Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

143. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President¹

Saigon, May 7, 1964—7 p.m.

1. I have been asking myself whether another Dien Bien Phu is possible in South Vietnam today; that is a really big defeat in 1964 which would end the struggle and bring Communist victory, as Dien Bien Phu did in 1954.

2. I do not anticipate a concentration of GVN troops comparable to the concentration of French troops in 1954 and therefore do not expect a wholesale defeat of the GVN army.

3. But I do think a massive Communist success is possible which could end the war as a Communist victory if the US were not to react promptly. I think it may be possible for North Vietnam to seize the northern provinces. The Viet Cong have a very strong hold on Quang Ngai now. In this regard, see General Westmoreland’s statement at Mission meeting—Embtel 2142.² If there were no US reaction to such an event, there is no doubt that morale would drop to the bottom in Saigon.

4. I assume that if this were a clear-cut invasion by the North Vietnam army in uniform with flags flying that the US would react immediately.

5. But we must expect that NVN is crafty enough to fuzz the whole operation so that in Washington it will not look clear-cut. Whether a lot of men dressed as farmers will swarm in through the forests and suddenly appear and how it would be done, I do not know. A plausible effort might be made by “agrarian reformers” to invite us to leave. It is under such circumstances as these that a foothold at Cam Ranh Bay—see my tel 2101³—could be valuable.

6. The above unpleasant possibility is something you should have in mind because it may create a situation in which quick action by the US Government could actually make all the difference between either holding or losing South Vietnam.⁴

Lodge⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 2144 from Saigon, which is the source text. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 002655.
2. At the regular weekly Mission meeting on May 7, Westmoreland raised “the possibility that General Giap, whom he described as a master strategist whose stock in trade is deception, might secretly build up a formidable Viet Minh force just north of the DMZ, perhaps in Laos along Highway 9. Then, if another coup were to occur or the Geneva Accords were to collapse, such a force could move quickly to seize the northern provinces, including the city of Hue which is a cultural and religious center of great importance, and perhaps the entire I Corps area. The GVN would then be confronted with a very serious situation, since such an overt move would certainly be complemented by the more than adequate guerrilla force available in the South.” (Telegram 2142 from Saigon, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Document 135.

4. Because President Johnson was away from Washington on May 7, McGeorge Bundy sent the following response to Lodge in White House telegram CAP 64139, May 7:

   “The President will see your 2144 promptly, but in his absence I can assure you that he will share your view that any NVN attempt to achieve rapid control of important SVN territory would present most serious contingency for U.S. President knows you and your advisors will keep Washington fully informed if hard evidence of any buildup aimed at northern provinces is developed. In meantime I am sure you and McNamara and Taylor will discuss contingency planning already undertaken here and any other we should be doing in the light of this possible new threat.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

5. Telegram 2144 bears this typed signature.