Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

100. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 30, 1964.

SUBJECT

• South Vietnam

Apropos of our discussion this morning,² my thinking is as follows:

Although we have paid a lot of attention to the personnel and organization of the new government in Saigon, we have done very little to improve our own organization there. It is a full five months since the November 1st coup and two months since General Khanh’s coup. Most of the experts seem to be agreed that this dry season is critical in reversing the declining trend in the war we have been observing during the past year. Unfortunately, we have now let more than half that season go by without having shaken ourselves down in Saigon.

The warning indicators are still flashing. The MACV report³ which I have shown you over the week-end does not by itself prove that we have a military staff in Saigon inadequate for the job. All one can say (and this only at the risk of violent reaction from the uniformed side of the Pentagon) is that such a report which places such emphasis on military activities so similar to those which failed the French, suggests a lack of understanding of what the war is about.

It is extremely difficult, and probably irresponsible for civilians to second-guess military field commanders; and it is even more difficult for them to propose new tactics. Beyond recommending that Roger Trinquier’s book⁴ be made required reading, there is not much we can do from here. So, what it comes down to is that we simply must get out to Saigon our most imaginative military commanders and civilian administrators. This we simply have not done.

Both Bill Bundy and Bill Sullivan spoke to McNamara about this problem in Honolulu on their way to Saigon. The best Bob could offer was that he would consider relieving General Harkins no sooner than April 15 and not later than June 30. I spoke to Bob myself before the Forrestal Award Dinner, and he then told me that he plans to move Harkins when Lodge leaves. Bob thinks that Lodge will inevitably succumb to temptation in the month of June, resign, and return here for the convention. His reasons for not wanting to move Harkins now are:

a. We can’t afford a change in the American organization until the Khanh Government is settled down.

b. Khanh and Harkins get along very well.

c. General Westmoreland has not been there long enough yet to be able to take over.

Sullivan believes, and I agree with him, that these three reasons merely cover Bob’s fundamental problem, which is that Max Taylor and the Chiefs will not agree to a change at this time. Sullivan is also somewhat concerned about Westmoreland. He thinks he is an able, flexible officer, but extremely ambitious and anxious to take over the complete direction of the war from the Ambassador. Sullivan is worried that unless Westmoreland gets into the habit of working for a powerful figure, he will tend to dominate any new ambassador we send out, if and when Lodge returns. For this reason Sullivan thinks it is important that there be an overlap and that any new ambassador be a particularly powerful figure.

Our record on the civilian side is not any better. You know the problems we have had finding an AID Director. On top of that, there is still no civilian in Saigon who is acting as Chief of Staff for the war in the countryside. The original theory was that Dave Nes, the DCM, would do this. But I am still doubtful whether he can do this job at all, and certainly not within the time we have left. Dave has not had experience in an insurgency situation and, like most senior Foreign Service Officers, is bound to devote more of his time to the diplomatic and housekeeping problems of the Embassy and the vast American community in Saigon. For some months I have felt that another man at Nes’s level was required-a man who would be Lodee’s Chief of Staff for coordinating all U.S. activities, military and civilian, in support of the war in the field. The ideal I have in mind is someone like Desmond Fitzgerald, and there are probably some other people like him in the CIA and perhaps in the DOD. I attach a memorandum I wrote to Bob McNamara before he went out on his trip, a copy of which I have sent to John McCone; but so far I have gotten absolutely nowhere with it.⁵

I had a long talk with Dave Bell about his new Mission Director, during the course of which he exposed his own theory that since the AID Agency did not actually have full responsibility for the effort against the Viet Cong, he did not see how an AID official could take over the whole job. I had been trying to convince him of the importance of getting a man like [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. I think that Dave may be right; but the result as of the moment is that there is no one in the AID Mission in Saigon, and no prospects for finding anyone who can even do a first-class job in running the AID part of the Strategic Hamlet Program.

Finally we must face the likelihood that Lodge might leave and start looking for a new ambassador. This is going to be an immensely difficult job, since we need a man with somewhat inconsistent qualities. He has to be prestigious enough to retain civilian control of the total U.S. effort, and at the same time he has to know enough about the theory of counterinsurgency at least to be able to encourage the useful actions of the military and discourage the self-defeating ones. What I really would like to see the President do would be to appoint you and Bob as a committee of two to produce the top level personnel and effect the changes in Saigon. You could both call on the two departments, the Agency and the AID people, for nominations and suggestions; but somehow there must be a place where the brutal decisions are taken and made to stick.

Chet Cooper is completely right. This is a Greek tragedy, and the curtain is slowly descending.

MVF

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Luncheons with the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. I, Part 2. Secret.
2. See Document 99.
3. See footnote 2, Document 99.
4. See footnote 3, Document 99.
5. Not found