Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, January 11, 1964—3:59 p.m.

1055. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Joint State/Defense/Aid Message. In elaboration of brain trust concept suggested by General Minh and accepted by President Johnson (our 1000),² it is our view here that high-level advisors may be essential key to instilling ingredient most sorely lacking in GVN: efficiency and urgency of action. Minh’s invitation to establish brain trust and readiness to accept US advice and cooperation which it connotes should be seized upon as avenue to increase guidance of new government along proper lines in effective conduct of war. What we have in mind is advisors working directly with Vietnamese officials on day-to-day implementation of agreed policy lines. They would, of course, be completely responsible to you for policy guidance and would in no sense supplant your policy role with top GVN officials nor would they infringe direct and comprehensive military advisory role of COMUSMACV. On contrary they would be continuously implementing policy Country Team urges on GVN and would in effect be extension your arm into key sectors GVN by maintaining closest possible liaison between Country Team and key GVN officials. We believe that this new link should reinforce, not compete with, influence of Country Team members. We recognize such advisors must operate behind the scenes and that their persistent prodding must be done with great tact. We believe this can be done and it is essential to do it to reverse war trend.

Specifically, we think it would be useful to begin by assigning three senior experienced full-time advisors (plus necessary assistants) to work with top levels of GVN. One would be senior FSO working with General Minh and Premier Tho on broad program implementation; second would be ranking AID official working with GVN counterinsurgency and economic officials, especially those dealing with rural programs; and third would be high ranking military officer provided by COMUSMACV to represent him in working with Minister of Defense and Joint General Staff particularly on coordination military policy with other related programs. (In economic area this would not supplant joint committee work in which Kaysen and Silver involved.) Other advisors might be added later depending on experience we gain in these operations.

We envisage these advisors as team subordinate individually to their respective Country Team principal but working closely with each other and advisors who are already assigned within, for example, Joint General Staff, as well as with high-level Vietnamese officials whom they are advising. Primary task this team will be to advise and assist GVN in coordinating policies and programs related to war effort, in issuance implementing instructions and funding for policies and programs to lower echelons, and in following up to help insure action is taken at lower echelons. They would necessarily require full support of Embassy, USOM, and MACV. We would not expect them to prepare policy or technical proposals; we would expect them to contribute to proposals developed by the Country Team elements and to help gain effective Vietnamese implementation. Examples include coordination of plans for military clear-and-hold operations with follow-up program for protection villagers, assistance in preparation of directives for this follow-up program (whether it be strategic hamlet program or some modification of that program), amnesty program and Minh’s domestic Peace Corps proposal. These advisors will, in other words, assist top-level GVN officials and Country Team members by helping to serve as coordinators and expediters of actions to implement policies decided upon by GVN officials.

We contemplate that American assistants to these officers be Vietnamese language officers (like Helble and Rosenthal) to maximum extent possible to achieve optimum efficiency. Both advisors and assistants should have office space in GVN buildings close to officials they advise.

We know that extent of direct US involvement envisaged in concept set forth here may be somewhat greater than General Minh had in mind in suggesting the brain trust idea. If we can put forth right people, however, we think it likely that he and other generals will welcome this further evidence of our determination to do everything possible to help them. We think advantages from our point of view quite clear. Unless you or Harkins find difficulties with concept, you are authorized to discuss it with General Minh at early opportunity.³

You should ask General Minh whether he likes this suggestion or whether he has different ideas. Also what individuals GVN would like to have for these advisory portions. We believe it desirable that American advisory personnel working in close contact with Vietnamese officials as set forth above should be known to and held in high regard by GVN. If this not possible, they must at very least have strongest endorsement of Washington.

With regard to senior political, military and economic advisors, we would expect them to be at level of FSO or FSR 1 or 2 and Brigadier General and assigned permanently.

Re your 1257 further message will be forthcoming.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Mendenhall; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Hilsman, Poats (in draft and substance), William Bundy, and Krulak (both in draft); and approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. IV, pp. 745–747.
3. In telegram 1304 from Saigon, January 14, Lodge commented in response that the Vietnamese Government was loath to follow up on the brain trust idea and refused to treat it as a businesslike proposal. Lodge doubted whether the government “would like the idea of high-powered Americans on an “opposite number” basis in adjacent offices to them all through the government” Lodge thought such a scheme had a “colonial” touch. Instead, he recommended advice in a purely advisory, friendly basis through existing channels. Lodge maintained that American advisers would sap the determination of the Vietnamese to act responsibly on their own. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. In telegram 1052 to Saigon, January 10, the Department “heartily endorsed” the Embassy proposal in telegram 1257 from Saigon of setting up a domestic Vietnamese peace corps organization drawn from the youth and students of Saigon (see footnote 2, Document 6). This organization could aid in getting the government’s message across to the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam. Equally important, the Department contended, was the creation of trained resident village and hamlet leaders to carry on the work between visits of the Vietnamese peace corps. The Department also considered that Long An would make an excellent “showcase” for such a program and suggested consideration of a radio contact/airborne troop carrier system to defend Long An’s villages and hamlets from Viet Cong attack. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S)