Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

13. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency¹

Saigon, January 20, 1964.

CAS Saigon 3902. Ref [document number not declassified].² Following are Ambassador Lodge’s comments on ref.

1. Your [document number not declassified]. Herewith my comments as requested your paragraph 4.

2. I welcome exerting increased pressure on North Vietnam with the double aims of bringing about a cease-fire by VC and Pathet Lao and the neutralizing of North Vietnam, turning it into an oriental Yugoslavia. I do not think it profitable to try to overthrow Ho Chi Minh, as his successor would undoubtedly be tougher than he is.

3. We should have it clearly understood that GVN intensifies its efforts as our operations start in accordance with a definite commitment approved by MACV.

4. Reur paragraph 7,³ I propose to bring GVN into planning process by personally explaining to General Minh the purpose and general types planned operations. In this connection General Minh likely to ask U.S. estimate of actions North Vietnam (NVN) might take in retaliation. I intend to ask General Minh for GVN estimate of possible NVN retaliatory actions in any event, but would appreciate estimate of interdepartmental committee having in mind possible actions against American employees and dependents.

5. Assume that actual operations will be accompanied by supporting political actions designed to leave no doubt in minds of NVN leaders (and their Chinese mentors and Soviet associates if any) that these operations are merely first phase and examples of type of treatment NVN can expect if they persist in their support of indirect aggression in SEA. In this regard, we hope that our pressure program could be carried out in a manner which would: (a) permit Ho Chi Minh to give ground without losing face; and (b) not give appearance of a direct challenge to the entire Communist bloc. Our strong preference therefore is to maintain the maximum possible deniability on part of ourselves and GVN (paragraph 3 reftel).⁴

6. In general we believe the sooner the NVN leaders realize they are dealing with the U.S. (albeit from discreet sources) the better. Further, NVN would tend to lose less face in giving ground to U.S. rather than to SVN.

7. As a related subject, we wonder whether it is not possible to inject a carrot along with the stick at some later stage in the pressure program. The carrots might be withdrawal of some U.S. military personnel (assuming we are going to do it in any case) and some SVN rice to assuage NVN’s obvious agricultural difficulties. Depending on progress of events, we may be able to gain some advantage from anticipated U.S. action (i.e., withdrawal of some U.S. military personnel), which otherwise would not be matched by any corresponding actions on part of NVN.

[Numbered paragraph 8 (2–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

9. General Harkins concurs.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent by the CIA to the Department of State Exclusive for Hilsman, to the Pentagon Exclusive for Krulak, and to the White House for McGeorge Bundy. Rusk’s initials appear on the source text. No time of transmission is on the source text.
2. This joint State/Defense/CIA telegram, January 16, personal for Lodge, Harkins and the CIA Station Chief, outlined the manner in which the President created an interdepartmental committee representing the Departments of Defense and State and the CIA to select from the comprehensive 12-month plan for increased pressure against North Vietnam “those operations which are most feasible, and which promise the greatest return for the least risk.” In this telegram, the three agencies stated that the President had approved execution of the plan commencing February 1, and they asked for comments from Lodge, Harkins, and the Station Chief. (Ibid.)
3. Paragraph 7 of the telegram suggested that the covert use of Vietnam’s best military forces and their military resources required that the Vietnamese Government be brought into the planning on a “secure” and “most discreet basis.”
4. Paragraph 3 of the telegram noted that the actions contemplated could be plausibly denied by the United States and that deniability by the Vietnamese Government, while more difficult, should be attempted. In some cases Vietnamese acknowledgment of complicity might be appropriate and the message requested the recipients’ views.