Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

137. Memorandum for the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 4, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Lodge’s Conversation with Khanh Re Mobilization and Pressure on the North²

It is suggested that you raise the report of Lodge’s conversation with Khanh during the luncheon session with the President and Secretary McNamara.³ Khanh has touched upon several points which are difficult to answer by telegram and it would seem that the best means of bringing this conversation into focus would be to have McNamara prepared to discuss it with Lodge upon his arrival in Saigon May 12. Therefore, if your luncheon discussion produces a consensus we could send Lodge a brief message from you stating that McNamara will raise the matter with him.

Khanh’s motivations in raising these points are not entirely clear. However, coming through his talk there is a quite clear sense of his conviction that he must move soon to take action against the North. He has swung around to this position more forcibly in the course of the past months and this conversation is by far the most positive exposition of that conviction.

Secondly, there may be some sense of pique that we are pushing him too actively to declare national mobilization and to put the country on a war footing. Khanh seems to be telling Lodge that mobilization of the type which has been suggested to him would make sense only if there were to be action against the North; and in time that action would make sense only if the United States would fully support it.

Thirdly, and perhaps most disturbingly, there is a certain sense of despair and perhaps some trace of panic in Khanh’s presentation. His plea for an attack on the North, and particularly his request for the intervention of American ground forces are inconsistent with his statements that the current activity of the GVN is reclaiming population which had previously been lost to the Communists.

Khanh therefore seems badly in need of some type of reassurance. This could take one of several forms:

a. We could encourage him by saying that we will support him in action against the North, and agree to initiate joint planning with him.

b. We could assure him that we will support action in the North, but stipulate a specific date before which we would not consider such action politically feasible.

c. We could suggest a phased mobilization program which would move somewhat more gradually toward the more Spartan measures which Khanh has outlined, making it clear that these would be moving toward a basis for more vigorous action to the North, but at the same time making it clear that an improvement on the ground in the South was an essential element to progression through these various phases.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VIII. Top Secret. There is no indication on the source text who sent this memorandum to Rusk, but it was apparently from William Bundy. A copy of the memorandum is in Department of State, Bundy Files, Special Papers.
2. See Document 136.
3. At the luncheon meeting on May 5, beginning at 12:55 p.m., Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Taylor, and McCone discussed seven foreign policy items of which Khanh’s suggestion of a war footing for South Vietnam was the first. Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary, and memorandum to Rusk, May 5; Department of State, President’s Reading File, Lot 74 D 164) No record of the meeting has been found.