both as advisors and as practitioners who can act in support of Khanh’s Government.

Khanh has recently indicated his acceptance of the fact that the US advisory and assistance effort is fully integrated into his Government’s efforts and that the relationship should be an intimate one. We do not wish to seek command and would not accept command of either the military or civilian components of his Government even if he attempted to thrust it upon us. However, our personnel are willing and ready to become an integral part of his organization and to work as closely with his people as he wishes them to.

We recognize that the immediate question of mobilization and the problem of converting Viet Nam to a more active war footing pose serious questions for Khanh. We know that he does not have the administrative machinery to establish total mobilization in the sense of our own war time experience without at the same time hampering greatly his ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the countryside. We realize that, within the framework of Vietnamese experience, the countryside is already mobilized. The question of the war footing therefore becomes largely a matter of bringing the impression of the conflict more dramatically to the urban centers of population, and particularly Saigon.

We wonder whether such measures require many of the proposals which Khanh discussed. We would want the Secretary particularly to examine the need to eliminate the politicians from the Government, and whether there is any requirement at this stage to curtail civil rights beyond the current arrangements. We would want to know if there is any justification to consider the evacuation of American dependents, the diplomatic corps, and to plan for the evacuation of the total population of Saigon.

On the other hand, we believe there are many things which could be done. National service requirements for people in the city whose talents are not being currently used in the counterinsurgency program would be drawn upon. This is particularly true in the civilian sector where engineers, health workers, teachers, and general administrators could be recruited for work in the countryside. The pattern of the economic burden and the economic benefits would be consciously shifted. American assistance could be consciously and conscientiously headed toward the improvement of welfare in the country rather than the embellishment of luxury in the city. Taxation and other measures reflecting a contribution to the war could be brought to bear on the urban population so that the sense of “business as usual” would be dissipated.

As for the stance which Khanh should take toward Hanoi, it does not seem necessary at this time for him to begin threatening specific retaliatory military action against their interference in South Viet Nam. What is more important at this stage is that Khanh and his Government systematically and aggressively demonstrate to the world that the subversion in the South is directed from Hanoi. Tao much of the world’s population, including that of the US, has the impression that this is a “civil war” and a spontaneous uprising in the South. Khanh and his ministers must make it indelibly clear that the action is directed and controlled from the North. Khanh must send out capable ambassadors to the important capitals of the world to convince governments of this fact. He should realize that his own propaganda position throughout the world is weak and that the US alone cannot compensate for this weakness.

While he should tolerate no nonsense from Cambodia, he should recognize that his primary problem is with North Viet Nam and that the Viet Cong, who infest the Cambodian border reaches, are there because of the weakness of the Cambodian Government. Sihanouk is a nuisance but Khanh should not waste his energies or divert his attention by skirmishing either diplomatically or militarily. The real menace is in Hanoi and Khanh must constantly make that clear.

Similarly, Khanh must not be diverted by the annoyances that originate in Paris. Aggravating as these are to all of us, they do not represent a substantive menace. The French have no territory and no military power in Asia. They can only create annoyances, not policy. On the other hand, Khanh should keep a close surveyance [surveillance] upon French activities and should not hesitate to expel any French Nationals who are participating in actions contrary to interests of Viet Nam. Before contemplating the rupture of diplomatic relations with France, however, Khanh should estimate clearly what the consequences would be and whether the satisfaction he would receive from this step would be worth the difficulties he would experience.

Khanh’s claims to have brought two million people under his Government’s control in the past three months and his need to bring only five million more under his control seem overly optimistic to us. On the other hand, this does indicate that he has fastened on the right objective in his military and political efforts-the control and protection of Viet Nam’s population. We should use a discussion of these claims to work out with Khanh a manner in which a careful plotting of the progress of the counterinsurgency can be calculated. We should be able to do it graphically as the British did in Malaya so that we and the world will know that the Government is progressing in its fight against the Viet Cong rather than vice versa. A conviction of this progress would be the greatest morale factor that can be introduced in South Viet Nam and the greatest incentive for those who are sitting on the fence to join up in the war effort.

As far as the question of US ground forces in Viet Nam is concerned, Khanh should understand that we do not consider manpower is the limiting factor in the success of Vietnamese efforts. US ground forces deployed along the border of Viet Nam as he has suggested, would hardly make any contribution to the type of counterinsurgency in which he is engaged. In fact, such a deployment of forces would make the US look ridiculously impotent because we could expect that a continuing rate of incidents would take place behind those forces and in spite of their presence. He should be made to understand that we have the highest respect for the fighting quality of the Vietnamese soldier and that his need is for organization, leadership and executive control not for personal courage. Insofar as the US can supply or inspire those qualities we stand willing to do so. The basic and enduring strength, however, must be implanted in the Vietnamese military and civilian hierarchy.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Nodis. There is no indication on the source text that Sullivan was the drafter, but there is on an earlier draft. (Ibid.)
2. Document 136.