128. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam

The attached memorandum from Bill Sullivan results from my request for a status report on our responses to Lodge’s suggestions.

Bill’s memorandum is somewhat cryptic, because the actions which Lodge has suggested have been incorporated into a political-military scenario, which is now in the hands of the Joint Chiefs. I sent you yesterday the latest version of the political half of the scenario.2

I would suggest that the President see the narrative part (not the charts) of the scenario and consider whether it isn’t time for you and him (and perhaps Rusk and McNamara) to discuss future moves in Vietnam at one of your lunches. The point to keep in mind is that almost any of the actions suggested by Lodge, but not yet implemented, could start a chain of escalation for which we are not yet prepared.

Mike

Attachment

Memorandum by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)3

There are three categories of action in which Ambassador Lodge has made certain recommendations which we have not as yet fulfilled. These are (a) cross border probes into the Laos corridor; (b) hot pursuit into Cambodia; and (c) tit-for-tat raids on North Vietnamese targets in the event of terror against Americans.

All of these recommendations have involved certain contingencies. For example, the tit-for-tat suggestion was first made as part of a political-military scenario which involved covert diplomatic contacts [Page 272] with the North Vietnamese, offers of food and partial withdrawal of US forces, etc., etc. The Cambodian hot pursuit suggestion was in the context of further action by Sihanouk detrimental to the legal status of the Saigon Government. The operations into Laos were recommended if we considered current intelligence operations unsatisfactory.

Therefore, although we have not responded positively to these proposals from Lodge, it should be understood that the proposals themselves were in one measure or another designed to be part of a larger schematic view of our political and military posture in Southeast

Asia as a whole. On the other hand all of Lodge’s recommendations have in one form or another been incorporated into a planning document which has been roughed out on the political side here in Washington and is currently under study in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine its military consequences. Therefore. we have given positive consideration to these recommendations.

The basic question of course is whether the planning document can be considered a “live” plan directed toward ultimate accomplishment in the forseeable future, or whether it is a contingency arrangement which will always remain on the shelf. If it is the former, we can categorically state that we are acting on all of Lodge’s recommendations. If it is the latter, that statement would need considerable qualification.

W. H. Sullivan
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos. Top Secret.
  2. Reference is to an April 20 draft of a three-part political/military scenario with the narrative portion also summarized in tabular form. (Ibid.) For an earlier draft, see the attachment to Document 102.
  3. Top Secret.